The Kremlin's New Cards

By Jacob V. Lamar Jr

"The fate of President Reagan and of his Administration is in God's hands," argues Valentin Falin, a principal Soviet spokesman and director of the press agency Novosti. "If Oliver North reveals Mr. Reagan as a co-conspirator, then your President will not be worth a kopek." While the Soviets may be relishing the Iran-contra crisis, their interest is more strategic than voyeuristic. Reagan's current predicament, combined with Mikhail Gorbachev's success at consolidating his own power in the Politburo at his party plenum last month, has convinced many in Moscow that Reagan now needs a summit far more than Gorbachev. As a result, a wide spectrum of high-ranking Soviet officials are hinting that they may pounce on the opportunity to seek further U.S. arms- control concessions -- notably on Star Wars -- before setting a date for the two leaders to meet in Washington.

Only a few weeks ago, the foundation for a summit seemed to have been firmly established. The U.S. and the Soviet Union had agreed in principle on a plan to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces from Europe. This INF agreement, which would also include the elimination of shorter-range missiles, was to form the basis for a third meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev. But now the Soviets seem to be stalling. The Kremlin postponed a Washington meeting between Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze that had been expected to take place last week. "The Soviet Union seems to be drawing back in the past week or two from what we would consider a constructive or positive approach," says State Department Spokesman Charles Redman.

Once again, Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative may be playing a central role in the Kremlin's thinking. Gorbachev has a history of performing deft flip-flops on whether to demand SDI restrictions as a condition for other arms-control agreements. A year ago, he indicated that an INF deal could be cut separately. That led to October's Reykjavik summit. There the Soviets proposed a package deal, including acceptance of Reagan's zero option on INF in Europe along with deep cuts in strategic weapons and restrictions on SDI. The deal fell apart because Reagan felt Gorbachev was going too far in trying to limit SDI. Subsequent polls in Western Europe showed that the Soviets had won a propaganda victory. Some American negotiators felt they had been sandbagged.

Last February Gorbachev reversed field again, proclaiming that he was willing to unlink an INF treaty from SDI. But now that such an agreement seems close and summit fever is rising, there are signs that the Soviets are preparing to relink SDI to the package -- and perhaps even attempt a repeat of their Reykjavik public relations sandbag.

Over the past two weeks high-level Moscow officials have told TIME that the Soviet view all along has been that any summit should, if possible, be based on what they call "INF-plus." The plus they have in mind: tying an INF deal to a "framework agreement" that spells out "key provisions" on deep reductions of strategic arms and bans the testing as well as the deployment of SDI in space.

Soviet officials maintain that Gorbachev has made a few statements this year indicating that an INF agreement on its own might not be enough to warrant a summit. "A summit must not be just a ceremonial and pompous meeting," says Georgi Arbatov, the Kremlin's best-known Americanologist. "If we have only an agreement on INF and nothing else, people will not be sure what will happen next in arms control. Therefore perhaps something should be added, perhaps at the summit itself."

U.S. officials say they have no formal indication that the Soviets are trying to make an INF deal contingent on a framework involving SDI. "They are making tougher noises on INF," says a high-ranking Administration official, "but I have no sense that they are relinking." Another U.S. official close to the Geneva talks views Moscow's moves as typical presummit posturing. "Shock diplomacy is what they specialize in," says he. "Backtracking on ) INF linkage would be consistent with the kind of shell game we've come to expect."

Even without the SDI question, stubborn obstacles still stand in the way of an INF agreement. Under the current proposal, medium-range missiles in Europe would be dismantled, but each side would retain 100 warheads on missiles located elsewhere. The U.S. is now pushing for a "global zero" plan that would eliminate all such weapons. The Soviets have made conflicting noises about whether they might agree to this, but their official position is that they will not. Another stumbling block involves shorter-range missiles. The Soviets insist that 72 old Pershing 1A missiles in West Germany must be dismantled as part of a deal. While the missiles belong to the West Germans, their nuclear warheads belong to the U.S. American officials say eliminating these systems would cause a political uproar in Bonn and strain its ties with Washington. That may be precisely what Moscow has in mind.

For the time being, the Soviets seem content to sit back and monitor the Iran-contra hearings before taking their next step. If Reagan emerges unharmed, Gorbachev may be quick to clear away the obstacles to an INF accord and a summit. If, on the other hand, the President's reputation -- or Shultz's -- is further wounded by the hearings, the Kremlin might decide it has the upper hand. Soviet observers contend that the President, along with his political advisers, may realize that only a successful summit can deflect attention from the Iran-contra affair and assure Reagan a favorable mention in the history books. And if Reagan is unwilling to make the concessions necessary for such a summit, Moscow may then conclude it can now afford to wait for his successor.

With reporting by Strobe Talbott/Moscow and Bruce van Voorst/Washington