Spies At an Inquisition

By Jill Smolowe

Locked inside the Capitol in room H305, a racquetball-court-size chamber outfitted with eavesdrop-proof paneled walls and soundproof padded doors, the members of the House Intelligence Committee could barely mask their indignation last week as they hurled questions from a horseshoe-shape dais.

How, they demanded, could Aldrich Ames have spied for Moscow since 1985 without detection by his CIA colleagues? Seated at a table below the opening of the curve, Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey parried the questions with candor, defensiveness and anger. Yes, there had been warning signs that Ames might be a problem: a drinking habit, a foreign-born wife, a lavish life-style that far exceeded his $69,843 annual salary. Yes, suspicions should have deepened when Ames showed some signs of deception on polygraph tests in 1986 and in 1991.

Well, then, legislators asked, did the CIA question Ames about his $540,000 cash purchase of a house?

Yes, Woolsey responded. But Ames had explained the money as an inheritance from his wife's Colombian family.

Had the CIA sought to verify the existence of this alleged will?

No. Colombian wills are not filed in a public registry.

"Oh, please!" a committee member exploded as he recounted this exchange to TIME after the House's four-hour session broke up last Wednesday. "That's incredible." Echoed a congressional aide: "C'mon, there are other places in Colombia you can look to see if the family has wealth."

The post-Ames intelligence inquisition is under way. Congress is determined that this time the CIA will come clean about -- and then clean up -- years of sloppy security practices. Legislators want no more excuses for the mole penetrations, the running of untrustworthy foreign agents or the death or disappearance of Soviet double agents, all of which have bollixed CIA counterintelligence efforts since 1985.

Last week Woolsey seemed to get the message. He emerged briefly from a two- hour grilling by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to announce that the Ames debacle was being treated not "as a single episode or incident but as a serious problem." Some Congressmen suspected, however, that Woolsey, like past CIA directors, might merely be angling to head off legislative interference in the agency's internal matters. Warned one Congressman: "We are headed for a confrontation."

Legislators are particularly determined to establish procedures that will require CIA officials to scrutinize the personal finances of employees who have access to sensitive information. This demand is hardly original. Virtually every recent intelligence study conducted has pressed the point that the love of money -- not ideology -- drives modern-day espionage. Yet the CIA has made little effort to oversee employee assets. While polygraph tests now probe for signs of financial vulnerability, no effort is made to expose hidden wealth. So far, only top-level employees must disclose their financial , holdings. And the CIA has access to employees' income-tax returns and bank records only immediately upon hiring for a brief period and during each five- year review.

Legislators are also eager to pierce a hole in the CIA's "old boy" shield. Dennis DeConcini, chairman of the Senate inquiry, says that despite a 1988 memorandum of understanding with the FBI that instructs the CIA to share information when an internal investigation is in progress, "they haven't done that." Ronald Kessler, author of books about the FBI and CIA, wrote in the New York Times last week that Ames failed the 1986 polygraph but his CIA superiors shelved the report. Moreover, Kessler claimed, Ames was given two polygraph tests in 1991, both indicating deceptive responses. The examiner concluded, "I don't think he is a spy, but he does have money problems." CIA officials close to the investigation deny that Ames failed the polygraphs and noted that the FBI reviewed the 1991 tests and found nothing wrong.

Aided by hindsight and goaded by congressional oversight, Woolsey now promises action. He has pledged to launch three investigations: an independent review by the inspector general to determine how Ames eluded detection for so long; an internal assessment of the security damage caused by Ames' alleged activities; and a star-studded panel of outside experts to study the CIA's security and counterintelligence practices.

Most of this fails to impress members of both houses of Congress. They note that past intelligence reviews, both internal and external, have been largely ignored by the CIA. Since 1986, no fewer than five intelligence reports produced by legislative committees have warned about spy-for-money operations and called for tightened scrutiny. Yet nothing happened. Last week the Senate adopted long-overlooked measures to strengthen the spy hunt. Thanks to Ames, legislators now appear determined to force a change.

With reporting by Jay Peterzell, Elaine Shannon and Bruce van Voorst/Washington