Middle East Assignment: Murder

By Jill Smolowe

The bedlam began at Al Moasat Hospital in Damascus, where Khalil al-Wazir, the slain military commander of the Palestine Liberation Organization, lay in state. As the burial hour approached, the casket, draped with a Palestinian flag, was lifted onto a caisson wreathed in flowers and towed away by a truck with a Palestinian youth atop, brandishing al-Wazir's picture and flashing the victory sign. At the Yarmouk refugee camp, crowds of keening Palestinians surrounded the funeral cortege of Mercedes, jeeps and taxis. Suddenly the casket, bobbing precariously, was hoisted onto mourners' shoulders and carried amid a sea of people to the Cemetery of Martyrs, about a mile away. There the casket was lowered into a grave, as red-bereted Palestinian soldiers fired their guns into the air and the crowd shouted, "We will avenge your blood, our martyr!"

Officially, Israel continued to deny a role in the slaying of al-Wazir, known worldwide by his nom de guerre Abu Jihad. But that claim was undermined last week by high-level leaks in Israel and Tunisia. According to details pieced together by TIME, the assassination of al-Wazir had been under consideration for several years. MOSSAD, Israel's intelligence agency, had begun close surveillance of al-Wazir's comings and goings in Tunisia in 1983. The facts and details of his habits and living arrangements were so readily obtainable that Israeli intelligence experts marveled at how such a masterly military strategist could be so careless. "Of all people, he should have known better," said one. Even P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat had urged his deputy to move, warning that security at al-Wazir's cream-colored house in the village of Sidi Bou Said was inadequate. But al-Wazir was reluctant, partly because he had just renewed a three-month lease.

The possibility of assassinating al-Wazir was raised with the heads of the Israeli intelligence services during the administrations of both Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his predecessor, Shimon Peres. The plan was shelved out of concern that such an operation might imperil Israeli lives and damage the country's reputation. In the past two years, the matter was also considered -- and rejected -- several times by the "Prime Ministers' Club," the nickname for the informal meetings held by Shamir, Foreign Minister Peres and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who was Prime Minister from 1974 to 1977.

The topic arose again when P.L.O. hit squads directed by al-Wazir began to arrive from Lebanon and Egypt to fuel the current uprising in the occupied territories. Israeli officials blamed al-Wazir for the March 7 hijacking of a bus in southern Israel that left three Israeli civilians dead. Later that month the Prime Ministers' Club gave a green light to all security services for preparing an operation, although it is likely that Peres voiced doubts about the timing.

Responsibilities for landing a commando unit on the Tunisian coast and carrying out the assassination were carefully divided between MOSSAD and the Israeli Defense Forces. By late March the operation was ready, but word that the time was right did not come from Tunis until early April. The Israeli navy provided transport across the Mediterranean in a large vessel, then carried the team of 20 commandos ashore in rubber dinghies some 20 miles north of Sidi Bou Said. The commandos loaded into a Peugeot 305 and two Volkswagen vans and were delivered by MOSSAD agents to al-Wazir's doorstep. Other agents sabotaged the telephone switch box in the neighborhood.

During the attack, air force personnel, flying a Boeing 707 fitted with electronic jamming devices, hovered about 100 miles outside Tunisian airspace, close enough to jam communications in the area. The Boeing 707 also served as a relay station between Israeli personnel off the Tunisian coast, the hit squad and I.D.F. headquarters in Tel Aviv. Throughout the operation, the commanding general, Ehud Barak, 47, the army's Deputy Chief of Staff, stayed aboard the vessel in the Mediterranean. Barak had participated in a similar operation in April 1973, when Israeli commandos raided Palestinian headquarters in Beirut, killing three P.L.O. leaders.

The operation came off precisely as planned. At 1:15 a.m., while a dozen commandos stood watch outside, eight others stormed the house through the front door and raced to the second landing. Al-Wazir, hearing the commotion from his study, grabbed a pistol and headed for the top of the stairs. More than 60 bullets tore into him. Along the way, the gunmen killed the gardener and two guards but, as instructed, did not harm al-Wazir's family. By 4 a.m. they had returned to their ship. A few days later, they landed safely in Haifa harbor. An ironic footnote: al-Wazir had plotted a similar operation in 1985 that aimed to land a hit squad on Israeli soil, sailing first by boat from Algeria, then from mid-sea by dinghy. Israeli missile boats intercepted the ship, aborting the plan.

