The World Closes

By Lisa Beyer

Once he gulped down Kuwait, Saddam Hussein paused to consider what move he should make next. That gave the rest of the world time to muster its defenses -- but not much time. As the week wore on, Iraq and the U.S. moved closer to confrontation, but neither seemed to know just how far it would have to go. Saddam hesitated to send his battle-ready soldiers across the Saudi border, but he did not retreat either. A global gathering of opponents joined the U.S. in sweeping economic sanctions, but almost all troops landing in the desert to bolster the tiny Saudi army were American. The situation remained dangerously unstable. President Bush vowed not only to defend the Persian Gulf but also to force Saddam to disgorge Kuwait. Saddam formally annexed the Emir's kingdom, dropped all pretenses of a military pullout and called for a holy war to "burn the land under the feet of the aggressive invaders."

Still, it began to look as if Iraq's gamble had been an audacious miscalculation. Standing together against Saddam, every major world power worked in unprecedented concert to tame his renegade ambitions. The U.N. Security Council voted without dissent for record, tough economic sanctions -- mandatory for all U.N. members -- aimed at strangling Saddam until he released Kuwait from his grip. As added encouragement, and to dissuade the Iraqi bully from pushing any farther into the Arabian peninsula, various navies began to crowd the Persian Gulf as well as the Mediterranean, Red and Arabian seas. They were well placed to enforce a blockade of Iraq.

The U.S. poured thousands of troops into Saudi Arabia to stare down the Iraqis gathered threateningly at the border with Kuwait. Bush was betting that the very presence of G.I.s would deter Saddam from ordering his army forward. At the same time, the U.S. force served credible notice that Bush was indeed willing to put his own men at risk to protect the sanctity of the gulf states -- and their oil.

Another worry for Saddam -- surely unexpected -- was the Arab League's remarkable decision on Friday to endorse the dispatch of Arab troops to join the Saudis' defense. A day later, contingents of Egyptian and Moroccan troops were in place, prepared to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Americans against their Arab brothers, and Syrians were on the way. The Arab presence had political as well as military significance. No longer could Saddam easily cast himself as the Arab nationalist taking on the Western imperialists and their Saudi lackeys. The Arab League's move was a difficult but brave decision that drew the circle tight around Iraq. Observed British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher: "I cannot remember a time when we had the world so strongly together against an action as now."

The astonishing unanimity of purpose brought out all sorts of uncharacteristic behavior. The Saudis for the first time allowed the U.S. to stage military operations from their soil, breaking the old taboo against colluding openly with Israel's closest ally. Japan, which has assiduously avoided conflict with gulf states to guarantee a steady oil supply, chose principle over economics. Switzerland, which does not belong to NATO, the European Community or even the U.N. and ordinarily eschews economic sanctions, took sides by joining in. Even Cuba and Yemen, Security Council members that abstained in the vote for sanctions against Baghdad, fell into line when the Council moved to condemn Iraq's announced annexation of its tiny neighbor.

The old geopolitical map was being redrawn. China, the Soviet Union and the U.S. found themselves voting together on the Middle East, a subject that has bitterly divided them in the past. Moscow held open the possibility of joining a U.N. force against its ally Iraq. That could mean joint military action with the U.S., an unthinkable idea for the past 45 years. At the same time, the wider role that many in Washington would like to see NATO adopt got an unrehearsed trial run, with the U.S. relying heavily on Turkey to complete the economic asphyxiation of Iraq, its southeastern neighbor. "The real significance of this crisis," said a senior Bush Administration official, "is that it is going to define the post-cold war world."

For a time, anyway. Most nations seemed to realize that if the superpowers were no longer going to police the world, a global Neighborhood Watch had better develop -- at least to counter this particular bogeyman. As extraordinary as the harmony of world reaction was, the circumstances that created it were equally improbable. It is not often that the world produces a dictator who so blatantly disregards the laws of civility to commit such an overt, unambiguous act of aggression against a peaceful neighbor that poses no security threat whatsoever. It is rare that a victim's fortunes are so directly tied to the health of the Western economies. And it is more unusual still that the aggressor rules an all but landlocked country dependent on imports for food and on the sufferance of its neighbors to get its one significant income earner, oil, to market. "In international affairs," said a senior Bush Administration official, "it is rare that the ball is so clearly teed up."

But will the motives and the means to quell Iraq's hegemonic aims prove enough? Saddam was certainly in no mood for capitulation last week. "We would rather die than be humiliated," the Iraqi President thundered. "We will pluck out the eyes of those who attack the Arab nation." Baghdad cut off its only easy out when it dissolved the five-day-old provisional government it had established in Kuwait and announced an "eternal merger" of the country with Iraq. This left Iraq no way to retreat from Kuwait without a serious loss of face, something the megalomaniacal Saddam is not likely to accept.

