America Abroad

By Strobe Talbott

In trying to vote themselves out of the U.S.S.R. three weeks ago, the members of the Lithuanian parliament were making three statements: Here is what our people want; here is what we deserve; here is how to get it. They were right, right and wrong.

Kremlinologists have been wondering for months whether there are any "red lines" beyond which the military, the KGB, the Communist Party and Soviet public opinion will simply not let Mikhail Gorbachev go. The Lithuanians gambled that for them, at least, the answer was no. Gorbachev has replied that for him and for now, the red line is the border of the U.S.S.R. as it has existed since the end of World War II. Yet at the same time, he has acknowledged that the Baltic peoples are entitled to independence. Therein lies the nub both of the crisis and a possible solution.

A squabble has broken out in Washington between resident Soviet casuists and American cheerleaders for the breakup of the evil empire.

Clever Soviet: You should support Gorbachev because he, like Abraham Lincoln, is trying to keep our country together.

Cleverer American: Cut it out! The Union cause was just. The South had not been illegally, forcibly annexed. Stop implicitly comparing George Washington with Joe Stalin!

Touche, Ivan. But the argument is worth following one more step. Gorbachev has infinitely greater might on his side than Lincoln did in the Civil War, but considerably less right. And he knows it. Unlike Lincoln, Gorbachev has already conceded secession in principle. His ever droll spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, talks about divorce. By setting a price on its property in Lithuania, Moscow has opened negotiations on alimony.

Gorbachev is putting in place a procedure that may, if he is around to see it through, give each republic a choice: autonomy in a confederation or, after a transitional period, a separate state. That is probably the best he can offer the Lithuanians. It is also probably the most they can get from him, or from any Kremlin leader. By sticking to their unilateral declaration of independence, they risk everything, not just for themselves but for the more cool-headed Estonians, whose adroit step-by-step approach toward the same goal has a far greater chance of success.

During this episode, George Bush has displayed his favorite quality, prudence, to good effect. He understands that politics is a matter of being right about ends as well as means, of recognizing limits as well as obligations and opportunities. The last thing Bush wants is to repeat the mistake that the Eisenhower Administration made in 1956 when it egged on the Hungarian freedom fighters, leading many of them to die in the expectation of more help than the West could possibly provide. Bush has correctly concentrated on persuading Gorbachev to avert bloodshed and work toward a compromise. To urge him to grant Lithuania the instant annulment it demands would be futile and, as they say in Washington, counterproductive.

The Lithuanians have shown more political courage than political wisdom. Neither quality has been much in evidence from those members of the U.S. Congress who have called for formal recognition of a free Lithuania. Such a thing should and may someday exist, but it cannot be voted into existence by legislators in either Vilnius or Washington in defiance of Moscow. By applauding a morality play as though it were itself a happy ending, Congress is only increasing the chances that it will turn into a tragedy.