Not Again A grisly image of a dead hostage outrages the U.S.

By Richard Lacayo

The hostage scenario has become numbingly familiar. The sadistic videotapes of frightened captives, followed by threats of execution. The White House dispatching naval fleets or listening for some faint reply down a clogged diplomatic channel to the Middle East. Last week it was George Bush's turn to try urgent appeals and gunboat maneuvers while an angry public fulminated at American impotence. Just six months in office, Bush had become the third U.S. President in a row caught in the same wretched predicament. The latest hostage crisis, however, yielded a gruesome new image of horror: a man, bound and gagged, dangling from a makeshift scaffold.

The hanging man was almost certainly U.S. Marine Lieut. Colonel William Higgins, 44, who was kidnaped last year while serving as head of an observer team attached to the U.N. peacekeeping force in Lebanon. His captors claimed they killed him in retaliation for Israel's seizure of Sheik Abdul Karim Obeid, a presumed leader of Shi'ite Hizballah terrorists, during a raid into southern Lebanon. U.S. officials now believe, however, that Higgins had been dead for some time, then used for his kidnapers' macabre display. No matter which terrible theory turns out to be true, the image of Higgins' body was a brutal reminder that, ten years after the seizure of hostages at the American embassy in Tehran, the U.S. still lacks any truly effective means for dealing with terrorist kidnapings.

The grueling events of the week put strains on U.S.-Israeli relations over the question of whether Israel had recklessly endangered the lives of Americans. To the Israelis, at least, aggressiveness was clearly preferable to the unbudging status quo that the U.S. appears to tolerate in the unending hostage dilemma. All week the White House navigated between the same poles of military threat and diplomatic engagement that earlier Administrations had tried. Yet by week's end there was a tantalizing glimpse of flexibility: Iran's new President, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, offered to "help" find a solution to the hostage problem, thus raising the hope that Bush will not be boxed in by the implacable hostility of Iran as his predecessors were during the reign of the late Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Nothing better illustrated the endlessness of the hostage dilemma than the threat that Joseph Cicippio would quickly succeed Higgins as the next dangling man. No sooner had the videotape of Higgins' body been released to news agencies in Beirut than a countdown began toward the execution of Cicippio, 58, kidnaped three years ago from the campus of the American University of Beirut. Cicippio's last-minute reprieve was accompanied by a threat that the clock could be set ticking again. His captors demanded that Israel free not only Obeid but also unspecified Palestinians and Lebanese guerrillas. "Acceptance should be announced within days," they added. "Otherwise the initiative will be considered canceled."

In effect, Cicippio's suspended sentence left his loved ones -- and the U.S. -- suspended as well. Behind Cicippio is a tattered line of 14 other Western hostages, eight of them Americans, still believed to be held in Lebanon. Other Americans continue to live and work in that shattered country despite official warnings issued by Washington in January 1987 that in effect they are on their own. So long as the U.S. and its citizens venture forth freely in the world, they will be vulnerable to extortion by kidnapers. Trying to come to terms with that implacable fact, Ronald Reagan stumbled and Jimmy Carter fell.

What should the U.S. do? There is an instinctive longing for the bravado of 1904, when President Theodore Roosevelt was faced with the kidnaping of an American, Ion Perdicaris, by a Moroccan bandit named Ahmed Raisuli. Legend has it that Roosevelt pronounced a famous ultimatum: "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead." (It is less well remembered that Perdicaris was freed only after the Moroccan government paid ransom.) But a poll conducted last Thursday for TIME/ CNN by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman indicates substantial public recognition that a big stick may not be the answer to an explosive and delicate situation. Among those questioned, 45% said the U.S. should retaliate in this instance with military action and 39% said it should not. But when presented with an array of options, 58% of the respondents said the U.S. should negotiate with terrorist groups for the hostages' release, and between 45% and two-thirds rejected various specified U.S. military options.

