America Abroad

By Strobe Talbott

Lightweight, demagogue, buffoon, windbag. At best naive, at worst dangerous. Those were among the put-downs of the newly elected president of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic that came sluicing anonymously out of the U.S. Government on the eve of last week's summit. The name-calling stemmed in part from memories of Boris Yeltsin's visit to Washington in September.

Yeltsin called on Brent Scowcroft at the White House. "What is the objective of your visit?" asked the National Security Adviser. With no more encouragement than that, Yeltsin launched into a hortatory rhapsody about how U.S. business could "rescue" perestroika by building 1 million apartments and an entire service sector for the Soviet economy; he also plugged a joint mission to Mars. He talked virtually nonstop for a full hour.

* Just as Scowcroft's patience was giving out, George Bush stopped by to say hello and, as quickly as possible, goodbye. Asked about Yeltsin later, the President paused, smiled and said he had found him "a jolly fellow."

In the eight months since, American policymakers have frequently cited Yeltsin as living proof that there is no "serious" alternative to Mikhail Gorbachev. It is crucial to Gorbachev's strategy in dealing with the U.S. that Americans worry about his being replaced by a neo-Brezhnevite, if not a neo- Stalinist. Now along comes Yeltsin to pose the tantalizing possibility of a Soviet leader who would be more accommodating on a wide range of issues. He has indicated, for example, that he might give back to Japan islands occupied since the last days of World War II. Still, his victory last week was at first taken as little more than further evidence of how unhinged the Soviet Union is these days.

Ironically and significantly, some of the Soviets who accompanied Gorbachev to Washington last week wasted no time in buttonholing their American counterparts and privately urging a little constructive revisionism in the Yeltsin case. Their argument went like this:

Whatever his foibles, Yeltsin seems dedicated to all that is most welcome (if not most promising) in perestroika. Therefore he is a natural ally for Gorbachev. Even the disagreements between them constitute a tactical opportunity for Gorbachev. In dealing with his conservative constituencies in the military and the party apparatus, he can point to Yeltsin over his left shoulder and say, Do business with me or you may end up with that guy instead.

Several of Gorbachev's advisers added that they were concerned about his thin skin and his tendency to personalize political disputes. Hence they were upset to find the U.S. press awash in what they took to be officially instigated presummit Yeltsin bashing.

"We have a big job ahead of us," said one Gorbachev associate to an American who is close to Bush. "We must persuade our leader to make common cause with Yeltsin. It's in your best interests that we succeed. So don't play to Gorbachev's sense of his own indispensability."

All perfectly reasonable, but also perfectly extraordinary. Soviet officials used to chastise Americans for "interference in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R." Now they solicit help in teaching their boss the ways of democratic politics.