Cambodia Hurdles to Peace

By STANLEY W. CLOUD

After a week-long diplomatic gavotte over protocol, representatives of the four factions in Cambodia's civil war were all present in Jakarta last weekend. On hand were Prime Minister Hun Sen and leaders of two of the three guerrilla armies fighting to overthrow him: Son Sann and Khieu Samphan of the infamous Khmer Rouge. The third, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, pleaded a last- minute illness and sent a stand-in.

The gathering was to consider a maddeningly complex peace proposal put forth last month by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council that requires approval by all the Cambodian "parties" before it can go into effect. The main item on the Jakarta agenda was the plan's call for creation of a Supreme National Council intended to symbolize Cambodian nationhood during a long transition to peace.

To some, the prospects for ending the war seem brighter than they have in a long time. Not only were the Cambodian parties due to begin talking again in Jakarta, but Secretary of State James Baker disclosed that the U.S. had agreed to engage in direct diplomatic contact with representatives of the Hun Sen government. Still, many observers remain pessimistic. "An international agreement on Cambodia does not equal an internal agreement," said Shafiq Fit Abdullah of the Institute of Strategic International Affairs in Kuala Lumpur. To get that, at least six steps -- each problematic at best -- must be taken before the U.N. plan can succeed:

1. A Supreme National Council must be created. The body would have only an advisory role, but Hun Sen argues, not unreasonably, that the tripartite rebel coalition should have one vote instead of the three it seeks. It is by no means certain that the current peace offensive will pass even this initial hurdle.

2. All parties must accept a so-called interim U.N.-run administration, pending elections for a new government. The rebel factions have indicated their support for this, and small wonder. The proposal would achieve their main goal -- removal of Hun Sen's government -- at least until elections were held, and would replace his regime with an outside government that would be virtually powerless to punish cease-fire violations. Moreover, U.N. bureaucrats could serve as yet another foreign enemy against which the xenophobic Khmer Rouge could rally popular opinion. Hun Sen has predictably refused to dismantle his government, which was installed by the Vietnamese army in 1979 to replace the genocidal Khmer Rouge.

For their part, the Khmer Rouge and the other factions may agree to elections as a tactical matter. But none of them have ever participated in a fair election, and the Khmer Rouge, at least, could never dream of winning one. For them, power can come only from the barrel of a gun.

3. Foreign patrons must pressure their Cambodian clients. This may be the U.N. plan's best hope. Optimists believe Moscow will lean on Hun Sen, and Beijing on the Khmer Rouge -- even to the point of cutting off military aid. Severe economic problems and the end of the cold war suggest that the optimists may be right about Soviet intentions. But despite China's agreement to the basic plan and certain vague "signals," it is by no means clear that Beijing would pressure the Khmer Rouge to capitulate. If it does not, more war is likely; if it does, the Khmer Rouge, realizing that some other Asian countries feel as strongly as China about ousting the pro-Vietnamese government in Phnom Penh, could try to continue the war.

4. The proposed cease-fire must last long enough for the U.N.-supervised government to unpack its bags and organize elections. In Indochina few cease- fires have lasted long enough for the guns to cool. The U.N. plan calls for the four armies to be corralled into "cantonment areas," where their weapons would be stored under "U.N. supervision." Experience with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong during the Vietnam War and with the Khmer Rouge over the past 20 years suggests that this is a pipe dream. There are reports that the Khmer Rouge is already developing jungle caches of weapons and personnel in anticipation of a possible cease-fire.

5. A new government must be elected, and the defeated parties must agree to form a loyal opposition. In the 36-year history of modern Cambodia, no government has ever been chosen in a fair, contested election. Nor is there a democratic ideal to which Cambodians might cling. Instead, the great national myth is Angkor Wat and the all-powerful god-kings who ruled a millennium ago. Does this mean Cambodia can never have fair elections? No. Does it mean they are unlikely anytime soon? Yes.

6. Sihanouk must finally make up his mind. If there is one man around whom a new government might be built, it is Sihanouk. Now the various factions simply use him, or his name, at their pleasure. Last June the Prince joined Hun Sen in a call for a Supreme National Council along the lines Hun Sen prefers. But it is unclear whether this was really a split with his Khmer Rouge allies or a ploy aimed at persuading an increasingly shaky U.S. Congress to continue providing nonlethal aid to the noncommunist members of the rebel coalition. Sihanouk is as hard to pin down as a ball of mercury. If he began to lead again, he might make a difference. But he's 67 years old. The world will soon pass him by, if it has not already. The odds are that he will let it pass.

The Bush Administration and its bipartisan supporters in Congress believe the civil war will be brought to an end only through a "comprehensive" settlement that includes removal of the nominally communist Hun Sen government. Others, like former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and Democratic Senator Robert Kerrey, think the war could end through regular government-to-government contact between Washington and Phnom Penh and the lifting of the U.S.-led economic boycott of Cambodia. The former vision may be grander; the latter has a far better chance of success.

With reporting by William Stewart/Hong Kong