Vision Problems at State

By Christopher Ogden

It may be a great place for a powwow -- but a superpower rendezvous? This week's meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze takes place not in Washington or New York City but Wyoming's remote Grand Teton National Park, a glorious setting and a logistical nightmare. At a modern-day campsite near Jackson Hole, advance men have hauled in satellite dishes, encryption machines, secure telephones, simultaneous-translation systems, crates of computers, hundreds of pounds of barbecue and a gift box of hand-tooled cowboy boots.

Between talks on arms control and arrangements for a Bush-Gorbachev summit, Baker wants Shevardnadze to experience a different America at a Saturday cookout and Western hoedown. The informal atmosphere, he hopes, will enhance their rapport. The scenario is vintage Baker: relaxed on the surface, complex beneath.

When George Bush appointed his friend of 30 years to run the State Department, there was speculation that Baker might actually function as an unofficial Deputy President. A former Treasury Secretary, White House chief of staff and three-time presidential campaign chairman, Baker was expected to be the power next to the throne. That conjecture has so far been wrong.

After eight months in his mahogany-paneled office overlooking the Lincoln Memorial, First Friend Baker is not even running foreign policy -- the President handles that. After a rocky start in a new field, the legendary political operative is still taking lumps from critics who argue he is quick to cut a deal, such as the bipartisan accord on Nicaragua, but slow to present a consistent strategy for critical areas like Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

The criticism comes from both left and right. "To provide leadership, you can't just respond to circumstances, you have to create them," says Senator Alan Cranston, the liberal California Democrat and Foreign Relations Committee veteran. Frank Gaffney, director of the conservative Center for Security Policy, thinks that Baker "believes in success for its own sake and often finds specific goals inconvenient. That's not leadership or vision." Even Shevardnadze took a shot last week, complaining that "the restrained, indecisive position of the American Administration" has led to a "peculiar lull" in arms control.

Foreign service professionals have loudly criticized their boss for freezing them out and surrounding himself with longtime aides. "He's running a mini- NSC, not State," complained a senior diplomat. "We learn what our policy is when we read it in the newspapers."

! Yet Baker announced from the outset that he intended to be the President's man at State and not State's man at the White House. If U.S. foreign policy lacks vision, the shortcoming may stem less from Baker than from Bush, who reacts better than he anticipates.

Faulted early on for dithering over Mikhail Gorbachev's peace offensive, the Administration is now accused of being too passive about opportunities in Eastern Europe. In response, Bush last week doubled U.S. emergency food aid for Poland to $100 million. After presenting an early blueprint for Arab- Israeli negotiations, Baker has moved back to the Middle East sidelines. The U.S. has also miscalculated in Cambodia, backing Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who is willing to work with the murderous Khmer Rouge, instead of the Hanoi- backed Hun Sen regime, which is rebuilding the country.

But there have been brighter spots. Baker won plaudits for the Central American plan that demobilizes the contras. "He handled it well," said Kansas Republican Senator Nancy Kassebaum. "It was fuzzy enough for everyone to find a niche." Policy toward South Africa is on hold until new President F.W. de Klerk shows his hand, but the Administration has been tougher on apartheid. "Baker is much more positive on South Africa than Reagan," said Illinois Democrat Paul Simon, who chairs the Senate's Africa subcommittee. Baker also fine-tuned the cautious U.S. response to the Tiananmen Square massacre, pressing Bush for additional sanctions after sensing the depth of outrage in Congress.

If Baker has not become the President's prime minister, he has retained his role as counselor. He and Bush meet privately twice a week for sessions that range well beyond foreign affairs. But Baker carefully avoids meddling in the domestic agenda. Instead, he has settled in with Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to form the most collegial team since the three worked together in the Ford presidency. They gather each Wednesday in Scowcroft's office and coordinate throughout the week. Deferring to Baker, the more experienced Scowcroft seems content to be First Facilitator -- and closer to the Oval Office.

If the triumphs have so far been small, neither have there been any large mistakes. The sniping is likely to lessen if the spirit of Jackson Hole picks up the pace of U.S.-Soviet relations. In the meantime, Baker ignores the grumbling, particularly from his own department. If the professional diplomats - were so smart, he muttered last week, why hadn't they thought of inviting Shevardnadze to Wyoming?