The Political Interest the Cost of Removing Saddam

By Michael Kramer

Why not whack Saddam and be done with him? As we should have done last time, right? As even Richard Nixon advised two months after the Gulf War ended in 1991: "If I could find a way to get him out of there, even putting a contract out on him . . . I would be for it." Only Ross Perot is as publicly bold today, but the words "unfinished business" are on almost everyone's lips. From the soldier in the desert to the folks at home, most Americans (72% in the latest TIME/CNN poll) favor using military force to remove Saddam Hussein. The White House too seems on board. If it comes to war, says chief of staff Leon Panetta elliptically, "I can tell you one thing: we're not going to repeat the mistakes of the past."

Revenge is the ultimate temptation, but like most temptations the urge to topple Saddam -- let alone kill him -- should be resisted until the consequences are appreciated.

Ever since George Bush stopped short of Baghdad and Saddam four years ago, he and his top advisers have been asked to defend their hesitation. Last week they were at it again. "We carried out our war and political aims," said former Secretary of State James Baker. "If we'd gone further, the coalition would have fragmented and we wouldn't have the sanctions today." Finding Saddam wouldn't have been easy, says Norman Schwarzkopf, recalling that Panama's Manuel Noriega defied a manhunt for quite some time. "If we'd gone to Baghdad," says former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, "we'd probably still be in Iraq, responsible for the people and politics, owning the place like we now own Haiti."

All those excuses are valid, but two others are more important. First, there was no assurance then -- and there is none now either -- that a successor to Saddam would be less hostile to U.S. interests. "Saddamism without Saddam is a real possibility," says Richard Haass, who was Bush's top Middle East expert. "A new Iraqi dictator would undoubtedly be free of the sanctions crippling Baghdad today. Even those not eager to deal with Iraq would want to give the new guy a chance. Then, if he turned out like Saddam, he'd use the money he'd get when the oil flowed again to rebuild Iraq's forces, and sooner or later he'd strike out too. You might be able to modulate the behavior of someone new, and it might be worth the chance, but it'd be a big risk."

Above all, there is Iran, the region's other unstable element. When the Gulf War's outcome was certain in 1991, every state in the area feared Iraq's fragmentation. Turkey, a NATO ally, was worried that Iraq's Kurds would form an independent nation and incite Turkey's own 10 million Kurds to rebellion. But the larger fear was an extension of Tehran's influence via the establishment of an Islamic fundamentalist state carved from southern Iraq. That entity, bordering Kuwait, would threaten all the gulf emirates and the oil-rich eastern province of Saudi Arabia. Which is why, as Cheney says, leaving Saddam in Iraq is "messy" but removing him might be "worse."

There's a "misunderstanding about Iran," says Daniel Pipes, a leading expert on Islam who edits the Middle East Quarterly. "Khomeini's successors, led by President Rafsanjani, are more moderate only at home, where they are trying -- and failing -- to marry market economics and fundamentalist ideology. Their foreign policy is in fact worse than Khomeini's because they also believe in Persian nationalism, which historically has meant that they want to control the gulf, as they've said repeatedly." But the Iranians are * smarter and more subtle than the Iraqis, adds Pipes: "They'd want to take control of Iraq -- at least -- if Saddam were gone, but they'd likely create a classic satrapy rather than move to an outright annexation. They're not dumb enough to do something that offers a pretext for an American military response." Along with the "ideological component," says a senior Kuwaiti official, "it's exactly because they're so much more clever than Saddam that the Iranians pose the more serious long-term threat to us and to the West."

For two decades, the U.S. sought a regional balance of power by playing Iraq and Iran against each other. "We reject that in favor of a policy of dual containment," National Security Adviser Anthony Lake wrote recently. "We seek to maintain a favorable balance without depending on either" of them -- a realistic proposition only as long as the U.S. is willing to guarantee the region's stability.

The challenge now is to press onward with the sanctions against both Iraq and Iran at a time when industrial countries increasingly covet their oil. Staying the course is the only prudent option. America's allies suggest embracing Iran and Iraq on the theory that economic liberalization can spawn political democratization, an argument the U.S. advances in regard to China. But it won't work in Iran and Iraq, which are implacably hostile to Western interests. Fueling their economic resurgence would only permit them to rearm and become more adventurous.

If he remains in power, Saddam will no doubt cause the Clinton Administration further fits, and periodically Clinton will hear the clamor for him to finish the business in Baghdad lest he face the same bumper stickers that greeted George Bush during the 1992 campaign: Saddam still has his job. Do you? Like Bush, Clinton will be best advised to resist the implication.