BACKSLIDING IN BOSNIA

By RICHARD HOLBROOKE

The new conventional wisdom about Bosnia runs like this: despite the overwhelming success in implementing the military provisions of the Dayton accords, those agreements will not lead to a single, unified Bosnia; rather they have merely deferred the resumption of war or, at best, provided an interim stage on the road to partition. The basis for this view is the uncertain pace of implementing the civilian aspects of Dayton--economic reconstruction, return of refugees, prosecution of war criminals, preparation for elections. How valid is the new pessimism?

The short answer is that, with eight months remaining in the year that NATO plans to stay in Bosnia, enough time remains to put the civilian side of Dayton into effect--provided those in charge are themselves fully committed to it. The Clinton Administration remains dedicated to this goal. But there are disturbing signs of backsliding from others, including some representatives of nations that signed the Dayton accords.

First, however, let's note that the military aspects of Dayton have been implemented almost completely with no loss of life to NATO forces from hostile action. The Bosnian Serbs pulled back on schedule. Sarajevo was united under Muslim control. No one--not even the negotiators at Dayton--would have dared predict this five months ago. Still, it is too early for self-congratulations. Other divided lands--Korea and Cyprus, for example--bear witness to temporary cease-fire lines that turn into permanent dividing lines.

Roughly speaking, Bosnia confronts three possible fates after the NATO troops withdraw.

--A return to war.

--Implementation of the Dayton accords, which established--on paper--a unified country with a weak central government, linking two entities in Bosnia, the Serbs and the Muslim-Croat Federation.

--An armed truce in which the "inter-entity boundary line" becomes a permanent division and no central government emerges; in short, partition--something similar to the status of Cyprus or the two Koreas.

I consider the chances of renewed war to be low. However, as between the second and third possibilities--a unified Bosnia or partition--the outcome hangs in the balance, and will depend heavily on the actions of the outside powers.

Though a divided country might seem better in the short term than a resumption of war, it would hardly constitute justice. De facto partition would leave 49% of Bosnia under the control of the Bosnian Serbs. Partition could also lead to the eventual involuntary dismemberment of Bosnia, with each of its larger neighbors, Croatia and Serbia, annexing a portion of the country, leaving a weak, landlocked Muslim mini-state around Sarajevo. Such a result would threaten the fragile stability in southeastern Europe. At a minimum, Albania, Bulgaria, the Former Macedonian Republic of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey would all be affected.

It is, therefore, distressing that some important European officials are privately writing off Dayton's political provisions and preparing the ground for de facto partition next year. Partition is not inevitable, but the agreements will surely fail if those responsible for carrying them out are not completely committed to them.

The removal of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the two indicted war criminals who still head the Bosnian Serbs, is also necessary. Since the Dayton agreements do not permit them to run in the crucial elections planned for September and require that they be tried by the war- crimes tribunal, they have nothing to lose by all-out obstructionism. If they succeed in their current efforts to prevent the realization of the accords' political aspects, they will have defied the international community, including the five Contact Group countries--the U.S., Britain, France, Germany and Russia.

American leadership, headed by President Clinton, achieved both Dayton and the successful military phase of implementation. But on the civilian side, a messy, ineffective arrangement, insisted on by the Europeans, created multiple chains of command and little enforcement authority. In addition, Congress has been slow and parsimonious in responding to the need for a significant American contribution to the civilian-implementation effort.

President Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry and their colleagues are committed to making the Dayton accords succeed. They will need the full support of our European allies and Congress if, when NATO leaves, Bosnia is to have true peace. The threat of the use of force by NATO or of renewed sanctions should be among the tools available to make the Bosnian Serbs comply with the agreements.

Richard Holbrooke, chief architect of the Dayton accords, was until recently U.S. Assistant Secretary of State.