Is This Musharraf's Final Chapter?

By Aryn Baker / Islamabad

Like a Shakespearean tragedy, the final chapter of General Pervez Musharraf's reign began with an echo of the original sin of its first pages: the October 1999 coup by which he overthrew Nawaz Sharif, the democratically elected Prime Minister. Sharif's highly publicized return from exile on Sept. 10 lasted just four hours; Musharraf had him deported again. But if the general's first expulsion of Sharif--then an unloved head of an inept and corrupt government--brought Musharraf to power amid widespread acclaim, the second may well hasten the President's downfall.

Musharraf's early departure is not guaranteed. He could drag things out by declaring martial law, but that would be highly unpopular, even within the military, which doesn't want a confrontation with an angry populace. Sharif's party faithful, undaunted by their leader's absence and the arrest of many of his aides, are planning mass protests. They are likely to be joined by a wide swath of Pakistani society, from Islamist parties to liberal lawyers and professors. Al-Qaeda and other extremist militants in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, meanwhile, are capitalizing on popular discontent to reinvigorate their jihad against Musharraf's regime: terrorist attacks, once confined to tribal areas in the north, have spread across the country. Some of Musharraf's political allies and fellow military officers are backing away, and his enemies sense his vulnerability. "This is the death spasm of the general's rule," says Supreme Court lawyer Iftikhar Gilani. "He can't survive anymore as a political entity."

The most immediate threat to Musharraf comes from the Supreme Court, which can block his bid to remain in power by enforcing a constitutional ban on elected officials holding military rank. Musharraf previously got around that by obtaining an exemption from tame judges. That exemption expires on Nov. 15, and Supreme Court justices, who resent the general for trying to sack an independent-minded top judge earlier this year, are unlikely to give him another. If Musharraf sheds his uniform, they can block him with another constitutional provision: retired soldiers must wait two years before standing for office.

This is all alarming news for the Bush Administration, which regards Musharraf as a key ally in a highly unstable part of the world. The Administration is backing a power-sharing deal with another exiled former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, as the best way for the general to regain popularity. But Bhutto's own standing has plummeted since she started dealing with the dictator. Now negotiations are stalled over her demands that he resign as head of the military, drop corruption charges against her and give up the power to dissolve parliament. U.S. officials predict Bhutto's popularity will spike if she returns to power in an alliance with the general because she'll be seen as a counterweight to Musharraf. "The conventional wisdom is that would be enough to steady her numbers," says a U.S. State Department official.

U.S. officials are counting on Musharraf to retain control over the military--Pakistan's most powerful institution--even if he gives up his uniform to keep the presidency. "The hope is that Musharraf will continue to influence policy in the war on terror as President," says the official. That may be wishful thinking. Lieut. General Hamid Gul, a former head of Pakistani intelligence, says the Americans are "naive" for thinking that Musharraf will have any clout once he steps down as military chief or that Bhutto will be able to control the army as Prime Minister. "The Pakistani army is a one-man show," he says. "Whoever is chief gets to call the shots ... no civilian leader can tell them what to do."

If a Musharraf-Bhutto deal were in fact to leave both leaders discredited and weakened, then U.S. interests in Pakistan--continued help in the war against al-Qaeda, protection of the country's nuclear arsenal and the strengthening of the moderate majority against the extremist fringe--might be better served by the man both leaders despise: Sharif. The Bush Administration is skeptical. The State Department official describes Sharif as "a player with a mixed record." As Prime Minister, he had a good relationship with the Clinton Administration, allowing the U.S. in 1998 to use Pakistani airspace for missile attacks against al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan. He also invited the CIA to train Pakistani commandos to capture Osama bin Laden: 60 soldiers started training, but the program was aborted when Sharif was deposed. Sharif's record in other areas is less than reassuring. His two stints as Prime Minister were marked by mismanagement and corruption. In 1998 he tested a nuclear bomb, earning the country devastating economic sanctions that were not lifted until 2001. He dismissed a Supreme Court chief justice--shades of Musharraf--and a President, and he promoted Islamic law. A senior Bush Administration official says Bhutto's party "has historically been more popular and closer to the moderate center than Nawaz's party."

What Sharif does have going for him is a groundswell of public support. Unofficial polls conducted by government agencies show that even before his deportation, Sharif's numbers were climbing. Many of the groups that demonstrated across the country this summer when Musharraf tried to sack the Supreme Court justice have thrown their support behind Sharif. As a center-right politician, he also has close ties to religious parties, which would allow him to build a broad coalition. He lacks support in Washington, but as Musharraf and Bhutto continue to fade, that could--and should--change.

with reporting by Massimo Calabresi / Washington