Hanging Together -- or Separately

By Lisa Beyer

As wondrous as it seemed at the time, the unanimity achieved by the world community three weeks ago in condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the easy part. The real test is hanging together to defeat Saddam Hussein.

In the first weeks of United Nations-sponsored sanctions, there was heartening evidence of a determined international effort to make the penalties stick. The exceptions proved the rule: Sri Lanka continued to sell tea -- 1.1 million lbs. of it each week -- to Iraq, arguing that its frail economy could not afford to lose the export income. Bulgaria asked the U.N. for an exemption, also pleading poverty. Most other nations appeared ready to hold to the embargo, at least for a while: even Switzerland broke a centuries-long tradition of neutrality to join in the effort.

On the military front, there was less cohesion. Initially, the Bush Administration's dash to bolster Saudi Arabia's defenses produced a groundswell of support. The British contributed warplanes and ships to the effort, and an armada comprising 71 ships from eight nations began to converge on the Arabian Peninsula. But as the U.S. military buildup continued, there was a palpable sense of hesitancy in many world capitals. Asked whether non- American and non-British vessels would actually fight against Iraq, a senior British diplomat replied, "Let's hope the issue never arises. The fragile unity could simply fall apart."

The single greatest source of concern was the U.S. move to enforce a blockade of Iraq without a go-ahead from the U.N. Security Council. Only Britain has publicly agreed with the U.S. that the interdiction effort was legally justified. But even if the U.S. had not forged ahead of the pack, differences were bound to emerge within the grand coalition. The truth is that each nation involved in the gulf crisis has a unique set of interests, and some augur for more tenacity than others.

BRITAIN. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has never been one to flinch from a challenge, and her country has a deep historical interest in the Middle East. Thatcher has long insisted that Saddam's pan-Arab assertiveness was a menace. Moreover, she is always keen on reinforcing the "special relationship" between London and Washington that was believed to be on the wane with the advent of the Bush Administration. Popular opinion strongly supports Thatcher's tough stand: a recent Gallup poll showed that 83% of Britons approve of her actions in sending forces to the gulf -- more than backed her in the 1982 Falklands war.

FRANCE. Although the government of President Francois Mitterrand has dispatched six ships to the trouble zone, it has assiduously distanced itself from the U.S. military effort. Asked why no French troops are on the ground in Saudi Arabia, Foreign Minister Roland Dumas declared, "Our help has not been solicited." A more likely explanation is that France, as ever, is averse to overt military cooperation with the U.S.

France has been Iraq's second largest arms supplier behind the Soviet Union. Until the embargo the country imported about 7% of its oil from Iraq, and until recently it paid for much of it with weapons. French sensibilities, however, urge a cautious approach. They are conditioned by a long-standing intimacy with the Arab world, especially in northern Africa, and by concern about the effects of Arab nationalism both on French investments abroad and on communities at home. More than 1.5 million Arabs form a significant minority in France.

WEST GERMANY. For the imminently reunifying nation, the gulf conflagration poses a starker question than for the rest of Europe: will it again function / as a global military power? According to most interpretations of the Federal Republic's 1949 constitution, West Germany cannot exercise military force outside the area defined by the NATO alliance -- which does not include the gulf. But last week five German minesweepers left the North Sea for the eastern Mediterranean to relieve American ships that have been sent to join the anti-Iraq squad. The German ships are well placed to move quickly to the gulf. Chancellor Helmut Kohl believes Germany owes the U.S. a debt of gratitude for supporting its unification and would like to give that order. But Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher argues that parliament must change the constitution before military action is taken.

TURKEY. Some of the biggest risks in the confrontation were being taken by the only NATO country that shares a border with Iraq. Turkey has effectively closed the pipeline that crosses Turkish soil, one of Iraq's two major oil pipelines, by refusing to allow tankers to take on Iraqi crude, about half of which normally gets to market via that route. On the other hand, Ankara has refused to allow the U.S. to use the four largest NATO bases in Turkey to stage operations in the gulf. Nor will it contribute troops to the Saudis' defense. "We are helping by keeping a large army on the Iraqi border with Turkey," President Turgut Ozal told TIME last week.

