GIVING THE BIG KISS-OFF

By Kevin Fedarko

The group of elite officers at the Russian Ministry of Defense had cooked up a plan out of profound frustration. According to one colonel, they first intended to intercept President Boris Yeltsin's motorcade as it traveled to the Kremlin along Znamenka Street, where their headquarters is located. Then, with Yeltsin trapped, they would demand their salaries, which had not been paid for several months, and tell him "to his face what we think about how he has destroyed the armed forces," as the colonel put it.

The officers never carried out the plot, believing Yeltsin's bodyguards would mow them down even before they could get close. But their attitude reflects the disaffection that top- and middle-level officers harbor toward the President. Many of them were once among his strongest backers, but the disastrous war in Chechnya, the general poverty of the officer corps, the delays in salary payments and an overall sense that Russia has been humbled have created powerful anti-Yeltsin sentiments. "Six years ago, I was ready to genuflect before Yeltsin," said the colonel. "Now I would just love to lock him in handcuffs and drag him off to Lefortovo prison. If I could."

As the first round of Russia's presidential election approaches on June 16, the question of the military's feelings toward Yeltsin becomes more important. With 4 million soldiers, members of paramilitary units and border guards, the armed forces are a sizable bloc of votes. Even more significant, the troops' loyalty may be crucial to Yeltsin after the election is over. "The possibility that Yeltsin might need the army to stay in power is very high," says a senior Russian defense analyst. During the failed hard-line coups of 1991 and '93, the army's stand was crucial.

Today the military is far weaker and more fragmented than it was back then. Like the country, it is divided over which candidate to back, and some U.S. officials argue that it is too demoralized and underequipped to intervene politically. Still, Yeltsin needs all the votes he can get, so his low standing with soldiers is a worry, and among Russian officials there is real concern that force will come into play after the election. Yeltsin needs to win the military back to his side, or at least neutralize its dislike of him.

How can he do that? He has tried to pay off some of those back salaries, and last week he decreed that only volunteers will be sent to Chechnya, but now he is contemplating another radical move: firing Pavel Grachev, the Minister of Defense who has stood by Yeltsin since the coup in 1991. Fragmented as it is, the military still respects the chain of command, so Yeltsin needs a popular and loyal Defense Minister to keep the top officers in line. Grachev, one of the main culprits of the Chechen misadventure, is highly unpopular, and now his loyalty is in doubt as well.

Last month Grachev was summoned before the Communist-dominated State Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament). The Duma wanted an explanation for the slaughter of up to 93 Russian soldiers in a rebel ambush in Chechnya. Grachev publicly decried "all the outrages that are happening in this country" and offered to resign, should the Duma require it. "He was signaling to Yeltsin that his loyalty could not be taken for granted," says the defense analyst. "And he [was] also signaling to the opposition that he might not be all that loyal to Yeltsin anymore."

That signal was heard. Lieut. General Alexander Korzhakov, the powerful chief of the Presidential Security Service, and General Mikhail Barsukov, chief of the Federal Security Service, are the most radical advocates of keeping Yeltsin in power, by force if need be. "Korzhakov and Barsukov zeroed in on [Grachev's threat to resign] to tell Yeltsin that Grachev must be replaced," says the analyst. "A while ago, Yeltsin sternly rejected Korzhakov's suggestions that Grachev be dropped. Now he seems to be heeding [them]."

Yeltsin has been striving to make Chechnya a less burdensome electoral issue--last week, for example, he invited the Chechen leader to Moscow for talks--and firing Grachev, who is inescapably linked to the war, would help. "The odds are better than 3 out of 5," a U.S. official says, "that Grachev will be dumped before the election. It's clearly a political call by Yeltsin, and if he thinks he can boost his vote count by sacking Grachev, he'll do it."

Korzhakov and Barsukov have presented Yeltsin with a list of eight possible replacements for Grachev. Perhaps the likeliest is Colonel General Boris Gromov, 53, the last Soviet commander in Afghanistan. Gromov has never been among Yeltsin's favorites, but he appeared in the President's entourage during his Victory Day visit to Volgograd, while Grachev was conspicuously absent. Last Thursday Yeltsin and Gromov held an unexpected meeting at the Kremlin. Gromov is popular with the troops, and the Chechen leaders have said that while they will never talk to Grachev, they would deal with Gromov.

Some military insiders, however, believe the man with the best chance to succeed Grachev is Colonel General Leonti Kuznetsov, commander of the vital Moscow region. If Yeltsin were to appoint him, it would signal a victory for those who advocate the use of force to keep power. Kuznetsov is a friend and ally of Korzhakov's, and earlier this month he publicly echoed Korzhakov's recommendation that the election be postponed.

In recent weeks it has become more and more clear that key military leaders are pursuing their own agendas. Colonel General Lev Rokhlin, for example, was chosen by Yeltsin and Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin to help lead Our Home Is Russia--Chernomyrdin's partyi--in last December's Duma election. Nevertheless, Rokhlin recently delivered a speech severely criticizing both Yeltsin and Grachev about Chechnya. He followed up that address with a report to a closed session of the Duma on the global disintegration of the Russian military machine.

According to Rokhlin's report, military sources say, Mikhail Gorbachev lost track for several days of the so-called nuclear attache case containing the codes for launching warheads when he transferred power to Yeltsin. "[Gorbachev] was a nondrinking President," the report is quoted as saying. "The Americans, who had learned about the missing case earlier than the Russian President did, asked themselves a question: If a nondrinking President could lose that case, what could be expected of a drinking President?" While the accuracy of the report cannot be confirmed, the reference to Yeltsin's greatest weakness in this context must have been stinging. That a senior officer close to Yeltsin would express such disloyalty shows how little Yeltsin can count on the military's support.

That backing is particularly important for Yeltsin if he tries to stay in power even after losing the election. It is significant that the men urging the replacement of Grachev are the strongest advocates of force. Korzhakov and Barsukov have reportedly been jealous of Grachev's closeness to Yeltsin. If they maneuver Grachev out and one of their candidates in, their hand will be strengthened. In particular, if Yeltsin elevates Kuznetsov, it will be a sign of trouble to come.

--Reported by Lewis M. Simons/Washington and Yuri Zarakhovich/Moscow

With reporting by LEWIS M. SIMONS/WASHINGTON AND YURI ZARAKHOVICH/MOSCOW