The latest crisis was sparked by events in Lebanon that dramatized the difference between the Israeli and American responses to hostage taking. On July 28, two dozen Israeli commandos staged a daring raid into the southern Lebanese village of Jibchit. Their goal was to seize Obeid, 32, whom the Israelis identify as a spiritual and military leader of the Shi'ite fundamentalist Hizballah (Party of God), a group with close ties to Iran that is holding most of the Western hostages. The Israelis say they wanted Obeid as a bargaining chip to gain release of three Israeli military men taken prisoner in southern Lebanon in 1986.

The Israeli Cabinet approved the mission by a vote of 11 to 1 in June, after an earlier kidnaping failed to impress Mustafa Dirani, the man believed to be holding one of the soldiers. Last December, Israeli commandos seized Jawad Kasafi, a Dirani associate. But when Jerusalem offered a swap, Hizballah declined even to reply. Israel concluded it needed a bigger fish, and Obeid was selected.

The raid was carried out by two dozen members of the elite Sayeret Matkal unit, which reports only to chief of military intelligence Amnon Shachak. As Israeli jets flew overhead to drown out the noise, a darkened CH-53 helicopter landed after midnight on the outskirts of Jibchit. Lightly armed with silencer-equipped Uzis, pistols and a few small explosives, the commandos crept toward Obeid's house in the center of the village. One team guarded the neighborhood while another raided the house and abducted Obeid and two men who worked as bodyguards. Another man was killed by the Israelis when he stepped out of a neighboring house. Obeid's wife, bound and gagged, was left in the house with his three children, who were untouched.

Although the kidnaping was a success, two days later the larger plan appeared to be backfiring. Recognizing that the U.S. could be more easily pressured than Israel by threats against its hostages, a Hizballah front group calling itself the Organization of the Oppressed on Earth vowed to kill Colonel Higgins unless Obeid was released. Israeli Cabinet officials convened an emergency meeting to formulate a counteroffer. Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin proposed an exchange of Obeid and the estimated 150 Lebanese Shi'ites held in Israeli prisons for the release of the three Israeli soldiers and all the Western hostages.

When Israel sought Washington's approval for Rabin's idea, Bush gave thinly veiled encouragement. On Monday, before the announcement of Higgins' killing, Secretary of State James Baker instructed the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, William Brown, to pass on the message that the U.S. would not "object" to the proposed swap. Though it was a pale green light at best, the Israelis recognized it as a sufficient O.K. But by the time the Israelis announced their offer, videotapes of Higgins' hanging body were already being distributed by Hizballah.

Israeli officials insist they had indeed considered the possibility of a backlash by Hizballah. Rabin told the Knesset on Wednesday that the government had taken into account all possible outcomes, "including the event that took place, and worse." He did not say whether it had concluded that an American hostage might be executed or whether it had anticipated the U.S. public outcry over the Higgins outrage.

Soon after the videotape was broadcast, minority leader Robert Dole took to the Senate floor to make an unusually harsh assessment of Israel's actions. He charged that Israel had "struck out alone, free-lancing," with no regard for the American hostages. Said Dole: "Perhaps a little more responsibility on the part of the Israelis would be refreshing."

Israel was also widely criticized for not informing Washington about its plans to seize Obeid, though advance consultation would have made the U.S. an accomplice to Israeli actions, further alienating Arab nations from the U.S. Some in both houses of Congress came to Israel's defense, stressing that to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its closest Middle East ally would merely serve the interests of the kidnapers. For its part, the White House called pointedly throughout the week for the release of all hostages -- presumably including Obeid.

At the first reports of Higgins' murder, the President cut short a Western- states speechmaking trip to return to Washington. He quickly conveyed his sorrow and outrage in a phone call to Higgins' wife Robin, a Marine public affairs officer. But throughout the week Bush was careful to apply a lesson that had been painfully learned by Jimmy Carter: never let a hostage crisis appear to consume the presidency. The President went to unusual lengths to create what might be called a mood of concerned normalcy, acting as host at a barbecue for members of Congress, playing tennis, even attending a ball game between the Baltimore Orioles and his son George's Texas Rangers.

