The Political Interest

By Michael Kramer

War by Christmas and perhaps much sooner. That is the latest estimate from Washington and abroad. Whether the economic embargo could ever force Saddam Hussein to retreat from Kuwait may never be known. "Our worst-case scenario," says an Arab diplomat involved in the allies' deliberations, has Saddam acceding to Bush's public demands. But the alliance's true objective has moved beyond restoring the status quo ante to the destruction of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological warfare capacities, a goal almost no one believes can be achieved through negotiation. Hence "the logic of war," to borrow Francois Mitterrand's phrase.

The policy now being debated in Washington seeks to maximize international support for war while minimizing the loss of allied life. Some believe maintaining multinational solidarity requires an ultimatum to Saddam: Cave in by such and such a date, or we come at you with everything we've got. Sounds good, but . . . "The problem with a clear warning," says Michael Mandelbaum, a Johns Hopkins University foreign policy professor, "is that it could cause Iraq to strike pre-emptively, and pre-emption is a card we may want to play ourselves. For Saddam this is World War III. He wins or he dies. If he thinks it's coming, why wouldn't he shoot first? If we could go first, it would lessen our losses on the ground and cause the least disruption to the world economy. If an ultimatum results in Saddam getting the jump, the chances of his crippling the region's oil production increases greatly."

Without the luxury of a further provocation from Iraq -- an invasion of Saudi Arabia, the killing of Western hostages or some other horror -- it may fall to the Kuwaiti Emir to request that the United Nations act militarily. The collective-security provisions embodied in the U.N. Charter's Article 51 could provide the legal fig leaf for an internationally sanctioned war against Iraq while preserving at least some element of tactical surprise.

Assuming a "go," the war will be fought massively, but conventionally -- unless Saddam launches a chemical attack and threatens Saudi Arabia's survival. "If our calculations prove wrong and half of Riyadh is destroyed," says an Arab official privy to the war gaming now under way, "then I wouldn't be surprised if tactical nuclear weapons were used, and I don't think many would resist their use."

The case against nukes, however, is strong. Besides the taboo that has existed since Nagasaki, and the problem of precedent ("The temptation for other countries to use nukes would increase if we use them in the gulf," says a Pentagon official), there is the post-crisis environment to consider. No matter the reason, an American atomic strike in the gulf would signal that, unique among the world's present hot spots, the Middle East is the region where the West views life as so cheap that any weapon of war is justified. The problems of repair -- physical, psychological and political -- and the desire to fashion a more stable regional order once Saddam was defeated would be significantly magnified.

A Bush adviser who countenances tactical nuclear weapons as easily as the Arab official -- if only to forestall an imminent Iraqi victory -- says their use has yet to be discussed seriously because "everyone is confident" that a war against Iraq will resemble a turkey shoot. He had better be right.