Caution: Speed Bumps Ahead

By LISA BEYER/JERUSALEM

Oded Ben-Ami, a senior aide to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, allowed himself a sweet moment of repose the other day. Fresh from Washington, Ben-Ami relaxed with his family during the Jewish New Year, but he had no illusions about the new way of life awaiting Israelis and Palestinians. Both sides have to fill in the blanks of their agreement in principle and figure out precisely how to transfer most government functions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from the occupier to the occupied. "The game remains a puzzle of fitting hundreds of small details together," he said. "You don't have enough pages in your magazine to list them all."

Two lifelong enemies have undertaken a new relationship before making sure they know how to live it. Says a Rabin confidant: "We wanted to nail each ! other down at the lowest common denominator, make it public and from there build the layers that will lead to a settlement on the ground." That leaves a host of urgent issues to resolve if the first stage of the pact is to be implemented as planned in the next two to four months. "They range from questions of security to issues of regulating the tomato trade," says Ephraim Sneh, a Labor Party Knesset member. Among the most immediate issues:

SETTING BOUNDARIES

The agreement stipulates that Israel will begin turning over responsibility for the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area in the West Bank to the Palestinians by mid-November and complete the task within two months. The Gaza Strip is a well-defined beachfront rectangle of 140 sq. mi. But what, exactly, is the Jericho area? The municipal bounds of the city encompass only 10 sq. mi., but the Jericho district, as defined by Jordanian law that was in effect before Israel's 1967 conquest, comprises 146 sq. mi. The Palestinians want the autonomous zone to contain much of that territory, including the wood-planked Allenby bridge, one of two border crossings into Jordan. The Israelis insist that the boundaries should be more circumscribed and that they should continue to control the bridge.

RETURNEES

The agreement allows an unspecified number of Palestinians to return to the territories, which were taken by Israel during the 1967 war. By Israeli count, 200,000 people were displaced by the war; P.L.O. officials speak of more than 800,000, a number that includes the descendants of the original refugees. To pacify their respective constituencies, both sides are taking extreme positions on how many exiles can come back. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres has suggested the absurdly small figure of 5,000, while P.L.O. officials have said they would wave in the whole 800,000. That would increase the Palestinian population in the territories by one-third and bring in many individuals deemed security risks by Israel. In reality, both sides recognize that the main constraint on the number of returnees is economic: the West Bank and Gaza Strip are impoverished and cannot afford to absorb a gigantic influx of newcomers. During the secret negotiations in Oslo, both sides informally batted around the figure of 200,000 returnees.

ARAFAT'S SAFETY

Among those who will return will be senior members of the exiled P.L.O. leadership, which will administer self-rule until free elections are held for a Palestinian council within nine months. According to a P.L.O. official, the negotiators in Oslo discussed allowing the entire executive committee of the P.L.O. to relocate to the territories. Although Israeli officials won't say so explicitly, P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat will surely be among them. "It is not that he can come tomorrow," says Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin. "That still should be discussed."

One brake on Arafat's homecoming is the problem of securing his safety. Palestinian radicals have threatened to kill him, and a former chief rabbi of Israel has blessed his murder. P.L.O. sources in the territories say Arafat plans to move between two headquarters, one in Jericho and one in the Gaza Strip, a 70-mile trip by road through central Israel. The agreement guarantees safe passage, but for Arafat, "safe" would probably necessitate a military convoy. A Palestinian force that size would irritate the Israelis, while an Israeli contingent would humiliate the P.L.O. Arafat might commute by helicopter, but the Israelis are very particular about whom they allow in their airspace, since the tiny country's military installations are clearly visible from the sky.

PALESTINIAN POLICE

While Palestinians have long run their own schools, hospitals and social services, they have not had an independent security force in the territories since the 1967 war. Before they can begin, the two sides must negotiate the terms of the "strong" Palestinian police force called for in the agreement. Israeli security officials say the Palestinian cops will probably be armed with pistols, rifles and light machine guns. The P.L.O. would like to have armored personnel carriers and spotter helicopters as well. "We will give them everything they need to maintain security and keep power," says Nissim Zvilli, secretary-general of the Labor Party, "but nobody is going to build a Palestinian army."

The force will be made up of Palestinians from the territories plus exiled Palestinians from two units of Arafat's Palestine Liberation Army: the Badr Brigade in Jordan and the Ain Jalud Brigade in Egypt. The P.L.O. began training these fighters as policemen three months ago, and 1,200 of them have already completed the course. In his office in Amman, Jordan, General Hamed Qudsiyah, head of the Badr Brigade, sits with maps of Jericho on his desk, planning for the deployment of his men there within 10 weeks -- before Arafat's first visit, he says.

The Palestinian force will be relatively small while it polices Gaza and Jericho. But over the next nine months, its turf will expand into the entire West Bank as the Israeli army withdraws from populated areas and Palestinian autonomy spreads. Faisal Husseini, the chief Palestinian peace negotiator, has said police should eventually total 30,000 officers. But Israel's principle is that there should be the same proportion of Palestinian police to civilians as there is in Israel, which would make for a force of about 6,000.

Coordinating this new constabulary with Israeli security personnel will be extremely delicate. The Jewish settlements in the territories will continue to be protected by Israeli forces. The government does not intend to turn them into military camps, but they will become increasingly fortified: the army suggests adding electrified fences and land mines to prevent infiltration.

It will be even harder to protect Israelis traveling in the territories. The army proposes keeping the roads, including wide shoulders on each side, under Israeli control. Finances permitting, electrified fences would be erected on either side of the highways to prevent guerrillas from ambushing passing Israeli cars, recognizable by their yellow license plates. Since Palestinians use the same roads, one idea under discussion is to have joint Israeli- Palestinian units patrol them.

Then there is the issue of hot pursuit: What happens if the Israelis chase a suspected miscreant into a Palestinian-controlled area? Would the Palestinian police allow the Israelis to continue, take up the chase themselves or sit idly by? As'ad Abdul-Rahman, a member of the P.L.O.'s Central Council, says, "I believe the P.L.O. would go so far as arresting and handing over Palestinians who do violence."

Once these mechanisms are worked out, negotiators will have to decide whether the Arabs of East Jerusalem will be able to stand for election to the Palestinian council scheduled in nine months and what the legislative limits of that body will be. For the 22 months that the peace talks made no visible progress, issues like these seemed impossible to resolve; now that the psychological barriers are down, such issues appear manageable -- as long as both sides are prepared to settle for less than they want.

With reporting by Ron Ben-Yishai/Tel Aviv and Lara Marlowe/Amman