Behind the scenes, the Administration was working in a crisis mode. In private Bush described himself as going through "the most difficult time of my presidency," and by week's end the strain in his face was pronounced. To save Cicippio, the State Department set up a round-the-clock hostage task force, while the White House launched a diplomatic rescue effort that one U.S. envoy called "a full-court press on everybody we know." Characteristically, the President worked the phone with the heads of state of most European allies and nations in the Middle East -- with the notable exception of Syria's Hafez Assad, whom Bush does not trust.

Bush was also considering a military response. About three dozen U.S. warships were dispatched toward Lebanon and Iran. Iran was notified that as the paymaster of the Hizballah, it would be held responsible if any American hostages were harmed. Through a variety of conflicting leaks, the Administration let it be known that if Cicippio was killed, the President was prepared to order an air strike against suspected terrorist bases.

But Tehran was being offered carrots as well as sticks. Through acquaintances like Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid, Bush offered the possibility of a "constructive relationship" with Iran. The U.S. overtures to Iran went "well beyond the current situation with the hostages," said a senior White House official. Another official said that once the hostage crisis is settled, the U.S. will be willing to discuss renewed "trade and commerce," as well as possibly freeing $4 billion in frozen Iranian assets.

The Administration insists it is not offering to trade for the hostages in violation of U.S. policy, the trap that Ronald Reagan fell into. "We can offer ((the Iranians)) better opportunities with the West, but we're not going to hold out anything specific," said a White House official.

When Cicippio's captors extended the deadline for his execution by 48 hours, there was cautious optimism at the White House that diplomatic efforts were paying off. That mood was sorely tested on Thursday morning, when the kidnapers turned the screws further with the release of a videotape in which Cicippio read a statement urging quick action for the release of Obeid. The tape ended with Cicippio painfully bidding farewell to his wife. But just 45 minutes before he was due to be executed, Hizballah lifted its death threat indefinitely, though with the condition that it was now seeking release of further prisoners.

Bush's strongest card with the Iranians may be his contacts with Algeria, whose intercession helped win the release of the American hostages in the U.S. embassy in Iran. Algeria's Ambassador to Beirut, Khaled Hasnawi, helped negotiate the stay of execution, using Algerian intelligence officers as his mediators with the kidnapers.

Hizballah later named five prisoners held in Israel that it wants released, then issued a statement claiming to have "nothing at all to do with the hostage issue." Even so, Israeli officials interpreted the decision not to execute Cicippio as proof that their gamble was paying off, and that the kidnapers would ultimately agree to a deal for Obeid's release. Cicippio's captors credited the stay of execution to the intervention of "certain parties and countries," a sign that Washington's overtures to Iran might not be falling on deaf ears as in the past.

While Iranian "moderates" have a way of disappointing Western expectations, Rafsanjani is reportedly convinced that Iran failed to win its costly war with Iraq because of its international isolation, which deprived the country of desperately needed military technology and hardware. In a speech Friday, the new Iranian President was remarkably conciliatory: "I tell the White House, the problem of Lebanon has solutions, the freeing of the hostages has solutions, reasonable, prudent solutions." Rafsanjani offered: "Come let us approach the problem reasonably. We too will help solve the problems there."

But the next day Iran was still holding to the line that it had no connection to the hostage takers. Iran's official Islamic Republic News Agency quoted an unidentified foreign ministry official as saying Iran had refused a Bush message about the hostages sent via a third country. "Since the content had nothing to do with Iran," the news agency quoted the official as saying, "the message was not accepted." Tehran's denials were contradicted by an Israeli intelligence report claiming that Obeid had confessed that Hizballah's terrorist activities were directed by the Iranian embassies in Beirut and Damascus.

