Central America The "Disposal Problem"

By Jill Smolowe

The symbolism was as inescapable as the irony. When the five Central American Presidents gathered last week in the resort town of Tela in northern Honduras, their meeting place was a seaside compound once owned by the United Fruit Co., the U.S. multinational concern that long represented the essence of gringo imperialism in the region. There, the Presidents* negotiated the dissolution of the Nicaraguan contras, a force that to many Central Americans symbolized U.S. arrogance and interference during the 1980s. When the Presidents emerged from three days of deliberations, they had signed an agreement on a specific series of steps to demobilize the contras within the next four months.

The so-called Tela Declaration was a gesture that carried all the moral authority of the region's leaders but none of the military force that might be needed to make it stick. Its realization hinges on the "voluntary" cooperation of the contras and assigns responsibility for implementation to the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

Still, the latest attempt to end the eight-year war in Nicaragua was a rebuff to the U.S., which has supported and guided the contra effort since its inception in 1981. Right up to the last minute, the Bush Administration lobbied regional leaders to postpone demobilization until after the Nicaraguan election, scheduled for Feb. 25, to give the Sandinista regime at least some incentive to uphold its pledges for a free and fair vote.

But as the contra war winds down to a whimper, so too does a U.S. policy that preoccupied the Reagan Administration through two terms. The seeds of disengagement were sown last April, when President Bush secured $49.75 million in nonlethal aid for the contras in exchange for a guarantee that Congress could review -- and sever -- the aid package this November. Since many in Congress support the Central American leaders' desire to disband the contras, the Bush Administration seemed to capitulate without a fight. "Our intention is to play it straight and stick with the ((peace)) process," said a State Department official. "We're not going to stand in the way."

If enforced, the demobilization scheme will complete the gradual mutation of the contras from a military threat to a political force to a refugee remnant that U.S. officials have dubbed the "disposal problem." The Tela plan invites contras and their families to return to Nicaragua from their bases in Honduras but offers the option of resettlement in other countries. Honduras desperately wants the contras to go elsewhere, and Nicaragua has offered to repatriate them safely. But if the contras do not trust such Sandinista promises, the U.S. will face the painful question of its responsibilities toward the rebel force it created.

Much to the dismay of the contras, the demobilization plan enjoys the support of Nicaragua's 20 opposition parties. To ensure their cooperation, President Daniel Ortega Saavedra pledged to suspend Nicaragua's military draft until after the election, to hold fair balloting and to grant opposition candidates free television time. But the U.S. remains skeptical that the election will really prove free or fair, and last week's agreement provides no penalties whatsoever should Ortega renege on his pledges.

Despite the Tela plan's promise, few observers are ready to pronounce the contras dead. Such pronouncements have been issued before. And the rebels made it plain last week that unless the Sandinistas agreed to negotiate with them as equal partners, they had no intention of disarming. If the contras fail to lay down their rifles voluntarily, no one is offering to take the weapons by force.

FOOTNOTE: *Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica, Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador, Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala, Jose Azcona del Hoyo of Honduras and Daniel Ortega Saavedra of Nicaragua

With reporting by Ricardo Chavira/Washington and Wilson Ring/Tela