High Hopes, Low Expectations

By David Beckwith

When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, large numbers of Americans shared his determination to build up U.S. armaments and take a hard stance against Soviet expansionism. But as Reagan prepared for this week's meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva, a TIME poll showed more support for reaching an accommodation with the Soviet Union than at any other time during his presidency. The U.S. public strongly favors making significant progress in talks with the Soviets, particularly on nuclear arms control, even while it is dubious about any likely success. Alkthough a majority of Americans favor development of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a solid 74% indicate a willingness to trade away the proposed missile-defense system for cutbacks in Soviet military power.

The desire for summit deals is hedged by considerable doubt about their feasibility. The survey of 1,020 registered voters,[*] taken Nov. 5 through Nov. 7 by Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., found that while 82% of respondents believed the first summit in six years was a good idea, only 7% expected significant forward movement from the talks, and 16% forecast no progress at all. The Administration's attempts in recent weeks to dampen expectations about summit accomplishments were clearly successful. For example, 86% of those surveyed considered a mutual reduction in nuclear arms a "very important" summit goal, but only 31% thought it likely to happen. More than three-quarters of the survey respondents put a high priority on the two superpowers agreeing to stop interfering in the affairs of Nicaragua and Afghanistan, yet less than one-fifth of them thought such restraint likely to be achieved.

Even if a breakthrough agreement on a vital foreign policy issue could be reached, the survey indicated considerable skepticism about whether it would work: 66% do not believe the Soviets can be trusted to keep their end of the bargain, and a surprising 28% think the U.S. is similarly unlikely to honor the fine print of a pact.

Much of the dubiousness can be laid to misgivings about the two main players in Geneva and their willingness to strive seriously for an arms-control agreement. Despite a flurry of artfully crafted public appearances, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev remains an unknown quantity to the American public. Some 93% of the survey group admitted knowing little or nothing about the new Soviet leader; 47% of those who know at least something about Gorbachev suspect that he cannot be counted upon to honor his end of a bargain. Gorbachev's public relations efforts and his youth (by past Politburo standards) notwithstanding, a majority of Americans consider the new Soviet boss to be part of the old Kremlin leadership, no better or worse than his predecessors.

More surprising are public doubts about the popular Reagan. Only 30% think the President emphasizes arms control over expansion of our nuclear arsenal, although 79% personally favor that position. Fully 50% of those surveyed believe Reagan is determined to build up America's supply of nuclear weapons, but only 12% find that a good idea. Indeed, by 25% to 21%, more voters believe Reagan's nuclear policies increase rather than decrease the threat of war. (A remarkable 46% think those policies have no effect either way.)

Still, the President enjoyed solid public support as he faced off with Gorbachev: by 53% to 20%, voters view Reagan as more knowledgeable in world affairs; by 66% to 14%, they rate him more skilled in presenting his ideas; and by 58% to 9%, think him more concerned about the threat of nuclear war than his Soviet counterpart. Moreover, a solid 55% predicted that Reagan would outscore Gorbachev in world opinion. Yet 33% thought Gorbachev more likely to get his way at the summit, while only 28% predicted Reagan would prevail there. More ominously, despite general approval of the Geneva talks, 51% of Americans think U.S. involvement in a nuclear war is either somewhat likely or very likely in the next 20 years.

The survey indicates a marked recent softening of anti-Soviet opinion in the U.S. In 1980, shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan, Americans were divided on how the U.S. should treat the Soviet Union, with 45% favoring a cooperative policy of detente and 41% urging a cold war approach to the Soviets as potential enemies. But after four years of a costly U.S. military buildup, the proportion of Americans favoring detente has jumped to 65%, while the number of those favoring cold war tactics has dropped to 24%. Significantly, the detente approach received almost equal support from Republicans and Democrats alike.

Even though a solid 55% of those questioned characterize current U.S.-Soviet relations as generally poor, the survey disclosed a startling drop in concern over the Soviet threat to this country. The proportion of Americans who believe the Soviet Union represents a very serious threat to the U.S. declined from 52% in 1983 to 32% this month. Similarly, the respondents who agreed that "the nuclear arms race is so dangerous that spending more money on nuclear arms weakens our national security rather than strengthening it" increased from 45% in 1982 to 62% this month. Some 68% believe the U.S. has sufficient nuclear weapons now. Only 22% favor more "for self-defense."

Despite the sentiment for moderating the nuclear buildup, public opinion is gradually forming behind the President's expensive space-based missile-defense project. A majority think SDI will work (65%), believe it should be built (59%) and are convinced it will make the U.S. more secure (58%). Those views, however, are hardly based on exhaustive knowledge. While 88% of those surveyed claim to have heard of SDI, or Star Wars as it is often called, 69% admit they know only "a little" about it.

Moreover, Star Wars creates notable splits along partisan and gender lines. Republicans plump for Star Wars 75% to 19%, while Democrats oppose it 47% to 46%. Men are overwhelming adherents of the program, 70% to 24%; women back it by a mere 47% to 44%. Nor does the increasing support mean that uneasiness about the project's usefulness has vanished. Asked whether Star Wars deployment would facilitate an arms-control agreement, 36% of the respondents replied yes and 33% answered no. Some 36% believe Star Wars would decrease the possibility of nuclear war, up from 26% in a similar survey last July; 20% believe the system would increase the chance of war, vs. 30% last July.

The depth of public commitment to SDI is also suspect. Among possible goals for the summit, the survey listed, "Reaching an arms-control agreement in which the U.S. stops building the Star Wars defense system and the Soviet Union makes similar cutbacks in its military systems." A commanding 74% thought that idea to be a "very important" goal, while only 18% labeled it "not very important." If the President continues to insist that SDI offers more security than a missile cut, he will have to persuade the U.S. public as well as the Soviets of his views.

The poll results underscore a remarkable anomaly in the public's reaction to Reagan, whose lusty 62% positive job-performance rating remains near its historic high. Even though the national economy has just completed three years of expansion, only 27% of respondents believe they are better off economically under Reagan, while 28% think their economic situation has deteriorated. Concern over the swollen federal deficit and U.S. economic health continue to rank first and second among problems facing the country, well ahead of the arms race and the threat of nuclear war. Yet, despite their reservations about the President's hawkish summit stance, many voters claim they feel more comfortable after five years of Reagan's defense and foreign policies. Only 16% consider themselves in greater danger militarily because of Reagan's policies, while a full 36% believe they are safer. Perceptions of the legacy from Geneva will doubtless affect those numbers. --By David Beckwith

Do you personally favor putting emphasis on ... Negotiating nuclear disarmament[*] Expanding our nuclear arsenal[*] December 1981 67% 25% March 1982 71% 21% July 1985 69% 18% November 1985 79% 12%

[*] Numbers do not add up to 100% as some answered "not sure" or "both the same".

TIME Charts by Renee Klein

Would you say the U.S.S.R. represents ... Sept. 1983 Nov. 1985 A very serious threat to our country 52% 32% A moderately serious threat 35% 44% A slight threat 10% 17% No threat 2% 5%