Who Lost Pakistan?

By Aryn Baker, Simon Robinson

Since Sept. 11, the Bush Administration has hailed Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf as a stalwart ally in the war on terrorism, providing as much as $10 billion in aid to his government. The U.S. believes Musharraf's autocratic rule is preferable to what might replace it: a nuclear-armed, fundamentalist regime sympathetic to Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. But there are growing doubts about how long Musharraf can hold on to power. Al-Qaeda's leadership has regrouped in Pakistan's tribal areas, while the country's middle class has taken to the streets to protest Musharraf's decision to suspend Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. (A suicide attack during a pro-Chaudhry rally on July 17 killed more than a dozen.) On July 10 Musharraf ordered the army into Islamabad's Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, to arrest Islamic extremists who had holed up there for months. Islamic radicals have vowed revenge for the siege, which killed scores of militants. A guide to Pakistan's ongoing crisis:

Why is Musharraf so unpopular?

Islamic fundamentalists, who want Pakistan ruled by Islamic law, and foreign extremists like al-Qaeda, who are hiding in Pakistan's mountainous and lawless borderlands, hate Musharraf because of his ties to Washington. Moderate Pakistanis dislike him because he seized power by force and seems determined to stay in office even if that means suspending the chief justice, who could be a potential block on Musharraf's bid for another term.

Is the current unrest helping al-Qaeda rebuild in Pakistan?

Probably, but it may have happened anyway. Growing resentment against Musharraf's heavy-handed tactics has fueled defiance across the country. Rule of law in the tribal areas, already weak, has collapsed entirely. A 2006 peace accord with Islamic militants in North Waziristan, near the Afghan border, forced the army back to the barracks, allowing al-Qaeda to flourish, according to the National Intelligence Estimate. Now the agreement has failed, and al-Qaeda is even stronger.

Does that mean Musharraf could be ousted from power?

Possibly. Radical clerics have declared jihad on the government in retaliation for the mosque siege. Suicide attacks are gathering pace in the North-West Frontier Province, the gateway to Afghanistan. A July 18 bombing there killed 17 Pakistani soldiers. And even religious groups once aligned with the government are turning against Musharraf. Machine-gun fire directed at the President's plane on July 6 marked the first assassination attempt on Musharraf's life in several years.

We've heard Musharraf promise to go after Islamic militants before. The Bush Administration says Musharraf's policies "haven't worked." Why is this time any different?

For the first time, perhaps, he has nothing left to lose. Though he has alienated religious groups with his raid on the Red Mosque, most Pakistani moderates support his stand against extremism. Elements within the army or intelligence services that remain sympathetic to the extremists may finally see them as the threat that they are. The risk is that Musharraf's anti-radical stance may widen divisions in the army and intelligence forces, costing the President their support when he needs it most.

Given Musharraf's political weakness, is the U.S. backing the wrong guy?

Certainly Washington seems to have put all its eggs in one basket. Musharraf's unpopularity fuels many of the problems in the country, and Pakistani opposition groups argue that the U.S. would do better promoting democracy over a single military dictator. Elections are due in a few months. Musharraf wants the current national and provincial assemblies to extend his term before that vote takes place. If they refuse, it's possible he will delay a vote or even use the increasing violence as an excuse to declare martial law--which would fuel more chaos.