Gathering Storm

By STANLEY W. CLOUD WASHINGTON

Hostages. Airlift. Blockade. Showdown. As the crisis in the Persian Gulf entered its fourth week, the words used to describe it came almost entirely from the passionate lexicon of conflict and national pride. And with the accelerating pace of events, the path to a peaceful resolution became increasingly difficult to find, let alone follow. The region seemed poised on the brink of war, a prospect made all the more horrible by fear that chemical weapons might be unleashed not only against troops but also against hundreds of thousands of defenseless civilians.

The use of poison gas would be contrary to conventions ratified by virtually every nation in the world (including Iraq). Yet as American and Egyptian troops tried on their chemical-warfare suits in 110 degrees heat -- and as civilians as far away as Tel Aviv clamored for similar protective gear -- it was impossible to forget that Saddam Hussein had used poison gas against Iran and against his own people. Nor could anyone be unaware that some in the U.S. were arguing for eye-for-an-eye retaliation with chemical, perhaps even nuclear, weapons. King Hussein of Jordan, who managed to become trapped between Iraq and the tightening economic and military vise the U.S. and its allies were clamping on Saddam, sensed a "world gone mad." The greatest danger, perhaps, was the rush of it all. In the jittery atmosphere, it was not always clear whether events were driving rhetoric, or vice versa.

At his family retreat in Kennebunkport, Me., George Bush walked a fine line between the determined vacationer, zipping about in his fuel-guzzling speedboat, and the grim-faced Commander in Chief facing the greatest challenge of his presidency. Bush ordered the first call-up of reserves since Vietnam and approved the sale of more F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia. He declared that in the face-off with Saddam nothing less than America's "way of life" was at stake. He abandoned his earlier fastidiousness about how to describe the thousands of Western civilians, including 3,000 Americans, held by Saddam and finally used the only accurate word: hostages. But he insisted that despite his concerns about their safety, the United Nations food and trade embargo "must be enforced." He won a significant victory early Saturday when the United Nations Security Council voted 13 to 0 (Cuba and Yemen abstaining) for a strongly worded resolution authorizing nations with naval forces in the area to use "such measures . . . as may be necessary . . . to halt all inward and outward maritime" commerce. It was the first time in its 45-year history that the U.N. had authorized force to back up economic sanctions.

For his part, Saddam sought to break his increasing isolation by portraying himself as a man of peace. His first move was to draw attention to the plight of his captives, whom he referred to as "guests of the Iraqi people." He paid a grotesquely avuncular propaganda visit to 25 British hostages, inquiring about their welfare and explaining that they were being detained to prevent a war from breaking out.

The next day, that hypocritical display of hospitality was exposed as a sham. U.S. embassy staff and dependents who had traveled to Baghdad from Kuwait City late in the week, apparently with the assurance that they would be permitted to continue to safety in Jordan, were detained. They had made the trip after Washington decided to evacuate everyone but the ambassador, Nathaniel Howell, and a skeleton staff. That decision followed the refusal of the U.S. -- and most other countries with diplomatic business in Kuwait -- to obey Iraq's order that all embassies be closed, in keeping with Saddam's contention that Kuwait is now part of Iraq. On Saturday Howell and his small staff remained at the embassy in Kuwait City, their electricity cut off, surrounded by Iraqi troops.

Bush and his inner circle of advisers have considered several scenarios for the way the crisis may play out and are refining their responses to each contingency. The most crucial factor is time. If, for example, the embargo takes many months to exert serious pressure on Saddam, says a White House official, "Iraq could simply hunker down and wait us out." A protracted stalemate could cause U.S. allies to tire of the mission or permit friction between American troops and the Saudi population to fester. In the U.S., public impatience with the cost of the buildup could lead to demands for a withdrawal.

But what if the blockade is effective and Saddam proves as good as his threat to make sure his Western "guests" suffer the same fate as Iraqis? The Administration's answer is that it would try to fine-tune the effort to maximize the discomfort of Iraqis, and thus the political pressure on Saddam, without causing actual starvation. To stave off a famine, it might, for example, agree to permit emergency shipments of baby formula and grain.

How might Americans -- and the rest of the world -- react to the sight on television of hostages, including women and children, wasting away under an embargo imposed by their own government? Bush and his inner circle are banking on their belief that most Americans, having seen what happened in Iran and Lebanon, now agree it is a mistake to let U.S. policy be the ransom for hostages' lives. Bush, explains an Administration official, "is not going to sacrifice the interests of 250 million Americans in an attempt to buy the freedom of 2,500 Americans."

Some influential Americans, including Henry Kissinger, have been urging Bush to launch a strike against Saddam before he has time to deploy the hostages as "human shields" at Iraqi military installations. But that option has been ruled out because the Administration believes it is essential for Iraq to be seen as the initiator of a military conflict. If America were to strike first and the Iraqi leader killed hostages in retaliation, says an Administration official, "we might well be blamed at home and abroad for recklessly provoking him." There is little doubt, however, that any actual harm to the hostages would trigger immediate and massive retaliation.

Rather than initiate a military conflict, the U.S. and its allies hope to resolve the crisis by bolstering the embargo's effectiveness. This could be accomplished by warning Jordan that if it does not stop supplies from reaching Iraq through its port at Aqaba, the U.S. will stop shipments from reaching % Jordan itself. As an inducement to King Hussein, oil-rich Arab states along with oil-hungry Japan have offered to make up any losses Jordan would suffer from such actions. The U.S. could also pledge to protect Jordan from any Iraqi military reprisal.

