A Legacy of Blowbacks

By Scott MacLeod

Ahmed Allawi, an AK-47 rifle slung over his shoulder, crouched in a hilltop cemetery in northern Iraq on a chilly night in March 1995. He and other guerrillas were launching their first armed assault on the Iraqi army since the formation of the opposition Iraqi National Congress three years earlier.

Their aim: overthrow Saddam Hussein. "We thought we were writing the history of Iraq," recalls Allawi, who bristled with adrenaline as the fighters overran three Iraqi positions. "But what happened later showed we were totally wrong."

What happened later should make Washington pause before getting too deeply entangled again with Iraq's opposition. Attempts by U.S. officials to foment an anti-Saddam revolution have been case studies in miscommunication, danger and betrayal. They have also been examples of how half hearted support by the U.S. has, in some respects, been even worse than no support at all. Allawi's group, for instance, was nearly wiped out less than 18 months after that glorious hilltop night, when Saddam overran its camps with a tank offensive. Up to 2,000 fighters were captured and executed, leaving the survivors wondering why U.S. forces hadn't stepped in.

In fact, the history of U.S. involvement with these groups is filled with similar tragedies. Part of the problem is that in the miles between Iraq and Washington, there is ample space for manipulation. Rebel leaders inflate U.S. support to attract followers. CIA officers move far beyond what politicians in Washington are willing to support. And politicians are not ready to match their rhetoric with military muscle.

One of the best examples of this is the oblique relationship between officials of the I.N.C. and the U.S. government. Some I.N.C. leaders have long ties to the U.S. In the 1970s, the U.S. financed a Kurdish revolt to destabilize Iraq, which was menacing Iran. Thousands of Kurds paid with their life when the U.S. dropped the plan after the Shah of Iran made peace with Baghdad. In 1991, President Bush called on Iraqis to revolt, but when they did, U.S. troops stood by as Saddam crushed the uprising by slaughtering thousands more.

After the Gulf War, Iraqi rebels grouped themselves into a coalition called the I.N.C., believing that the U.S. would back them. CIA money started flowing in and later, in a private letter from Vice President Al Gore, the Administration assured I.N.C. president Ahmed Chalabi of its commitment, promising "whatever additional support we can reasonably provide."

Those words of encouragement helped the I.N.C. flower briefly. Guerrillas dropped leaflets on Baghdad and thousands of Iraqi army defectors were lured into I.N.C. camps by the promise of a real opposition to Saddam.

The glory days didn't last. By 1994, the I.N.C. was collapsing as rival Kurd groups battled over smuggling routes for oil and other goods between Turkey and central Iraq. The infighting led one faction to form a desperate alliance with Saddam in 1996, helping him squeeze the other rebels. The U.S.--stunned by the intrigue--dumped the I.N.C.

As I.N.C. officials saw it, however, the U.S. shared the blame. To them, America had seemed increasingly ambivalent about replacing Saddam. Washington had refused to support the guerrilla offensive the I.N.C. launched against Saddam in March 1995, concerned that the dictator would strike out to destroy the rebels, dragging the U.S. into a wider conflict. Worse, the CIA seemed to lose interest in the I.N.C. and began supporting another rebel group that was proposing a military putsch, hardly the democratic revolution inc leaders say they wanted. That was enough to shatter the coalition. Says a senior Kurd now cooperating with Saddam: "We were ready to work with the U.S. if it supported us fully."

U.S. officials admit their words have been less than clear. In part this is the nature of Persian Gulf diplomacy, in which goals and enemies are far from black and white. But the confusion can also be traced to U.S. indecision. "We feel a responsibility to do this right," an Administration official says. "In the past, Iraqis have died in large numbers, partly in response to the urgings of Administration officials, partly in response to what they thought were commitments on our part. And we are conscious of the fact that if you go off half-cocked, this could have very negative consequences."

Now Chalabi and Washington have a new challenge: to create a strategy that is both workable and credible. Ahmed Allawi, for one, isn't eager to head back to the mountaintop until he knows there's someone behind him.

--With reporting by Douglas Waller/Washington

With reporting by DOUGLAS WALLER/WASHINGTON