Diplomacy A Hurry-Up Summit

By Richard Lacayo

When plans were first made for Eduard Shevardnadze's trip to Washington, the aim was to prepare for the upcoming summit meeting between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. By the time the Soviet Foreign Minister arrived for three days of talks last week, the sessions had taken on far greater importance. In the wake of Gorbachev's campaign to thwart Lithuania's drive for independence, Shevardnadze's visit would be watched for signs of the damage done to U.S.-Soviet relations by Moscow's tough line -- and to gauge Bush Administration priorities in the era of waning superpower tensions.

By the time the Soviet Minister departed, it was clear that the fate of the tiny Baltic republic, which unilaterally declared its independence from Moscow, though big enough to be a stumbling block in the rush toward better relations, was still too small, for now, to be a decisive obstacle. "We have an awful lot at stake in the U.S.-Soviet relationship," Bush said after meeting with the Soviet Minister for 2 hours and 20 minutes on Friday. "An enormous amount at stake."

Shevardnadze's trip was intended to give both sides a chance to make last- minute progress on major arms-control agreements that Bush and Gorbachev hoped to sign the next time they met. As it happened, the sessions also unveiled a new Soviet flexibility on Germany and Israel. But the most newsworthy outcome of Shevardnadze's three days of talks with Bush and Secretary of State James Baker was simply the announcement of a date for the summit -- several weeks earlier than Washington had anticipated. The announcement that the encounter would start on May 30 in Washington dispelled any question that Lithuania was important enough to derail the meeting. Before departing, a satisfied Shevardnadze could announce: "This summit will certainly become a major event in world affairs."

That did not mean relations were on the smoothest possible track. A "tough- love working relationship" was the term White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater used to describe U.S.-Soviet dealings these days. Tough in more ways than one. During Shevardnadze's five sessions with Baker, some serious snags appeared in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Afterward, a senior Soviet official said it was "impractical" to assume that a pact limiting the most destructive portions of the superpower arsenal would be signed at the Bush-Gorbachev meeting. Nonetheless both U.S. and Soviet sides agreed that all the major issues involved -- if not the fine print -- would be resolved by May 30.

Even before those differences surfaced, George Bush was having trouble satisfying congressional critics who want firmer White House support for Lithuania, while at the same time avoiding any U.S. steps that might play into the hands of Mikhail Gorbachev's conservative opponents at home. Every time Gorbachev turns up the pain on Lithuania, Bush winces, and he had plenty of reason to grimace last week. As Soviet armored vehicles paraded through Vilnius, the capital, Moscow closed Lithuania's border with Poland and expelled Western reporters from the republic.

The U.S. Congress, meantime, stepped up its efforts to pressure Bush into showing displeasure with Moscow's tactics. By a 416-to-3 vote, the House passed a non-binding resolution urging the President to recognize an independent Lithuania "at the earliest possible time." Meanwhile, 31 Senators sent a letter to the White House calling on Bush to spell out U.S. responses -- from trade sanctions to cancellation of the summit -- if the Soviets took further measures against Lithuania.

Unwilling to go that far, Bush seemed to be hoping that Gorbachev would keep him from having to face the issue. Last month Bush sent Gorbachev a letter underlining his expectation that the Soviet leader would not resort to force in Lithuania. Shevardnadze brought a lengthy return letter from Gorbachev, but it turned out to be a missive about arms control.

The Soviet Minister's visit also began amid a flurry of mixed signals about Lithuania. On his arrival Tuesday, Shevardnadze asserted that his government's "main weapon" for resolving any issue is "honest dialogue." His claims were buttressed in Moscow, where Lithuanian leaders had gone to seek a meeting with Gorbachev, a sign that the ongoing Soviet pressure campaign was bearing fruit. The Soviet leader refused to see the delegation but sent Aleksandr Yakovlev, a close ally and member of his presidential council. By Thursday, however, Soviet troops had moved into the chief prosecutor's office in the Lithuanian capital. They expelled staff members loyal to the former prosecutor, who was dismissed by Moscow two weeks ago and replaced by a successor chosen to enforce Soviet law in the rebellious republic.