That strategy has its own potential dangers. The biggest threat is that Saddam would order his extensive network of agents in Jordan's predominantly Palestinian population to rebel against the King. Under the pretext of restoring order, Saddam could then move troops into Jordan. That would trigger intervention by Israel. Saddam would have accomplished his goal of transforming the confrontation between Iraq and most of the world into a showdown with Israel and the U.S. that would unite Arabs behind him.

So far, things seem to be going Washington's way. Turkey and other U.S. allies with good intelligence in Iraq have reported shortages of food and other vital commodities there. A White House official notes that desert operations cause frequent military-equipment breakdowns and require large supplies of spare parts, which are not getting through the blockade. "We're expecting Iraq's military to begin suffering breakdowns that they can't fix," he said.

At some point, the White House believes, Saddam's increasingly untenable situation will force him to make a choice: either to lash out militarily or to seek a diplomatic compromise. Some experts detected a few feeble hints last week that he might be willing to negotiate, or was at least trying to buy time. "Saddam is not interested in going down in flames," one official said. "He's interested in power. So if he calculates that his gamble in Kuwait is not working, he may try to cut his losses and conserve his forces for another day." Washington rejected Saddam's elaborate preconditions for talks, such as immediate Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. But in a shift, the Bush Administration told Iraq that it would negotiate in advance of an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait so long as Iraq agreed to talks on the basis of that and other Bush demands.

Some within the Administration contend that an Iraqi retreat that left Saddam's formidable war machine intact, or him in power, would be unacceptable. Once American forces are strong enough, they would welcome some rash act by Saddam, such as an attack on Saudi Arabia's oil fields with high explosives or poison gas. That would give the U.S. an excuse to try to oust him by force. Other officials argued that the blockade alone, if it succeeded in forcing Saddam to disgorge Kuwait, would be enough to fell him. Said another senior official: "One way or another, we are going to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, and we don't think Saddam can survive that."

Washington was increasingly confident that it could contain any military thrust from Iraq. As Operation Desert Shield, which features the largest airlift in history, continued, the day when the U.S. and allied forces would have sufficient strength to conduct offensive operations against Iraq was rapidly approaching, especially since Defense Secretary Dick Cheney has persuaded other gulf countries like Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to provide logistical facilities. In less than two weeks, the U.S. has sent nearly 100,000 troops and a billion pounds of supplies, the equivalent, Pentagon officials boasted, of moving a community the size of Jefferson City, Mo. Despite all this, it could still be several weeks before the planned buildup of heavy armored units is completed, giving the U.S. the capability of waging a ground war against numerically superior Iraqi forces.

Even then the U.S. might not have enough military muscle on hand to liberate Kuwait by force. Said former Secretary of Defense and CIA Director James Schlesinger: "The President may have gotten himself to a point where he can neither back up nor go forward because he lacks the military capacity to expel the Iraqis." The Pentagon conceded it could have a serious fight on its hands. The million-man Iraqi army is battle-experienced (although its morale is in doubt after the eight-year war with Iran and Saddam's frequent purges of the officer corps). Moreover, Iraq's forward air defense and Soviet-built T-72 tanks would be highly effective against a U.S. ground and air assault. In this situation, officials indicated, the U.S. might choose to sweep around Kuwait, directly into Iraq, with ground forces receiving support from both the Air Force and the Navy in the gulf and a coordinated Marine amphibious assault. Before any such thrust, U.S. aircraft would sever Iraq's long and crucial supply lines from Baghdad to Kuwait and vicinity. U.S. aircraft would also try to take out Iraq's nuclear- and chemical-warfare facilities before allied troops had to don their gas masks and protective clothing.

Still, the Administration would prefer to continue the buildup in Saudi Arabia, pursue the economic blockade of Iraq, and try to keep up the international pressure until Saddam folds. That scenario has the ring of wishful thinking. Economic sanctions are rarely decisive; in Cuba and Vietnam they only stiffened the resolve of those at whom they were aimed.

Nor would the hardship of a prolonged confrontation be confined to Iraq. Although Bush, much like Lyndon Johnson during Vietnam, has sought to downplay the domestic costs of Desert Shield, he will not be able to do so for long. The fear of war alone was enough to push financial markets in the U.S., Europe and Japan into a deep slide, a mere foretaste of the worldwide economic disaster that would occur if an all-out war erupted, involving not just the U.S. and Iraq but Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries -- perhaps including Israel -- as well. The call-up of U.S. reserves will remove 40,000 men and women from their families and jobs.

Despite the general support that has greeted the initial stage of Bush's buildup -- a TIME/CNN poll by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman of 500 adults nationwide showed that 76% approve of the way he is handling the crisis -- doubts will inevitably begin to arise. Questions about the costs and objectives of the buildup will be asked when Congress returns from its August break. The possibility of heavy casualties, the plight of the hostages, the economy, the federal deficit (now well over $200 billion, including the savings-and-loan bailout) and the belief by some experts that the U.S. may have to maintain a military force in the gulf more or less permanently -- all these considerations are certain to come into play as the stalemate with Saddam continues.

Once sufficient U.S. forces are in place, political pressures might tempt Bush to break the stalemate by trying for a quick military victory. If Saddam's seizure of U.S. diplomats last week is any guide, Iraq is capable of an action so provocative that the U.S. would be forced to retaliate. But war is never as quick, clean or painless as the planners say. Patience and determination might still avert the increasingly inevitable tragedy. Those qualities are in alarmingly short supply.

With reporting by Dan Goodgame/Kennebunkport, J.F.O. McAllister and Bruce van Voorst/Washington