Shultz's Last Stand

By BRUCE VAN VOORST

After six years in one of the world's toughest jobs, George Shultz would be excused for spending his last weeks in office dreaming of the pool at his Palo Alto home or drafting the series on foreign policy that he plans to do for public television. Instead, the combative, lame-duck Secretary of State threw himself into a one-man jihad to prevent P.L.O. chief Yasser Arafat from speaking to the United Nations in New York City. At week's end Shultz prevailed, and Arafat was denied entry to the U.S.

The U.N. is scheduled to begin its perennial debate on Palestinian issues, and Arafat wanted to rally support for the Palestine National Council's (P.N.C.) declaration of an independent state. But mainstream American Jewish groups supported Shultz's view that Arafat's role in international terrorism justified preventing the U.N. speech. In late September, 51 Senators urged the Reagan Administration to block Arafat's visit. "I'm prepared to fight this one all the way to the President," Shultz vowed.

Arrayed against the Secretary was virtually the entire U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy, from National Security Adviser Colin Powell to Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci. Even within the State Department, Shultz was opposed by almost everyone, including the Regional Assistant Secretary, Richard Murphy. As one State Department official put it, "If Arafat doesn't speak, the issue becomes the U.S. decision rather than the merits of the P.L.O. case."

As host nation for the U.N., the U.S. is generally obliged to permit anyone to bring his case to the world organization, though it reserves the right to exclude security threats. In 1974 Arafat appeared before the General Assembly, an empty pistol holster conspicuous on his hip. At first, Shultz hid behind the flimsy excuse that Arafat had not formally asked for a visa. Then Arafat called the American bluff by making the request through the U.S. consulate in Tunis. The State Department said it would "severely scrutinize" his application. The possibility that the Americans might refuse the visa had angered U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, as well as other U.N. officials. But in the end, Shultz rejected Arafat's application on the grounds that the P.L.O. leader "knows of, condones and lends support" to acts of terrorism.

To many diplomats, Shultz's battle to keep Arafat away from the U.N. was another indication of his fervid antipathy toward the P.L.O. and its head, a position that threatens to undercut U.S. influence in the Middle East. "I know it's his gut feeling," said a senior aide, "but it's taking us out of the diplomatic game."

What most annoys Shultz's critics is his conviction that he alone knows how to persuade the Israelis to cooperate with American efforts in the region. Last spring Shultz waged a similar single-handed campaign on behalf of a memorandum of agreement that strengthened Israel's unique military and economic ties to the U.S. He resisted suggestions that the U.S. should use the memorandum negotiations to persuade Israel to moderate its strong-arm tactics against the Palestinian intifadeh.

The debate over Arafat's U.N. speech is symbolic of a more significant argument over how the U.S. should respond to the Palestinian declaration of statehood, which implicitly recognizes Israel through the endorsement of U.N. ^ Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. "If the Israelis moved as much as the P.N.C. did, this town would be beside itself with joy at 'encouraging signs,' " said former State Department official Michael Sterner. Already 55 nations, including the Soviet Union, France, Egypt and China, have applauded the Palestinian move. Yet even before the text of the P.N.C. declaration arrived in Washington, the State Department hastened to denounce the Palestinians' "unilateral" action. "The P.L.O. rid itself of its ideological baggage," said a senior British diplomat. "Now Israel and the U.S. need to do the same."

Although the international reaction to the nine-point P.N.C. declaration focused largely on whether it accepted Resolution 242, thus Israel's existence, and renounced terrorism, the real political dynamite was its appeal to the U.N. to "place the occupied Palestinian territory under international supervision to protect our masses and end the Israeli occupation." Arafat's initiative is repugnant to both Israel and the U.S., which would surely veto any such move in the Security Council. But Arafat is likely to renew his appeal if he persuades the U.N. to resume the Palestinian debate in Geneva.

Though he won the battle over Arafat's visa, by choosing to fight it Shultz is bound to be the loser. Withholding the visa is certain to trigger widespread criticism at home and abroad over Washington's violation of its obligation as host to the U.N, as well as the stagnation of its Middle East policy.

With reporting by Dean Fischer/Cairo and B. William Mader/New York