Even so, Rafsanjani's earlier words of conciliation toward a nation the Ayatullah Khomeini labeled the Great Satan indicate a major change since Khomeini's death in June. Rafsanjani appears to have moved with surprising quickness to consolidate his leadership against challenges from more radical mullahs, particularly Interior Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashami, the principal link between Tehran and Hizballah in Lebanon. There are signs that the new President is also gaining influence over Hizballah, as he must if he is to deliver on any promises to help in the hostage situation. When Hizballah leaders went to Tehran several weeks ago to express their condolences over Khomeini's death, they reported directly to Rafsanjani. He is believed to have dispatched his own men to Lebanon to bring into line pockets of Hizballah, including those loyal to Obeid, that still support Mohtashami.

But it is still far too early for the U.S. to draw firm conclusions about Rafsanjani. Virtually everything in the region is so riddled with confusion that no one last week could say for sure whether Higgins was executed on Monday, as his captors claimed, or months ago and the tape of his execution saved for use at a later, advantageous moment. It was not even certain that it was Higgins whose body was shown in the tape. Forensic experts at the FBI were carefully measuring and comparing the features of the man in the videotape with photographs of the captured Marine.

If it was Higgins, both the CIA and Israeli intelligence -- as well as Bush -- believe he was killed much earlier than last week. Intelligence specialists point to a number of anomalies that make them doubt his captors' account of when and how he died. For one thing, Higgins' captors announced last December that he had been sentenced to death after making a full confession of espionage activities.

For another, the figure in the videotape showed no physical signs of hanging, such as bulging eyes and extruding tongue. He was dressed in a parka or sweater, which seems unlikely in the middle of a Middle East summer.

In addition, although his captors claimed to have dumped his body near a hospital in Syrian-controlled territory in Beirut, no trace of Higgins has been found there. Marrack Goulding, U.N. Under Secretary-General of Special Political Affairs, met in Beirut last week with Shi'ite leaders and Iranian embassy personnel in an effort to recover Higgins' body. Though the effort failed, Goulding later told reporters in Damascus that there was "optimism in the air" in Beirut about the release of hostages.

Last week Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin laid out his unflinching quid pro quo for hostage trades in Lebanon. "We must have commanders and leaders of the terror organizations," he said. "Only when they are in our hands can we move ((them)) to exchange prisoners." Jerusalem has not hesitated to resort to kidnaping in the past. In 1983 Israeli troops in Beirut kidnaped the nephew of Ahmed Jabril, head of the P.F.L.P. --General Command and later the suspected mastermind of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Two years later Israel swapped the captured nephew -- and 1,150 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons -- for three Israeli soldiers held by Jabril.

The U.S. has also resorted to kidnaping of a sort, most famously during the 1985 midair interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers by fighter planes. In September 1987 FBI agents lured suspected terrorist Fawaz Younis into international waters off Cyprus, arrested him aboard a U.S. vessel and flew him to Andrews Air Force Base for eventual trial and imprisonment. For the most part, however, the U.S. has adopted a waiting posture, which critics charge has degenerated into a prescription for inaction.

What else should the U.S. be doing? Three years ago, a White House task force on terrorism chaired by then Vice President Bush recommended limited and well-defined military retaliation in a hostage crisis if all other means failed. "((The panel)) would not approve of wanton destruction of human life . . . in order to show some muscle," said Bush in introducing the report. Armed force would be used only "where it can be surgically done."

As a result of task-force recommendations, the State Department was designated as the lead agency in combating terrorism, with responsibility for coordinating other Government departments. At the CIA, a new covert counterterrorism force was set up to combine intelligence from other groups such as the National Security Agency and the armed forces. Any raid to rescue the hostages would require pinpointing where they are held, but the ability of U.S. intelligence to discover the whereabouts of the hostages is still limited. Terrorist cells are small, often based on family ties, and very hard to crack. The killing of two of the CIA's top Middle East operatives, former hostage William Buckley and Robert Ames, severely crippled what little was left of any U.S. intelligence network in the region.

