Mirved Mission to Moscow

By Johanna McGeary

The Pentagon's Richard Perle was idling in southern France and the State Department's Paul Nitze was relaxing in Maine when the call came. This week these two polar opposites within the U.S. arms-control apparatus voyage to Moscow as part of a high-level mission to explain President Reagan's latest proposals and create enough concord to entice Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev to set a date for a 1986 summit.

Reagan's refusal to negotiate restrictions on his proposed Strategic Defense Initiative has been the main obstacle to any progress. His latest letter to Gorbachev on the subject, which seemed to give something to hawks in the Pentagon as well as to arms-control advocates at the State Department, has caused confusion on both sides of the global divide.

The President developed that "creative ambiguity" even further last week in a speech to ardent supporters of Star Wars. "Our SDI program has provided a historic opportunity -- one that enhances the prospects for reducing the number of nuclear weapons," Reagan told the group, stirring prospects of an eventual "grand compromise" that would trade off defense for offense. But he simultaneously rebuffed such speculation. "Let me reassure you right here and now that our response to demands that we cut off or delay research and testing and close shop is: No way. SDI is no bargaining chip." Even that was not enough for some of SDI's most ardent supporters. Just before his speech, eight conservative Congressmen met with Reagan to press him to deploy portions of a space defense as soon as any are ready rather than wait into the 1990s for the full system to be operational. In his later talk, the President in effect said no to that demand also: "I know there are those who are getting a bit antsy, but to deploy systems of limited effectiveness now would deter or divert limited funds and delay our main research." Critics on the opposite side are meanwhile seeking to do that by chopping at the 1986 SDI budget.

But it is in Moscow that the confusion is most telling. When Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh held talks with Secretary of State George Shultz in Washington last month, he proposed a visit to Moscow by senior U.S. officials to explain the Administration's new position. By signaling the Soviet Union's hope that the U.S. would send a full delegation of top policymakers, the Soviets wanted to ensure that whatever was agreed to in Moscow would not be torpedoed back in Washington. In addition to Nitze and Perle, the delegation includes the top U.S. negotiators in Geneva and other experts. The U.S. was quick to accept the Soviet invitation as a way to give a "fast start" to summit preparations.

The U.S.S.R. also appears ready to move. The Soviets have said that they are "encouraged" by Reagan's letter, and have refrained from public sniping. They have agreed to 13 new educational, scientific and cultural exchanges, following the successful U.S. tour of the Kirov Ballet this summer. All together, says a Western diplomat, "we are satisfied that this glacier is beginning to move."

No single mission to Moscow is likely to bridge the wide differences on key arms-control issues that still divide the superpowers. U.S. officials call the trip a chance for "incremental movement" that is intended to "clarify" the differences on arms control rather than resolve them. Since many of these issues have purposely been left unclarified because of intramural disagreements in Washington, the process may test the Soviets' patience. Indeed, if they can sort out a clear U.S. stance from the different approaches that have been advocated by Nitze and Perle, that in itself may be a significant step.

With reporting by Barrett Seaman/Washington