Test-Ban Talks?

By Evan Thomas

The Soviet proposal for a moratorium on nuclear-weapons testing had sat on the table since July, disdained by the Reagan Administration as a mere propaganda ploy. But with the Kremlin's self-imposed (and rather self-serving) testing freeze due to expire on Jan. 1, Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev sweetened the offer. If the U.S. agreed to join the Soviets in a testing halt, he wrote President Reagan on Dec. 5, U.S. inspectors would be welcome in the Soviet Union to resolve questions about cheating.

Suddenly, the Administration began listening. In 25 years of jawing over arms control, the supremely suspicious Soviets have steadfastly refused to permit foreigners to poke around their most sensitive military installations. Although Gorbachev's proposal was deliberately vague, the hint that the Soviets might be willing to lower their guard and allow on-site inspections persuaded Reagan to reconsider his flat refusal to talk about a test ban. Last week the President sent Gorbachev a letter, described by White House aides as "conciliatory," suggesting that experts from the two sides meet to discuss the verification issue.

In theory, a ban on underground nuclear tests would slow the arms race by making each side less confident that it could rely on new weaponry. It would at least be an important symbolic step. In mid-December, 46 U.S. Senators, including twelve Republicans, wrote Reagan urging him to resume test-ban talks to "demonstrate to the world that both you and Mr. Gorbachev are willing to take concrete steps to further reduce superpower tension." After years of tortuous arms-control negotiations, a test ban has the popular appeal of a quick and easy fix, harking back to the enduring 1963 treaty to end nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in space.

But President Reagan is not eager to agree to a total test ban, even if verification procedures could be worked out. And any deal would surely meet fierce opposition from the Pentagon. The military, with support from the major weapons-research laboratories, wants to continue experimenting with its modernized nuclear arsenal, particularly technology that might be used to implement the President's Strategic Defense Initiative. Last Saturday at an under ground site in Pahute Mesa, Nev., northwest of Las Vegas, the U.S. exploded a device (code-named Goldstone) designed to channel the energy of a nuclear blast into a concentrated, powerful beam of X-rays that could knock out a missile or warhead. Indeed, it may have been the Soviets' fear of SDI that pushed the Kremlin to show some flexibility on verification, in the hope of winning a ban on future tests of such Star Wars technology.

The real significance of the verification issue goes far beyond nuclear testing. Actually, on-site inspection is not essential to a test ban, since seismic devices placed outside the Soviet Union can detect most underground nuclear explosions. The Soviets have even shown a willingness in the past to allow seismic sensors on their soil with direct satellite links to the U.S. Inspections of missile installations are a different matter, however, and have become a major sticking point of arms-control negotiations.

As if to emphasize that point, the Administration last week repeated longstanding charges that the Soviets have been cheating on existing arms-control agreements. "Soviet noncompliance," President Reagan stated in a report submitted to Congress, "has made verification and compliance the pacing elements of arms control today." According to the report, Moscow violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty by building a huge radar system in central Siberia, and the 1979 SALT accords limiting each side to one new ICBM by testing and deploying the SS-25 mobile missile. The Soviets argue that the radar station will be used for tracking satellites, not enemy missiles, and that the SS-25 is merely a modernized version of the old SS-12. Pentagon hardliners insist that the scope of Soviet cheating is greater than most other experts con tend; on-site inspection may be the only way finally to resolve the debate.

The Administration did say that for its part the U.S. would continue to observe arms-control measures like the never-ratified SALT II treaty, which would have expired Dec. 31. Nonetheless, until the two sides can agree on some means of verifying compliance with current accords, they may have difficulty reaching new ones. --By Evan Thomas. Reported by Jay Branegan/Washington and Nancy Traver/Moscow

With reporting by Reported by Jay Branegan/Washington and Nancy Traver/Moscow