Pakistan's New Odd Couple?

By Simon Robinson / Islamabad

Even in a country with a history of fierce political rivals coming together for their own survival, the idea of a union between Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf and exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto seems preposterous. After all, they hate each other with an undisguised passion. She has a phobia about military dictators--her politician father was executed by one--and has described General Musharraf as an incompetent ruler who indulges in "puerile brinkmanship." In his view, she and Nawaz Sharif, another former Prime Minister, epitomize the weak, deeply corrupt democracy he overthrew in a bloodless 1999 coup. Just the mention of their names can spoil his mood; Musharraf once told a television interviewer that he would like to "kick them."

But there was the general, traveling secretly by special plane to Abu Dhabi to meet Bhutto in late July at one of the royal palaces and talk about sharing power--a meeting that both continue to deny. It was an act of desperation by a man the U.S. has long regarded as an irreplaceable ally in the war on terrorism. Opinion polls show that the majority of Pakistanis want Musharraf out, and his crude attempts to control the judiciary have backfired and created new foes. Taken together, these factors could undermine his bid to extend his rule beyond his current tenure, which expires in November. Even some within Pakistan's powerful army, which Musharraf still heads, are beginning to grumble.

All this bodes ill for the Bush Administration's hopes that the general will keep his country together, safeguard its nuclear weapons and help combat a resurgent Taliban and al-Qaeda. Washington knows the general needs help, which is why it has covertly encouraged a Musharraf-Bhutto deal, with the goal of rallying the moderate majority. "There's an absence of any other people who could be seen as an effective cohering force inside Pakistan," says an Administration official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "The interest we have had is in trying to bring together the middle of Pakistani society to refocus efforts against the extremes." The theory is that Bhutto's personal popularity would bolster Musharraf's weakening support and her party's strength in Parliament could help him get re-elected. In exchange, he would name Bhutto as Prime Minister and drop corruption charges against her and her family.

The alliance would probably pursue policies not radically different from those of the present government. Musharraf would presumably supervise military and security matters, including the fight against militant groups, while Bhutto might be responsible for more political matters, like reforming the thousands of madrasahs, or religious schools, around the country.

But it is far from certain that Musharraf and Bhutto can come to a working agreement. Even if they can set aside their mutual antagonism and some early sticking points--like her insistence that he give up his military uniform--they face massive legal obstacles. For instance, it's up to the Supreme Court to decide whether the charges against Bhutto can be dropped, and whatever influence Musharraf may have had with the court has faded badly since his botched attempt this year to fire a top judge. It's entirely plausible that the court could disqualify him from seeking re-election by citing a law that bars active military officers from holding political office.

For all those reasons, the general has not yet given up on his Plan A for survival: imposing martial law. He came within a whisker of invoking emergency powers on Aug. 9; it took two phone calls from U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to talk him down. Martial law would plunge Pakistan into political turmoil, further alienate the moderates and hurt U.S. interests in the region.

Rice didn't mention Musharraf's sharing power with Bhutto in her phone conversations with him. But Bhutto has been working hard behind the scenes to shore up her support in Washington; officials say it was the former Prime Minister who first reached out to the U.S. with a power-sharing proposal. She visited New York City in mid-August, meeting with Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., and talking up a possible team. The task of calibrating U.S. policy on the potential union--to satisfy diverse interests in the Administration and avoid getting crosswise with Musharraf--has fallen to Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia. Administration officials say the office of Vice President Dick Cheney favors a deal.

In an interview with TIME, Bhutto dismissed questions about her history with the general, paraphrasing 19th century British statesman Lord Palmerston: "In politics, there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests." She characterized her negotiations with Musharraf as "an attempt to find a solution to Pakistan's deep-rooted crisis and to ... create a political system that can deal with the needs of the people and tackle terrorism."

But there's little reason to believe that a Musharraf-Bhutto union would bring about the systemic change that Pakistan so desperately needs. Both leaders represent Pakistan's failed past, a history defined by close ties between the ruling elite and the military, recurrent corruption and the creeping Islamization of a country whose original vision was a more secular Muslim state.

Partly for this reason, there's no guarantee that Musharraf and Bhutto would win enough votes to control the next Parliament. Eight years of military rule have left Pakistanis frustrated and angry. Many now see Musharraf as little more than a U.S. stooge. Meanwhile, support for Bhutto's party, the Pakistan People's Party, has been weakened by the revelation that she is contemplating a deal. "We are all exasperated. She was a symbol of democratic values, of decent values, of political and religious moderation," says Iftikhar Gilani, a Law Minister under Bhutto. "Benazir has lost credibility because of this deal with a dictator." So a pairing could end up weakening both sides rather than strengthening them.

Washington is hopeful that a deal can be worked out. But it knows that Musharraf has a history of getting out of a mess by taking out his weapons. As an Administration official puts it, "The question still becomes, At what point does his tendency as a commando to, you know, blow his way out of the situation, take over?"

With reporting by With Reporting by Aryn Baker / Islamabad, Ghulam Hasnain / Karachi, Massimo Calabresi, Mark Thompson / Washington