In Washington, Shevardnadze offered another surprise. He told his American opposite number that Gorbachev wanted a five-day summit, to begin on May 30. White House officials had been counting on a visit in late June. They had envisioned a meeting that would allow the Soviet President time for sight- seeing and for plenty of leisurely photo opportunities to remind Americans of the U.S.-Soviet goodwill that has blossomed under the Bush Administration.

Why the rush? Gorbachev's reasons were ostensibly domestic. In addition to his headaches in the Baltics, the Soviet leader faces a June session of the Congress of the Russian Federation, the deliberative body of the Russian republic. That will be followed by the crucial 28th Communist Party Congress, starting on July 2. At that meeting Gorbachev is expected to consolidate the transfer of his power base from the party to the newly formed presidency. "He cannot simply turn up at these meetings," said a Soviet spokesman. "He has to prepare for them." Administration officials admitted that the earlier summit allows Gorbachev to send a strong signal, as one put it, "that Lithuania isn't going to stand in the way of better relations."

The accelerated schedule was one reason why work on the START treaty would not be finished in time for a summit signing, a goal the two men set for themselves when they met for the first time in Malta last December. Problems still remain to be worked out on verification, the range limit of air-launched cruise missiles and methods for counting warheads on future types of missiles. Moreover, according to a report in last week's Washington Post, the START treaty has begun to look a good deal less sweeping than advertised. Originally, the treaty was expected to cut in half the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Now it seems that START will countenance deployment of nearly as many U.S. warheads as at present.

In their private meetings last week, U.S. and Soviet negotiators bogged down in an area that the U.S. had thought was resolved: sea-launched cruise missiles. An agreement forged last winter would have allowed both nations to abide by "binding declaratory limits" on the unmanned nuclear-tipped weapons launched from submarines or surface ships. The deal would have allowed the U.S. to keep a larger number of SLCMs, as long as it told Moscow how many were in the American stockpile.

Last week the Soviets said they want "equal verifiable limits" instead, meaning no U.S. advantage. The surprise reversal led to some tense debates between the negotiators and caused Bush to admonish Shevardnadze when the two men met on Friday in the Oval Office. "We have some difficulties on arms control," the President told his visitor. "I hope they can be resolved."

Some other Soviet shifts were more welcome. Bowing to the inevitable, Shevardnadze announced that his side was dropping its insistence on neutrality for a unified Germany -- an important change in Moscow's position. He continued to hold, however, that Moscow would not agree to the unified nation's joining NATO. Shevardnadze suggested that Germany might become part of both the Western alliance and the Warsaw Pact but offered no specifics. "We were equally firm in our view that a unified Germany must remain a member of NATO," Baker reported later.

Shevardnadze further informed his hosts that Moscow was willing to implement an agreement offering direct flights for Soviet-Jewish immigrants to Israel, provided that Israel give assurances the newcomers would not be settled "in the occupied territories." Because the Soviets include not only the West Bank and Gaza but also East Jerusalem in that term, the Israelis are virtually certain to balk. In addition, Shevardnadze held out the possibility that Moscow would resume the diplomatic ties with Israel that were severed in 1967 after the Six-Day War, though he conditioned that move on the "overall Middle East situation."

Even without a START treaty, Bush and Gorbachev should be able to sign a goodly clump of summit agreements. Among the topics: cooperation in trade, science, the environment and activities in space. Plans call for Baker and Shevardnadze to hold one more preparatory meeting next month in Moscow. "It's still our hope that major issues will be resolved by the summit, but that's got to take a lot of work," said Baker.

That meeting may also settle matters like the itinerary for Gorbachev's U.S. visit. The President, who favors one-to-one diplomacy, had hoped to take Gorbachev to the Bush family retreat in Kennebunkport, Me. Bush is now resigned to the likelihood that most of the summit will consist of working sessions in Washington, with the possibility of a side trip to Camp David. According to a White House official, the President has begun to accept that Gorbachev is not a "relaxing kind of guy." With the clock ticking on START and pressure continuing to build in the Baltics, the next few weeks are likely to be anything but relaxing.

CHART: NOT AVAILABLE

CREDIT: TIME Chart by Steve Hart

CAPTION: WHERE THE TREATIES STAND

With reporting by Anne Blackman/Moscow and Michael Duffy and Christopher Ogden/Washington