New Day Coming?

By Bruce W. Nelan

A moderate Iranian leader? to most Americans, that's an oxymoron. And President Mohammed Khatami didn't do much to change it in his ballyhooed interview with CNN last week. His style was genial, all right, but his policies were rigid. Everything was America's fault, he insisted. The U.S. was hostile, trying to dominate Iran and giving "unbridled support" to Israel, "a racist terrorist regime." He saw no need for resuming political ties with Washington, and felt that Iran would do just fine working with the Europeans and others "who are far more advanced in their foreign policies than the U.S."

And yet, and yet. Viewed from the Iranian end of the telescope, Khatami was taking big risks just to sit down for what he billed as a message to "the great American people." With a bit of potted history, he elaborated on why "the American civilization is worthy of respect." He had a good word for the Puritans, the Declaration of Independence and Abraham Lincoln. Somewhat condescendingly and totally preposterously, he granted the "legitimacy" of the American government. But he said he wanted to crack the "wall of mistrust" between Iran and the U.S., even though it was caused by American misdeeds. So, while government-to-government talks were not on the agenda, a "dialogue" could begin with cultural exchanges among scholars, journalists, artists and tourists. Who knows, he implied, where that might lead?

Khatami's interview was probably not the sudden overture it seemed to be but a response to U.S. signals. Last May, President Bill Clinton said he saw Khatami's surprising landslide election over a hard-line opponent as a hopeful sign. "I have never been pleased about the estrangements between the people of the U.S. and the people of Iran," Clinton said. "They are a very great people, and I hope that the estrangements can be bridged." According to the Washington Post, Clinton followed up later through Swiss intermediaries with a letter to the Iranian government proposing direct talks. Khatami chose to reply on television, which may be safer for him than dallying secretly with evil Washington.

Even such tenuous feelers toward the U.S. put Khatami on the other side of the political barricades from his nation's supreme leader, Ayatullah Ali Khamenei. Spiritual chief Khamenei and other militant hard-liners still prefer shouting sulfurous slogans at the "Great Satan" and setting fire to Old Glory. Khatami has been walking a line between the Iranian reformers and mossbacks from the day he was elected. At an Islamic summit in Tehran last month, Khatami reportedly passed the word that he intended to reshape and moderate Iran's foreign policy, but it would take him two years to build up enough domestic strength to pull it off.

Whatever Khatami hopes to achieve with smiles for the American people, he has to go about it very cautiously, balancing them with harsh words about U.S. leaders and policies. There are signs of liberalization in Iran's public life--some of the opening up of debate, press and literature that women and young voters were hoping for--but black-clad thugs still patrol the streets to enforce vigilante justice on those who offend the old order. Iranians can still be locked up for criticizing the ruling clerics, as happened to Ayatullah Hussein Ali Montazeri, a very senior religious figure who faces possible treason charges for questioning Khamenei's right to rule last November. Something bad could happen to Khatami too if he goes too far.

The Clinton Administration knows all about that, and has similar problems. CNN interviewer Christiane Amanpour rightly told Khatami that, for Americans, "the message that has come out of Iran over the past 20 years is the message of hostage taking, death to America, burning the American flag--the message that almost looks like Islam has declared a war against America and the West." The anger runs deep in American memories. U.S. officialdom doesn't want to be too demanding and discourage Khatami, who might be launching a serious turnaround. Still, none of the decision makers, especially those like Al Gore who have elections to face, want to risk accusations of being soft on Iran or offending friends of Israel, which Khatami went out of his way to vilify in the interview.

So Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and National Security Adviser Sandy Berger got together on a statement that tried to have it both ways. The U.S. welcomed Khatami's idea of a dialogue and his nice words about America's heritage. But if relations are really to improve, the U.S. insists on a face-to-face meeting of representatives authorized to speak for their governments. That has historical roots as well. Official Washington still shudders at the echoes of those unauthorized secret sessions, complete with a cake decorated with a chocolate key to symbolize the opening of better relations with Iran, and arms deals that became infamous as Irangate.

This time around, the U.S. wants things done according to Hoyle. That means formal talks, dealing with what Iran does rather than what it says. That is: Iran's support for terrorism, its campaign to build nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, its violent opposition to the Middle East peace process. Since Khatami was elected, members of his government have met with representatives of terrorist groups like Hizballah, and U.S. intelligence reports indicate no falloff in Iranian support for them.

Khatami might have normal diplomatic relations in mind as a final goal, or, as skeptics in the U.S. government feel, he may intend to use honeyed words about America only to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the Europeans he speaks so highly of. He could be playing a mini-max game, with the maximum aim to change U.S. policies and the minimum to convince Europe that Iran has turned a new leaf and should be welcomed to full economic--that is, oil and gas--partnership.

As long as Tehran keeps supporting terrorists and working on nuclear weapons and missiles, the U.S. will not even begin rethinking its containment policies. It is already arguing with itself about whether to slap sanctions on French, Russian and Malaysian companies that are about to take a $2 billion plunge into the Iranian oil and gas business. Washington is of two minds: sanctions would antagonize not just Paris and Moscow but also most of the rest of Europe. Waiving sanctions, though, could open the floodgate to unlimited cooperation between the Europeans and Iran. The team arguing against sanctions is led by Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Stuart Eizenstat, with support from two other top State officials, Strobe Talbott and Thomas Pickering. The pro-sanctions faction includes Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk; Bruce Riedel, the National Security Council's top Middle East expert; and Leon Fuerth, Gore's national security adviser.

First, U.S. officials must try to figure out whether Khatami is really in charge of his government. Under a Shi'ite Muslim religious principle, supreme leader Khamenei has final authority over spiritual and political matters. There is no certainty Khatami could put together a full-blown reconciliation with the U.S. if he wanted to. Then again, maybe he could. Iran's faction-ridden, partyless political system is so complicated, it's hard to tell. Yes, Khamenei is the top man, but Khatami is the President, elected by 70% of the voters, a point he makes often. Khatami also has a likely ally in former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. While Rafsanjani is not the reformer Khatami seems to be, he is more open to change than Khamenei. The former President now heads a new advisory body, the Expediency Council, which could be in a position to mediate between Khatami and Khamenei.

As for Khatami's proposed cultural exchanges, they are already under way on a modest scale. American tourists go to Iran, although the State Department warns them that it is unwise, and many Iranians visit the U.S. and even attend American universities. Academics from both sides fly back and forth to give lectures and take part in conferences. There is no sign such exchanges have warmed the icy political climate much.

Washington has to wrestle again with the policy argument it has faced so often in the past. What is the best way to deal with rough adversaries in Moscow, Beijing, Baghdad, Tehran? Is it better to respond eagerly to their hints of detente in order to reinforce the (presumed) moderates on the other side? Or will it pay off more in the long run to stand firm on principle to show the hard-liners that their belligerence will get them nowhere? There are good arguments for both approaches, in theory. Unfortunately, this is practice. The U.S. could find itself standing on principle all alone, watching its European allies stampede to do business with Tehran. But here's the rub: if Washington signals that it is willing to get chummy with Iran, the same stampede could be the result. Meanwhile, domestic political considerations demand great caution in any rapprochement. Iran has few American supporters, and Khatami didn't make many converts in his message to the American people.

--Reported by Dean Fischer/Washington and Scott MacLeod/Paris

With reporting by Dean Fischer/Washington and Scott MacLeod/Paris