Next, Saddam upped the ante by explicitly threatening Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states, issuing a call for the overthrow of the "Emirs of oil." Ever since his capture of Kuwait, Saddam has played on Arab xenophobia and proclaimed himself the leader of a campaign to redistribute Arab wealth from the rich gulf monarchies to the poorer republics, or at least to Iraq.

Saddam's intransigence left only dangerous scenarios for the outcome of the crisis. Despite their willingness to mount a pan-Arab force to protect Saudi Arabia, Iraq's fellow Arab states could eventually put together an agreement to buy Saddam off. In its most likely form, the dictator would agree to leave the rest of the gulf alone in exchange for large chunks of Kuwait's land -- especially Bubiyan Island, which blocks most of Iraq's short shoreline -- plus huge sums of money and possibly a permanent share of Kuwait's oil revenues. A nominally independent Kuwait might wind up in a federation in which Baghdad was the obvious senior partner. This solution would almost surely prove temporary. Once paid, the extortionist usually comes back for more.

Or Iraq could sit tight in Kuwait while the American forces sweat it out in the Saudi desert. This could lead to a long standoff that would severely test the patience of the West and its commitment to the region. The U.S. in particular has an aversion to protracted expeditions abroad. Washington hopes that the economic sanctions will eventually force Saddam to relent. But if they fail, the U.S. would have to write off Kuwait or move against Iraq's troops there. Once Saddam is put on the defensive, his position could drastically improve in popular Arab circles, muddying the lines in the conflict.

Or Saddam could strike out at his enemies. That would be an extremely daring, perhaps suicidal move. Before the deployment of foreign troops to Saudi Arabia, the Iraqis would have faced a weak opponent there. Now they are up against an American ground force, which could quickly grow to 50,000, plus the Arab contingent. Iraqi tanks would suffer air attacks from U.S. and British fighters, whose numbers will soon reach 130. And Baghdad would face the prospect of bombing raids. But in return, Saddam could wreak havoc with the region's oil fields, wiping out production facilities and sending the world economy into a tailspin.

Saddam cannot win such an encounter, but that will not necessarily deter him. He fought the Iranians, after all, for eight years, spent $112 billion, lost an estimated 120,000 soldiers, gained absolutely nothing and yet considers himself the victor of that conflict. While the presence of the Arab forces has reduced the likelihood that Saddam will send his tanks rushing across the border, he could choose a more limited form of engagement. He might well strike at foreign ships positioned nearby, as happened in the so-called tanker war of the 1980s, calculating that this would not provoke massive retaliation.

Or he could completely alter the equation by attacking Israel, thus pulling his Arab opponents back to his cause. "No intelligence service in the world can anticipate what he will do," noted an intelligence official in Israel, where the air force and air defense command were on alert, and where television broadcasts were filled with advice on how to survive a chemical- weapons attack. "He is cornered and can do almost anything."

Among the scariest of Saddam's options would be to exploit the tens of thousands of foreign nationals who are stranded in Iraq and Kuwait. Both countries are a hostage taker's dream bazaar. Among the expatriates in Kuwait are 3,000 Americans, 3,000 Britons and 3,000 Turks. In Iraq there are an additional 500 Americans, 2,000 Britons, 8,000 Soviets and 3,000 Turks. Last week Iraq sealed its borders and Kuwait's. Later, 11 Americans, all of them Baghdad embassy staff and their dependents, except for 10-year-old Penelope Nabokov, were allowed to depart for Jordan. But there was no indication of when any others would be permitted to leave.

Fears about Saddam's intentions toward the foreigners escalated when the short-lived provisional government in Kuwait hinted that it might take hostages. The regime announced it could not be expected "to act honorably at a time when ((foreigners)) are conspiring against us and our brothers in Iraq." If Saddam does interpose these civilians between himself and his confronters, the Western powers will face the nastiest dilemma: giving in to the demands of a vicious brute or risking thousands of innocent lives to squash him.

Even if the foreigners do not become Saddam's pawns, life in occupied Kuwait is unpleasant enough. According to refugees who managed to escape, the invaders have gone on a rampage of pillage and rape. A Turkish man saw Iraqi troops carry off every piece of gold in every store along Amara Street, Kuwait's jewelry row. Other witnesses said soldiers broke into automobile showrooms, seized Mercedes and drove them back to Iraq. The marauders raided private homes and even emptied supermarket shelves. "It was more like a big robbery than an invasion," said Ali Awsar, a Turk who had been working in Kuwait.

Examining all options to defuse the crisis, the U.S. has begun to weigh the possibilities of toppling Saddam from within. That, however, would be no mean feat. There is no organized opposition in Iraq and no dissident movement to speak of. Saddam has seen to that by killing or imprisoning all foes, real or imagined. According to British diplomats, he had some 50 senior military officers, including several generals, shot when they balked at his plans to raid Kuwait.

