THE CASE FOR EXPANDING NATO

By Strobe Talbott

This week's NATO summit in Madrid is a defining moment for the transatlantic community on the eve of the 21st century. The alliance that played such a key role in keeping the peace for the past 48 years will open its doors to former adversaries. Some will be invited to join as full members soon; others will be encouraged to do so later; and representatives of all the emerging democracies in what used to make up the Soviet bloc will intensify their cooperation with NATO on a range of common concerns, from arms control to regional crisis management.

The admission of former Warsaw Pact member states into NATO represents the organization's response to the end of the cold war and the spread of democracy in Europe. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the U.S.S.R., countries that had been captive nations became sovereign, independent states. They have been holding elections, instituting the rule of law, opening their economies and nurturing a free press.

Although old threats have disappeared or receded, new ones have arisen. More Europeans have died violently in the past five years than in the previous 45. The combination of actual and potential dangers requires a robust, capable collective defense pact, and NATO is the best ever.

But the changes facing Europe today are not just military, and NATO also serves a political function. Inclusion in the new NATO will strengthen the values and institutions of democracy in the new member states. The very possibility of membership has already encouraged a number of countries to step up their internal reforms and improve relations with one another. This sort of progress is a potent vaccine against the kind of plague that befell the former Yugoslavia.

The alliance is determined that the enlargement strengthen Europe as a whole, to benefit nonmembers as well. In particular, the Madrid Summit will provide an impetus for bolstering the Partnership for Peace, which for the past three years has fostered joint exercises and closer coordination of defense planning among the allies and 27 neutral and former Warsaw Pact states.

Some have asked, Where are the geographical limits to NATO expansion? The right answer is, Let's see--and let's not be in a rush to proclaim new limits. To draw a new line on the map would be a betrayal of the alliance's shared vision of an undivided, increasingly integrated Europe.

The Russian Federation is part of that community too. The idea that an enlarging NATO can contribute to Russia's own long-term security--which the alliance leaders firmly believe--is, to put it mildly, not self-evident, certainly not to the Russians (or, for that matter, to critics of enlargement in the U.S.). Yet as enlargement has moved forward, NATO and Russia have developed an increasingly close relationship. In May, at a landmark meeting in Paris, the leaders of the alliance and President Boris Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act. It lays the basis for a solid, growing partnership between the alliance and Russia. Meanwhile, contrary to the predictions of some critics of enlargement, Russia has accelerated its program of reform. President Yeltsin has beefed up his government with innovators committed to economic modernization, made dramatic progress in reconciling differences with Ukraine, participated at the Summit of the Eight in Denver and intensified Russia's effort to enter the World Trade Organization.

While the past few months have been auspicious, a number of challenges remain. Most immediately, the allies must reach consensus in Madrid on the first countries to join NATO. The U.S. favors the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, because these nations have met the toughest tests of reform, resolved every dispute with their neighbors and demonstrated that they are prepared to meet the military obligations of NATO membership.

Enlargement is the right thing to do, especially when compared to the alternative of freezing NATO in its cold war membership. Whatever the expenses and difficulties associated with enlarging NATO, there would be far greater costs and dangers of not doing so. If we were permanently to endorse the line Joseph Stalin carved across Europe in 1945, we would subject the alliance to the risk of irrelevance and perhaps dissolution. Rejected in their aspiration to join NATO, the Central and East European countries would scramble to jury-rig their own independent and therefore competitive security arrangements.

Twice in this century Europe has exploded into world wars, both times because of instabilities and rivalries in Central Europe. Those conflicts cost the lives of more than half a million Americans. The cold war too began in Europe, and it cost the U.S. the equivalent of more than $13 trillion. The adaptation of NATO to post-cold war realities, including its enlargement to embrace a post-cold war membership, is crucial to the U.S.'s strategy for ensuring that Europe is more peaceful in the 21st century than it has been in the 20th. If Europe is safer and more prosperous, the U.S.--and the larger international community--will be too.

Strobe Talbott is Deputy Secretary of State.