Neither "Negligent" Nor "Culpable"

By Bruce van Voorst/Washington

The legendary 19th century Military Theorist Karl von Clausewitz called it simply the "fog of war," that unfathomable combination of human personality, weapons performance and just plain luck that makes battle so unpredictable. This "fog," the Pentagon declared last week, was largely to blame for the tragic decision by the U.S.S. Vincennes on July 3 to shoot down Iran Air Flight 655, killing 290 civilians.

Captain Will C. Rogers III ordered two missiles launched at the Airbus, a Navy board of inquiry concluded, for two reasons only: the plane was heading directly toward his ship in a combat situation, and it had not responded to twelve radio demands that it identify itself. Thus it had to be considered hostile. In a 53-page unclassified version of a 1,000-page report, the Pentagon admitted that the Iranian aircraft was not descending toward the Vincennes or emitting military identifying signals, as the Navy originally claimed.

These misreadings of radar data were attributed to "human errors" made by the ship's crew. But Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci insisted they were not crucial in triggering Rogers' decision to act. Contrary to the implications of an earlier, leaked version of the report, Carlucci said, no one will be punished, because "these mistakes were not due to negligence or culpability."

Both Carlucci and Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stressed that the Vincennes' captain, while under the difficult circumstances of engaging armed Iranian speedboats, had less than four minutes in which to make his fateful decision. The ship was heeling at 32 degrees in a sharp turn. "Things were falling in the CIC ((combat information center)), lights were flickering, and in the background, guns were booming," said Carlucci. The sound of bullets hitting the ship's hull rattled the crew. Rogers, said Crowe, had to assume that "the relentlessly closing" aircraft, which had taken off from a Bandar Abbas airport used by the military, was part of the Iranian attack unless he could prove otherwise. Said Crowe: "The proof never came."

Initially, the Navy placed great weight on the detection of a so-called Mode II IFF (identification, friend or foe) signal from the approaching aircraft that identified it as an F-14 Tomcat jet fighter. Although crew members on the Vincennes CIC claimed to have seen this military signal, tape recordings show only a Mode III code, which is used by both civilian and military aircraft.

Why the false reading? The report cites "stress, task fixation and unconscious distortion of data" by the crew as likely causes. Whatever the IFF signal, Crowe said, Rogers would not have relied on it alone, since Iranian military aircraft have been known to use Mode III to hide their identity. The report said the Airbus was not using its normal weather radar, which would have conclusively identified it as civilian.

Several critical technical questions remain unanswered. The air control tower at Bandar Abbas had been talking regularly by radio to the Airbus, but the Navy did not explain why the Vincennes failed to monitor these communications. Shipboard commercial-flight schedules showed that Iran Air Flight 655 should be in the air about this time, but nobody reacted when an officer standing behind Rogers in the CIC raised the possibility that the oncoming airplane was a commercial flight.

Carlucci stressed that Rogers' decision must be seen in the context of the shooting war going on in the Persian Gulf. In May 1987, 37 American seamen were killed when the U.S.S. Stark was hit by two Exocet missiles launched by an Iraqi airplane. Critics complained then that indecision by the captain and overly restrictive rules of engagement had prevented the Stark from taking defensive action. Earlier this year, an Iranian boat and jet each launched a missile at the U.S.S. Wainwright. Both Carlucci and Crowe emphasized Iran's culpability in sending a commercial aircraft over a battle at sea.

Despite the catalog of errors committed by the crew, Carlucci accepted the report's recommendation that "no disciplinary or administrative action should be taken against any U.S. naval personnel associated with this incident." He reversed the recommendation of a senior reviewing officer that a nonpunitive letter of censure be issued to one lieutenant commander for "failing to verify the data." Any letter sent under the intense publicity surrounding the incident, Carlucci explained, would be "punitive."

For centuries, military commanders were held accountable for failure, even when not directly responsible. That dictum was ignored when 241 U.S. servicemen died in the 1983 Beirut barracks truck-bombing. It was further eroded when the Stark's captain, Glenn Brindel, who was accused of a "lack of readiness," received a reprimand after his ship failed to respond to the Iraqi attack but was not court-martialed and was allowed to retire quietly.

The decision to absolve everyone in the Vincennes disaster follows this recent pattern. U.S. military-combat rules now in force in the gulf are intentionally tilted toward the saving of American lives. Yet Crowe's conclusion that "Captain Rogers acted reasonably and did what his nation expected of him in the defense of his ship and crew" is little consolation to the survivors of those who died on Flight 655 or to the collective American conscience.