The Iraqi dictator, however, will find his position at home sorely tested as economic sanctions start to bite. The U.N. measures bar all member states from buying anything from or selling anything to either Iraq or Kuwait, except on humanitarian grounds. Separately, the E.C., the U.S. and Japan have frozen Kuwait's foreign assets, some $100 billion worldwide, to keep them out of Saddam's clutches.

Only twice before has the U.N. leveled mandatory sanctions to try to humble a recalcitrant state. Both attempts were flops. A ban on trade with Rhodesia was in effect for 13 years, beginning in 1967, after the white racist government unilaterally declared independence from Britain. Neighboring South Africa kept Rhodesia -- now Zimbabwe -- supplied with arms, gasoline and vital consumer goods while acting as middleman for the country's tobacco exports. In 1977 the U.N. banned arms sales to South Africa to protest apartheid, and independently, many countries restricted their economic ties in the mid-1980s. Still, South Africa's economy has prospered.

Iraq's circumstances, however, are more favorable to the sanctioners. The country is vulnerable because its economy is staggering under the weight of $70 billion in war debts and the $10 billion-a-year cost of keeping 1 in 17 Iraqi citizens under arms. In addition, the sanctions against Iraq, unlike those against South Africa, are comprehensive. And unlike Rhodesia, Iraq derives its income almost entirely from one commodity, oil, which accounts for 95% of its exports. Unlike each of the other countries, Iraq lacks the industrial or agricultural base necessary to achieve a significant degree of self-sufficiency.

Iraq's softest spot is food. The country relies on imports for 70% of its wheat and nearly all its chicken feed, meat, cheese, sugar and cooking oil. Most of these foodstuffs come from North America, Europe and Australia. The sanctions exempt food exports if they are justified on humanitarian grounds, but many of Saddam's suppliers have decided to starve him out, at least as long as famine is not imminent. Estimates of how long Iraq's food stores will last range from two to six months.

Even if Saddam finds someone to sell to him, he will soon run out of cash for supplies if the boycott of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil continues to hold. By week's end the embargo was nearly 100% complete, choking off all exports from both countries.

For now, only an honor system enforces the sanctions. After 30 days, the U.N. will determine whether violations have occurred. If they have, the U.S. will press for a U.N.-sponsored naval blockade of Iraq. Ships in nearby waters could -- with considerable accuracy -- monitor incoming and outgoing vessels to ensure that no blacklisted oil got out. In effect, President Bush has already put such a blockade into position, warning Saddam, "I would advise Iraqi ships not to go out with oil."

These sanctions will also damage many of the countries that impose them, since the world relies on Iraq and Kuwait for 10% of its oil needs. But Iraq's opponents won a reprieve last week when important oil producers like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela and Mexico said they would increase output to make up for most of the shortfall. That news helped stabilize world financial markets and stymie the superquick climb of oil prices last week.

Particularly vulnerable to the fallout of the sanctions is Turkey, which had been getting about half its oil from Iraq. A poor country, Turkey earned as much as $250 million a year in pipeline fees from Iraq, which is among its largest trading partners. Because the location of Turkey makes it a linchpin in the strategy to isolate Saddam, its worries have been taken seriously. Kuwait's Emir has offered to compensate the Turks for most if not all of their financial damages, which Ankara estimates will come to $2.5 billion annually. Because Turkey is so vulnerable to Saddam's wrath, Secretary of State James Baker traveled to Ankara to personally deliver Western assurances, and saw to it that NATO reaffirmed its commitment to back the country in the event of an attack.

President Turgut Ozal agreed to enforce the full-scale sanctions against Iraq, but Baker's reassurances apparently were not enough to persuade him to contribute forces to the Saudis' defense. The other NATO countries have also been happy to have the Americans shoulder the brunt of the burden. Still, every time Saddam blusters anew, fresh offers of assistance roll in. "If Saddam is not punished this time," said a worried official close to Ozal, "he will be out seeking new adventures soon."

It would be overly optimistic to hope that the global encirclement of Saddam will serve as a model for coping with future regional conflicts. The world response to the Kuwaiti crisis is a special case because the stakes -- oil -- are so high and because Saddam has played such a textbook villain. No such unanimity could be expected if, for example, India invaded Pakistan, Senegal made a move on Gambia, or Bolivia rumbled into Paraguay. In effect, this first test of the post-cold war security structure is a relatively simple one. But that is all the more reason why the forces lined up so uniformly against Saddam must not be allowed to fail.

With reporting by William Dowell/Bahrain, Michael Duffy/Washington and Christopher Ogden with Baker