American officials think they know the locations among which the hostages are moved, like peas in a giant, high-stakes shell game. But even if they were found, their guards would be likely to kill them before the rescuers could prevent it. "We've considered going in for the hostages time and time again for years," says a senior Administration official. "But it's just an exceptionally difficult environment in which to operate." Indeed, the U.S. reportedly knew where Higgins was for several months last year, but Ronald Reagan refused the Pentagon's pleas to be allowed to go in after him because of the risk that the remaining hostages would be killed in retaliation.

A commando raid might not be possible even if Bush ordered one. The U.S. still lacks special units trained for antiterrorist warfare. Though Congress has mandated the establishment of a Special Operations Forces Command, the separate services refuse to cooperate -- the Navy, for instance, will not assign SEAL units to the force -- and Congress has not funded equipment like new MC-130 Combat Talon attack aircraft needed to drop commandos in enemy territory.

The U.S. has met with only limited success when it tried using more conventional forces to hit back at terrorists. When Jimmy Carter dispatched Marine helicopters to rescue the embassy hostages in 1980, the result was wreckage in the desert. Bombing runs over Lebanon in 1983 resulted in the capture of a naval aviator, Lieut. Robert Goodman, who was later retrieved by Jesse Jackson. Only the snatching of the Achille Lauro hijackers and perhaps the 1986 bombing of Libya could be considered effective in reducing terrorist activity.

There is little support in the Pentagon for a military response this time. "What are we supposed to hit?" an admiral asked last week. For the most part, the group has no major command centers outside heavily populated districts, where an American strike would be sure to result in many civilian casualties.

A military strike against Iran would probably doom U.S. hopes to build bridges to Tehran. Any American military action could isolate Washington from Arab countries just as the U.S. is engaged in the delicate process of urging Israel and the Palestinians to negotiate a peaceful settlement concerning the occupation of the West Bank. Such action would also play directly into the hands of Israeli hard-liners. On Friday P.L.O. leader Yasser Arafat opened a congress in Tunis of Al Fatah, the P.L.O.'s chief guerrilla group, the first such meeting since 1980. The discussions may prove critical because Arafat's public declarations calling for negotiations with Israel have brought him under increasing pressure from more extreme elements in the P.L.O.

Though the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in December caused the number of U.S. terrorist victims last year to shoot up sharply, hijackings and kidnapings have actually decreased in recent years. A surge of terrorist incidents was expected after the downing of the Iranian Airbus by the U.S.S. Vincennes last July, but it did not take place. French hostages in Lebanon were released last year with the intervention of Iran.

But hopeful trends do little to help the remaining hostages. Some Administration officials are pessimistic about the prospects for a deal as long as one of Hizballah's priorities remains the release of 15 members of a closely affiliated Shi'ite fundamentalist group called Al Dawa (the Call). The 15 are imprisoned in Kuwait for a series of 1983 bomb attacks on the U.S. and French embassies there. Kuwait has stoutly refused Al Dawa's demands for the release of the prisoners, some of whom are relatives of Hizballah leaders. Said a close Bush adviser: "There's a family tie there, so I would be surprised if anyone could cook a deal that could get all our hostages released."

In the end, even agility, patience and firmness may not be enough to thread a way through the thicket of obstacles that block freedom for the hostages. For all George Bush's best efforts last week, the only things certain for now are that he has headed off another terrible execution and heard some encouraging words from Iran's new leaders. Yet after a decade of outrage and frustration, the President and the American public may be willing to settle for such small steps while they strain to see, through the latest signals from Tehran, at least a glimmer of hope.

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With reporting by Dan Goodgame and Bruce van Voorst/Washington and Jon D. Hull/Jerusalem