How Many Fingers on the Button?

By Bruce van Voorst/Washington

Tensions escalate. The military goes on alert. A Soviet-American showdown seems probable. When a nuclear attack upon the U.S. is considered imminent, authority to use nuclear weapons is automatically "predelegated" to various military commanders. For a nation that mistakenly assumes only the President's finger is ever on the button, this little-known fact will come as a disconcerting discovery. In his first novel, State Scarlet (Putnam; $18.95), David Aaron, a top staffer at the National Security Council during the Carter Administration, uses fiction to show how the nation's command, control and communications system, known as C 3, could spin out of control during a crisis.

With its tense plot wrapped in insider's jargon, State Scarlet follows in the tradition of Tom Clancy's best sellers, The Hunt for Red October and Red Storm Rising. In Aaron's book a disgruntled G.I. in Europe provokes the crisis by stealing a backpack-size nuclear bomb and threatening to detonate it unless the President withdraws nuclear forces from Europe. When the Kremlin hears about this, it activates its own crisis machinery, and the two sides inexorably proceed toward a macho nuclear confrontation. The chief of the Strategic Air Command warns that the C 3 system can absorb only a couple of hundred "hits" and still function. The National Security Adviser, who wants to prepare American missiles for launch even without the President's approval, argues, "If the Soviets strike first at our command and control, we may not be able to strike back." In short, the U.S. has to be prepared to use its missiles or lose them.

It is something of a mixed blessing that the Soviets are equally confused. The General Secretary struggles to keep his hawkish military in check, but both leaders are unpleasantly surprised to learn of cracks in the system. Initially the Pentagon can't find all its 25,000-odd nuclear warheads, and dismisses this problem as "inventory shrinkage." A ballistic-missile submarine in the Indian Ocean can't be located. The Soviet leader's helplessness mounts as the KGB and Soviet military battle for turf.

The most distressing revelation for the American President is that he really does not control the trigger. "I hope you realize, Mr. President," an aide says, "that you're not the only one who can release nuclear weapons." Launch authority devolves on the President's 15 constitutional successors (including, ultimately, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the Secretary of Transportation) and also on the National Military Command Center, the Strategic Air Command, and a "looking glass" airborne command center. "They all can launch if you're incapacitated," the aide tells the President. Then, ominously, he adds, "As a practical matter, sir, they can also launch even if you're not."

The President's dilemma spotlights a basic conundrum of the nuclear age: how to limit access to the nuclear button yet make sure it can still be pushed if something suddenly happens to the President. The novel also gets to the heart of a debate over nuclear strategy: Does it make sense to target the Kremlin and other Soviet command centers? That might serve to destroy Moscow's war-fighting capability, but it could also eliminate its ability to de- escalate a crisis once the shooting begins. This strategy is known as "nuclear decapitation," and Aaron likens it to "two headless chickens" in a fight.

Although public attention has widely focused on arms-control schemes, many experts feel it is far more important to find ways to reshape the military strategies of both nations to make it less likely that a nuclear crisis will spin out of control. If either nation feels that its command structure is vulnerable, it is more likely to get an itchy finger on its button. One way to prevent this is to establish crisis-control centers to prevent misunderstandings. Another is for the U.S. to make its C 3 system more survivable -- and to avoid causing the Soviet command to feel vulnerable -- so that there would be less pressure on either side to launch a pre-emptive strike and less chance that a confrontation could get beyond the President's control.

As former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara puts it, a credible deterrence presupposes a believable command and control structure. Aaron's concern is that C 3 is the Achilles' heel of America's capacity to respond. "Deterrence is like fine crystal," he says. "It's tough, but brittle and can shatter."