Mixed Signals on Sanctions

By Richard Lacayo

The words that filled the House committee chamber were clear and unequivocal. Given time, the sanctions against Iraq could be counted on to halt its industry and hobble its military. That judgment would have been no surprise if it had come from any of the Democrats who used last week's House and Senate hearings to warn the Bush Administration against a hasty resort to force in the Persian Gulf. But the message came from one of the President's own men: William Webster, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

As the potential for war in the Persian Gulf has heightened, the debate about U.S. policy has come to hinge largely on two questions. Can sanctions really cripple Iraq? And even if they can, will that be enough to persuade Saddam to leave Kuwait? Those questions are dissolving the once solid support for the Bush policy along partisan lines as Democrats in Congress have begun to insist, loudly, that the embargo must be given time. Says Maryland Senator Paul Sarbanes: "The cost of a year of waiting is nothing compared with the cost of a week of war."

Webster's description of an Iraq under severe economic pressure is a depiction much bleaker than that put forward by the White House. In recent weeks the Bush Administration has been closing ranks to offer a suddenly more downbeat assessment of whether sanctions can work. In late October, George Bush was still expressing the hope that the embargo could force Saddam to retreat. But last week, a few days after the United Nations Security Council approved the use of military force in the gulf, he declared, "I've not been one who has been convinced that sanctions alone would bring him to his senses." On the same day that Webster spoke before the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of State James Baker appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to announce that he was "very pessimistic" about the prospect that sanctions alone would work.

In his appearance before the committee, Webster was also careful to caution that even an economic stranglehold on Iraq might not cause Saddam to loosen his grip on Kuwait. There is no guarantee, Webster advised, that "economic hardships will compel Saddam to change his policies, or lead to internal unrest that would threaten his regime." But in the most comprehensive public analysis to date of the impact of the sanctions, Webster went on to outline a picture of an Iraqi economy that would be badly crippled by next summer.

Webster said more than 90% of Iraq's imports and 97% of its exports have been shut off. Though the impact upon the nation's food supply has not been serious, the virtual end of imports is bad news for Iraqi industry, which is heavily dependent on parts and equipment from abroad. At the same time, the embargo on Iraqi exports, especially oil, has cost Saddam $1.5 billion a month since he invaded Kuwait in August, leaving his nation without the foreign exchange it must have to offer as payment for smuggled goods. For now, Iraqi factories can dip into preinvasion stockpiles or obtain parts plundered from Kuwaiti factories. But by next spring or summer, Webster predicted, "only energy-related and some military industries will still be functioning."

Webster warned that it would take longer, however, before the Iraqi military started feeling squeezed. Given the static defensive posture of Saddam's air and ground forces, which reduces wear and tear on equipment, they could probably maintain their current level of readiness for nine months at least. After that, however, the unavailability of spare parts would start to tell, especially for Iraq's high-tech air force. Webster predicted that by as early as next March, Baghdad would have to reduce reconnaissance and training flights by its fleet of French- and Soviet-made aircraft. The departure of foreign technicians and the lack of replacement parts, he said, would make repairs too difficult.

Significantly, Webster said that if military force did eventually become necessary, the passage of time would favor the anti-Saddam alliance because Iraq's war machine would have deteriorated so badly. That view contrasted sharply with the one put before the same House committee two days earlier by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. He told the panel that delay would only give the Iraqi military more opportunity to strengthen its defenses in Kuwait and southern Iraq. Webster had other concerns about the effect of delays, however. During closed-door sessions of the House hearings, he reportedly told the committee he feared that the international coalition lined up against Iraq would fall apart before sanctions had time to work.

Even granting that sanctions were hurting Iraq, however, could they be counted on to persuade Saddam to withdraw? Baker cautioned the Senate committee that the Iraqi leader could protect chosen segments of his nation for some time. "You can bet the Iraqi people will feel the pain first and most deeply," he said. "Not the Iraqi military and not the government." The question is whether that is any reason not to let sanctions work a while longer -- long enough at least to find out whether the pain will eventually touch Saddam.

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With reporting by Bruce van Voorst/Washington