YELTSIN'S SECRET REPORT ON HOW TO CALL OFF THE VOTE

By Kevin Fedarko

THERE ARE TWO WAYS BORIS YELTSIN CAN PREVENT THE Communist Party leader Gennadi Zyuganov from becoming President: by defeating him in the election or by making sure the election doesn't happen in the first place. Given the communists' strength and Yeltsin's deep unpopularity, there is a chance that he may choose the second method.

Talk of postponement is already in the air. Last month the communist-dominated Duma voted to abrogate the 1991 agreement by which the former Soviet Union had been dissolved. Though the measure carried no legal weight, an infuriated Yeltsin denounced it as "scandalous" and charged that the deputies had "destroyed the foundation on which they were sitting." The import of this ominous but vague outburst was soon made clear by a group of regional leaders in the upper house of parliament who support Yeltsin. Responding to the Duma's action, they proposed that the election be postponed for at least two years. As explained by Vladimir Khubiyev, president of a North Caucasian ethnic republic within Russia, the need is "to discard all these elections and gradually move forward." Konstantin Titov, the regional governor of Samara, said, "Either you cancel your decision, or we cancel the June 16 elections."

The theme has come up elsewhere. In remarks to Russian newspapers, Yeltsin's chief of staff has also raised the possibility that the elections would be called off. The U.S. is confident the elections will be held, but Secretary of State Warren Christopher sought reassurance when he met with Russian officials last week in Moscow. "Yeltsin is not going to give up power," says a senior Russian defense analyst. "His team will do everything it can to hold on to the Kremlin." How could the vote be prevented? Sources have told Time that top commanders of Yeltsin's powerful Security Service have prepared "an analytical report" for their boss that outlines the pretexts under which he might do so. First, he could cite the long-discussed confederation treaties with Kazakhstan and Belarus, whose arrangements would supersede the current Russian constitution. In this context, the Duma's effort to reconstitute the U.S.S.R. could be seen not as a threat but as an opportunity. In fact, this week Belarus and Russia are signing a treaty as a step toward integration. The report reminds Yeltsin that if reunification went far enough, he could claim that new elections were necessary for all branches of government. The presidential elections could then be delayed until the other voting took place.

Another strategy the report discusses is to actually allow the war in Chechnya to worsen. When things became bad enough, as the report puts it, Yeltsin could declare "an emergency concentration of power in the hands of the President for the sake of restoring constitutional order." There is no provision in the Russian constitution that allows for canceling elections because of a state of emergency. However, the rules for imposing a state of emergency do empower the President to ban meetings and mass rallies and to suspend political parties. Holding elections under such restrictions would be almost impossible.

A top Kremlin official has said privately that even if 80% of the people vote against him, Yeltsin will not leave power, and there are ways he could void the results of an election after it did take place. The report discusses the possibility of having Yeltsin accuse the opposition of falsifying the returns, thus rendering the election invalid (the report also elaborated on the debacle that might ensue if Yeltsin himself cheats and is caught). The Kremlin could also claim that voting regulations had not been observed. Under a state of emergency, Yeltsin might refuse to allow his successor to take office--Russia does not have any clear laws on the transition of power.

The success of any action Yeltsin might take to circumvent the election would depend on the cooperation of the armed forces, and their support is an open question. If disorder followed the cancellation of the election, Yeltsin would also face a financial problem. The International Monetary Fund has promised Russia a three-year loan of $10.2 billion, which would provide cash the President desperately needs. But the arrangement is conditioned on compliance with strict fiscal guidelines. To deal with civic disruption, Yeltsin might have to abandon disciplined monetary policies, and he would thereby lose the IMF billions.

For these reasons, and because Yeltsin is doing better in the polls, the U.S. State Department regards the chance that he will stage a constitutional coup as slim. But if Washington is breathing easy, Russian officials and citizens are not. They express grave suspicion about the President's intentions. Yeltsin is generally acknowledged as the best guarantor of his country's democracy. But in the past 1,000 years, no Russian leader has ever relinquished power on the basis of a national plebiscite. Like anything else that tries to withstand the force of history, Yeltsin's devotion to democratic principles will have to be formidable indeed if it is to survive the upcoming test.

--By Kevin Fedarko. Reported by Dean Fischer/Washington and Yuri Zarakhovich/Moscow

With reporting by DEAN FISCHER/WASHINGTON AND YURI ZARAKHOVICH/MOSCOW