The Israeli commandos boarded their ship about four days before the April 16 attack, but Israel's ten-member inner Cabinet was not informed of the final plan until just hours before it was carried out. The Cabinet had approved preparations for the mission shortly after the Prime Ministers' Club had decided on the plan. At the time, the only reservations were sounded by Peres and Minister Without Portfolio Ezer Weizmann, who voiced strong objections. Now, with al-Wazir's assassination only hours away, eight Cabinet members again endorsed the plan and the same two holdouts renewed their objections. Last week, as doubts continued about the wisdom of the operation, Peres maintained a discreet silence, but Weizmann spoke out against the attack. "It doesn't contribute to the fight against terrorism," he told Israel Radio. "It distances the peace process and will bring greater hostility and makes us more vulnerable around the world."

Some Israelis echoed Weizmann's concerns. They feared that the attack might backfire, unleashing a vengeful and more virulent wave of violence in the territories, strengthening extremist forces within the P.L.O. and weakening the already thin prospects for a U.S.-sponsored regional peace plan. "Abu after Abu can be liquidated," warned Knesset Member Yossi Sarid. "But this will not liquidate the Palestinian problem."

Other Israelis found no room for doubt. "Anyone directing terrorism is a proper target for elimination," said Major General Amnon Shahak, the I.D.F.'s head of intelligence. Some Israelis predicted that the attack would boost morale throughout the country, and especially within an army frustrated by its inability to put down the uprising and polish Israel's international image as a formidable foe. They suggested that by robbing the P.L.O. of the man responsible for military operations against Israel, the operation had delivered the Palestinians a crippling blow that would demoralize their spirits and deflate the uprising.

Fearing that last week's funeral would ignite further unrest, the Israeli army sealed off large parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The army also imposed curfews on 21 refugee camps, towns and cities, putting close to 300,000 Palestinians under virtual house arrest. In addition, eight more Palestinians were deported to Lebanon, bringing to 20 the number expelled since the intifadeh (uprising) began last December. Despite the precautions, which included banning most reporters from the territories, clashes between soldiers and Palestinians resulted in five Arab deaths, raising the four-month toll to at least 170.

"We have nothing for the Israelis except stones and Molotov cocktails and feeding our babies with the milk of hatred for them," said Fatima, 60, mother of one of the Palestinians deported last week. Several Palestinians offered predictions confirming Israel's worst fears. "Al-Wazir's killing will no doubt weaken the moderate voices and take Arafat to extremist positions," warned a doctor in Gaza. A Palestinian lawyer offered a prognosis that the Israelis may find even more distressing. "The killing of Abu Jihad," he said, "may achieve Palestinian unity."

While that seems a distant prospect, al-Wazir's funeral did have the momentary effect of unifying the fractured Palestinian community in mourning. Almost every faction was represented at the burial, and the graveside frenzy was dignified by the presence of such Palestinian leaders as Farouk Kadoumi, Nayef Hawatmey and George Habash. But the turnout could not mask the absence of one man: Arafat. As his closest friend was being lowered into the ground, Arafat was in Libya talking to Muammar Gaddafi.

Initially, the P.L.O. had requested that al-Wazir be buried in Jordan at a site within view of the West Bank. King Hussein had consented, although Jordanian officials were concerned that the burial might spark demonstrations of support for the uprising from the two-thirds of the Jordanian population that is Palestinian. Then word came that al-Wazir would be interred in Syria, and Damascus invited all P.L.O. leaders to attend the funeral.

The official explanation for Syria's gesture was that al-Wazir's parents, who live in Damascus, had asked that he be buried near them. But given a bitter five-year rift between Syria and the P.L.O., Arab analysts concluded that Syrian President Hafez Assad is looking to end a feud that led to Arafat's expulsion from Syria in 1983. Hani al-Hassan, Arafat's chief political adviser, called Syria's cooperation a "good gesture" but apparently not good enough. Although Algeria attempted to broker a reconciliation between Arafat and Syrian leaders, the P.L.O. chairman ultimately opted to stay away. "Arafat hasn't gotten a political invitation ((from Syria))," Hassan explained. "A visit should be political."

As the Palestinians ended their three days of mourning for al-Wazir, the Israelis began a day of festivities to commemorate the 40th anniversary of statehood. Reaching beyond the usual Independence Day appeals for regional peace, officials urged the Palestinians to call off their revolt. Said President Chaim Herzog in a speech broadcast by the Arab service of Israel Radio and Television: "Many Palestinians know in their hearts that the violent intifadeh is a dead-end, useless struggle." That may be true, but it is also wishful thinking for the Israeli government to believe the intifadeh will die with al-Wazir. Commando operations may rob Palestinians of their leaders, but they will not buy peace for Israel.

CHART: TEXT NOT AVAILABLE

CREDIT: TIME Chart by Joe Lertola

CAPTION: ANATOMY OF A HIT

DESCRIPTION: Method used by Israel to assassinate Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad).

With reporting by Sam Allis/Damascus and Ron Ben-Yishai/Jerusalem