BOMBS AND BLUSTER

By Bruce W. Nelan

This time, they said, they would put an end to vacillation and to pinprick bombing. "What we must do today," Prime Minister John Major told the 16-nation emergency conference on Bosnia in London last week, "is spell out in unmistakable terms the consequences of further attacks" by Bosnian Serbs on U.N.-declared "safe areas." "We must mean what we say and be determined to carry out what we say."

Right. But what did they say? And what did they mean? At the end of eight hours of discussion among foreign and defense ministers, British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind emerged to deliver the official summary of the meeting. He issued the Serbs a warning, but an ambiguous one, declaring that any attack on Gorazde, the last remaining safe area in eastern Bosnia, "would be met with a substantial and decisive response." Precisely what that response would be was not spelled out. The U.S. had gone into the meeting calling for sweeping air attacks on the Serbs. France favored sending more peacekeepers to Gorazde. As host of the conference, Rifkind reported that "there was strong support for the use of air power" but there was also concern about "the serious risks involved in this course of action." He went on to "emphasize that the U.N. must not go to war but needs to support realistic and effective deterrents."

Taking his turn on the podium, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher agreed that the policy was to deter the Serbs. But he insisted that an attack on Gorazde would be met with decisive air strikes on Serb forces and supply lines. "Any air campaign will include significant attacks on significant targets," he said. nato already has plans for such air raids, ranging from close support of troops on the ground to a "regional" bombing campaign, although the relevant U.N. resolution authorizes strikes only in and around a safe area. It was still unclear just who would make the decision to launch those strikes. At one point Christopher said, "The people of Bosnia simply cannot afford any more empty threats," thereby suggesting, perhaps unwittingly, that the many previous challenges to the Serbs had been bluffs.

The details of the policy will have to be spelled out soon. As the ministers sat down in London, one safe area -- Srebrenica -- had already fallen and another -- Zepa -- was about to fall. Gorazde was surrounded, under artillery fire. If the Serb commander, General Ratko Mladic, presses ahead with his assault, the U.N. and NATO will then be pledged to strike.

Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic was skeptical. "They always produce half-measures," he said, referring to the Western allies. The ultimatum to the Serbs to keep their hands off Gorazde, he said, was a "green light" for them to attack elsewhere. He predicted the Serbs would take the pressure off the eastern enclave but keep squeezing the capital, Sarajevo, and possibly try to capture Bihac, the last government outpost in the northwest.

The catalyst for the Lancaster House conference was the brutal Serb assault on the eastern enclave of Srebrenica two weeks ago. The Serbs made captives of men and boys of military age and, in a new wave of "ethnic cleansing," sent the rest of the town's 42,000 Muslims fleeing to government lines. U.N. officials collecting the testimony of refugees are convinced that the Serbs committed appalling acts of rape and murder. The Serbs then moved on Zepa, and Mladic staged a surrender ceremony with some Bosnian civilians at an abandoned U.N. observation post outside town. But the government troops there, bolstered by escapees from Srebrenica, refused to go along with the capitulation because the Serbs intended to detain men ages 18 to 55 again.

As the Serbs attacked Zepa and then Gorazde, French President Jacques Chirac proposed a counteroffensive, or at least a reinforcement of Gorazde, with French troops to fly in aboard American helicopters. That got President Bill Clinton's attention, since he is still determined to keep the U.S., especially its ground troops, from sliding into the war. Though Clinton begrudges any time he must divert from domestic concerns, he spent at least 20 hours last week working on the Bosnia problem with his national-security aides.

Perry and Shalikashvili convinced him that Chirac's proposal was unacceptable, an idea prompted more by the French sense of honor than by a serious assessment of the situation in Bosnia. Shalikashvili checked with French military chiefs and learned that they also believed the idea was poorly thought out. "Shali's ultimate argument," says a senior White House official, "was that you would have to have an air campaign to get the troops into Gorazde anyway, so why not try an air campaign first?"

Without dissent, the London conference agreed to keep the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia as long as possible. The ministers also said they would use a new U.N. rapid-reaction force now taking shape to secure a land supply route into Sarajevo, where relief shipments have been cut off for weeks. But Rifkind warned that if the U.S. lifts the arms embargo against Bosnia, the situation would become too dangerous and "unprofor would have to withdraw."

The life of a peacekeeper is pretty dangerous in any case. More than 300 Dutch troops captured by the Serbs in Srebrenica were released through Belgrade only last Friday. In besieged Zepa, the 79 Ukrainians on peacekeeping duty were first disarmed by Bosnian government soldiers, then driven into their shelters. Bosnian troops in Zepa threatened to kill the Ukrainian peacekeepers if the U.N. did not send a high-ranking negotiator. The Serbs made that impossible by closing the approach road and next day opened up with mortar and artillery fire. The Bosnian government forces responded, and some of their shells, by accident or design, landed in the Ukrainian compound, causing heavy damage.

The Clinton Administration opposes a unilateral lifting of the embargo, arguing that the U.S. would then have to supply weaponry and training to the mostly Muslim Bosnian army, thus "Americanizing the war." Senator John McCain, who was a prisoner of war in Vietnam, asked in Senate debate last week, "What, pray tell, does bombing the Serbs make us? A disinterested third party?" In fact, Bosnian leaders have said they are most interested in acquiring tanks and artillery made in former Warsaw Pact countries such as Russia and Poland. Those are the weapons they have used and trained with in the past, and they could put them into combat quickly.

At Clinton's request, Senator Robert Dole, sponsor of the resolution to lift the embargo, agreed to wait until the London meeting was over to act on the matter. He said the Senate would take up his bill this week. Most congressional head counters believe that the measure will pass even if Clinton vetoes it and that the House of Representatives will rush through its version as well.

But it is a very different piece of legislation from those that have previously appeared in the Senate or House. This one will go into effect only after unprofor troops have pulled out of Bosnia or 12 weeks after the Bosnian government asks the force to leave, whichever comes first. Even then, the bill provides Clinton with a waiver that will allow him to postpone any action, but he must reapply for that authority every 30 days. So the law lifting the embargo is likely to be irrelevant by the time it is a reality. Bosnia's fate will be decided not by legislation but by the dynamics of the brutal conflict outsiders have been unable to stop.

--Reported by Edward Barnes/Belgrade, Massimo Calabresi/Vitez and Dean Fischer with Christopher, with other bureaus

With reporting by EDWARD BARNES/BELGRADE, MASSIMO CALABRESI/VITEZ AND DEAN FISCHER WITH CHRISTOPHER, WITH OTHER BUREAUS