Anatomy of A Decision

By Ed Magnuson

The decision was made by one man, against the recommendation of nearly every other senior Administration adviser. But he happened to be the U.S. Secretary of State and the most powerfully determined opponent to a U.S. appearance by P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat. George Shultz proudly takes -- and certainly deserves -- full credit for the Great Visa Flap.

The bulldog Secretary acted "from his gut," say State Department aides, but not completely without outside support. A majority of 51 Senators urged him not to admit Arafat. Some members of Congress had been quietly in touch with Jewish representatives. "We didn't want the campaign against Arafat to be an Israeli one; we wanted America to take the lead," explained an Israeli official. But Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir went on record as opposing a visa for Arafat in a mid-November meeting with U.S. Ambassador Tom Pickering.

On Nov. 25, when Arafat formally asked for entry, Shultz consulted his top advisers. A broad array of officials counseled Shultz to grant the visa: Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Michael Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs; National Security Adviser Colin Powell; Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci. The U.S. delegation to the U.N. strongly endorsed Arafat's admission. The arguments ranged from policy to practicality. A denial would undermine U.S. Middle East policy and would offend nearly the entire U.N.

Only two aides shared Shultz's views: L. Paul Bremer, head of State's counterterrorism office, who documented the case against Arafat as terrorist; and Charles Hill, the Secretary's tight-lipped, omnipresent personal assistant, who is known to share Shultz's strongly pro-Israel views.

The consultations were in effect pro forma. Shultz delivered his decision to deny the visa early Saturday morning. A public statement was drafted and a copy sent to Reagan, vacationing at his Santa Barbara, Calif., ranch. Powell called the President to summarize the pros and cons. Said a laconic senior official: "The President understood why the Secretary came to that conclusion, and he supported it." Neither George Bush nor incoming Secretary of State James Baker, who will inherit the repercussions, was consulted. Bush advisers were happy to distance the President-elect from the brouhaha. Said a grateful aide: "They chose not to discuss this issue with us."

Why had Shultz ignored so much contrary advice? "This decision," explained one of his senior aides, "was a reflection of Shultz's deep psyche." Associates point to his long-avowed vendetta against terrorism. A friend, Robert Ames, was among the dead in the truck bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut. Schultz was singled out by anonymous terrorists as the target of a car bomb placed near a Jerusalem hotel where he was staying in March.

Shultz had also been frustrated in every attempt to move the many parties in the Middle East toward peace -- and he seemed to blame Arab leaders far more than Israeli intransigence for his failures. His personal distrust of the Arabs stems from their regular rejection of his initiatives, such as the 1983 Lebanon accord, which was immediately scuttled by Syria. At the same time, his support for Israel, despite provocations like the Pollard spy affair, has been unflagging.

Privately, some hands at State were dismayed by Shultz's decision. Said one: "Sometimes he acts like the old Marine he once was. The Arabs caused him grief, and this is the way to get back at them."

With reporting by Ricardo Chavira and Bruce van Voorst/Washington