Joining the embargo has been costly to the Turks, whose frontier with Iraq extends 200 miles. They stand to lose an estimated $4 billion in revenues from the cutoff. The policy could also be costly to Ozal, who drew strenuous criticism for his actions. A poll last week showed that 72% of Turks continue to oppose any kind of military involvement in the gulf crisis. Unhappiness over the embargo may increase when it becomes clearer that Ozal's action will not get the country any closer to its wish of joining the European Community.

CANADA. The U.S.'s neighbor quickly promised to send three vessels to the gulf. But since then, the blockade controversy has caused growing ambivalence. The government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney has come in for heavy opposition criticism. Having long prided themselves on their support of U.N. peacekeeping, many Canadians are bothered by Washington's failure to wait for U.N. approval of the naval interdiction.

SOVIET UNION. Moscow voted with the U.S. in the U.N. Security Council -- a rare occurrence -- condemning Iraq's land grab and supporting the sanctions. But as American soldiers began pouring into Saudi Arabia, the Soviets began to feel increasingly uneasy about their role in the anti-Saddam alliance. Moscow is not eager to be seen as joining Washington in a police action against a former close friend, nor can it condone so dramatic a shift in the military balance in the gulf. Still, the Soviets recognize that cooperating with the West against Saddam is an excellent way to earn points that could translate to desperately needed economic assistance later on. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze reiterated last week that if the U.N. calls for a multinational force in the gulf, Moscow would join the effort.

JAPAN. The initial response to the crisis was stereotypical: Tokyo began to spread money around. The government announced that it was considering an unspecified package of economic aid for Turkey and Jordan, which will be badly bruised by the cutoff of Iraqi trade, and for Egypt to defray some of the costs of keeping its force in Saudi Arabia. Other proposals include offering technological assistance to build a water-desalination plant in Saudi Arabia and the dispatch of noncombat medical, communications and transportation personnel to help in the Saudis' defense. Japan must scramble harder than some countries to secure new energy supplies during the embargo: 13% of Japan's oil imports formerly came from Iraq and Kuwait.

The crisis has also triggered a new debate in Japan over its long-standing constitutional restrictions against overseas military involvement. Late last week Tokyo apparently began to consider sending minesweepers to the Middle East. Such a move would be extremely controversial, not only within Japan but also in the rest of Asia.

SOUTH ASIA. The only non-Western, non-Arab countries to join the anti-Saddam military effort are, not by coincidence, both Muslim and highly dependent on U.S. aid. Pakistan receives an average of $600 million a year from Washington, and Bangladesh gets $135 million. Officially, both decided to send token forces in response to a request from King Fahd to protect the Islamic shrines of Mecca and Medina, but it was plain enough that U.S. urgings had played a role. The decisions to deploy were not well received in either country. In a front-page article in the Frontier newspaper, Mushahid Hussain, a leading Pakistani columnist, charged that the new government had "compromised national sovereignty and weakened national security."

AUSTRALIA. In a rare display of solidarity, Labor Prime Minister Bob Hawke and Conservative opposition leader John Hewson stood together last week in Sydney harbor to bid farewell to three Australian warships headed for the gulf region. The general public was less enthusiastic. Various polls showed 55% of Australians oppose the dispatch of the vessels; many compared it to Australia's vain support for the U.S. in Vietnam.

Can such a diverse array of interests remain in concert? It must. Without the fragile alliance, the U.S. would probably still win a war against Iraq. But the prospects for a lasting solution in the region depend on keeping the struggle between a unified international community and a belligerent Arab state from degenerating into a collision only between George Bush and Saddam Hussein.

With reporting by Cathy Booth/Ankara, John Kohan/Moscow and William Mader/London