A Compromise May Yet Be Possible

By Strobe Talbott

Amid the rubble of Reykjavik are the makings of a deal that might have been, and a deal that might yet be. Until now, the idea of a "grand compromise" < has always been an abstraction: the U.S. would curtail the Strategic Defense Initiative in return for significant reductions in the wretched excess of Soviet missiles that helped provoke SDI in the first place. But no one knew exactly how far the Soviets would go to achieve a bargain. There was good news out of Reykjavik: they might go further than even some proponents of the grand compromise had predicted.

Under the terms of the tentative accord, the Soviets agreed to retire within five years a significant portion of their large, hydra-headed ICBMs, including their notorious "heavy" SS-18s. Those are the most worrisome of the missiles in their arsenal, since they have the combination of accuracy, speed and destructive capability to carry out a sneak attack. Numerical reductions alone do not necessarily strengthen the nuclear peace. What is important about the outcome at Reykjavik is not so much the dramatic-sounding goal of a 50% cut across the board, which would probably prove illusory in a final agreement, but the Soviets' implicit admission that heavy ICBMs undermine the stability of the superpower balance.

As for the American end of the grand compromise, the indications out of Reykjavik were less encouraging. Reagan seemed to say he will not pay any real price in SDI, at least not yet.

His biggest supposed concession was actually no concession at all. He agreed to delay Star Wars deployment for ten years and adhere to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. But Reagan's understanding of the ABM treaty is sharply at odds not only with that of the Soviets but with that of the Americans who negotiated the document in the early 1970s. The traditional interpretation of the treaty, which is endorsed by most experts, holds that only research is permitted on space-based antimissile systems like lasers. The Administration has advanced the so-called permissive interpretation, under which development and testing of those systems and their components would be allowed. That would mean that as soon as the ten-year moratorium on deployment ended, the U.S. might have some kind of partial defensive system ready to erect on short notice, or so the Soviets fear.

Faced with that prospect, the Soviets would have no incentive to reduce their offensive forces. Quite the contrary, they would have every reason to increase their arsenal of nuclear spears. In order to maintain their own concept of deterrence, they must be confident of their ability to penetrate and overwhelm whatever shield the U.S. eventually erects.

Reagan's refusal so far to make any significant concessions on SDI calls into question what many analysts see as the one plausible rationale for the program: its use as a bargaining chip. None of the other justifications for SDI has ever been entirely credible. Partly for that reason, the Administration has made SDI a moving target for its critics, constantly changing its stated scope and goal.

In the beginning, more than three years ago, President Reagan unveiled SDI as a global, impregnable Astrodome. But anyone who could conceive of space-based, laser-armed battle stations could also imagine Soviet steps to evade or destroy such a defense. On the eve of the Reykjavik meeting came a new pitch for SDI: as an "insurance policy." Even if the Soviets would agree to ban strategic offenses, some defense would still be necessary in case the Soviets were to cheat. The trouble is, as long as they have to plan against any significant level of American defenses, the Soviets will never agree to offensive limitations, much less reductions or a ban. Thus the issue of their cheating would never arise. The way to ensure compliance is with verifiable agreements, not with a defensive system.

That leaves only one argument for SDI: it is the key to a trade-off between Soviet offensive firepower and American defensive potential. The Soviet incentive for such a deal is clear. Even a partially effective American system will require the Kremlin to spend huge resources on offensive and defensive countermeasures. Also, SDI represents a new kind of arms race in exotic technology, where the advantage, at least initially, would be with the U.S.

The bottom line of Reagan's current position on the defensive half of the grand compromise is that the U.S. will accept no deal that impinges on any aspect of SDI. Gorbachev's bottom line is just the opposite: he will accept no deal unless it inhibits SDI. In his attempt to restrict the program to "laboratory" research, Gorbachev seems to be pushing a more restrictive interpretation of the ABM treaty, just as the Reagan Administration is advancing a more permissive one.

But each side still has room to maneuver. Reagan's concern is to protect SDI from the Soviets' efforts to kill the program. He is right to want to see work on strategic defense go forward. The U.S. needs such a program as a hedge against Soviet R. and D., which is vigorous and must at least be | matched. Also, American scientists must keep looking in case there is some undiscovered technology that can overcome the fatal flaws of all the ideas advanced to date: the vulnerability of defense to pre-emption and the inherent cost-effectiveness of a nuclear offense. According to Gerard Smith, who was the chief negotiator of the ABM treaty, that search can continue under the traditional interpretation of the treaty: "There could be testing, outside the laboratory, of some new technologies and devices, as long as they were not components of a deployable system. Defining components may be a key element in the ongoing negotiation, but in the gray area between the Soviets' current laboratory definition of permissible research and the Administration's claim that anything goes, there should be a way of accommodating Gorbachev's fear and Reagan's dream."

If there is to be a grand compromise, Reagan will have to be convinced that SDI is still alive as a research program, and Gorbachev will have to be convinced that the Soviet Union does not need insurance in the form of extra warheads against some future American defensive system.