The Problems with Retaliation %

Frustration and anger over the TWA hijacking have fed the desire to find some way to do to terrorists what they are doing to American citizens. Why not, in future crises, threaten and perhaps take the lives of hijackers? Might swift retribution deter terrorists, or at least punish them? What about covert counterterror, the capacity to identify and eliminate terrorists, pre- emptively or in retaliation? TIME Washington Bureau Chief Strobe Talbott put these questions to four former directors of the Central Intelligence Agency. All agreed that the U.S. should move vigorously and effectively to oppose terrorism but not adopt assassination as an instrument of policy.

Each of the former CIA chiefs has had other experiences that bear on the current challenge. Richard Helms (Director of Central Intelligence from 1966 to 1973) spent many years in the CIA's clandestine services and was Ambassador to Iran from 1973 to 1976, so he knows about Shi'ite fundamentalism firsthand. James Schlesinger (DCI from January through June 1973) was Secretary of Defense from 1973 to 1975. William Colby (DCI, 1973 to 1976) ran the highly controversial Phoenix counterinsurgency program in Viet Nam from 1968 to 1971. And at the request of Annapolis Classmate Jimmy Carter, Stansfield Turner (DCI, 1977 to 1981) came to the CIA from a career in the Navy. Their interviews with Talbott follow.

RICHARD HELMS

It is very important to keep these incidents in perspective and not get so incredibly worked up over them. Terrorism, of course, is a serious challenge, and we must do our best to deal with it. But to declare a "war on terrorism" is just to hype the problem, not solve it. The quiet, steady approach is better than bombast.

As for assassination, it's just not on. The people of the U.S. won't stand for it. In fact, there are problems with all levels of violent action. Let's say the Delta Force puts on masks and goes in and blows up an installation around Beirut. We've violated the sovereignty of Lebanon and killed a lot of people in cold blood. Are they terrorists? You'll have a lot of argument about that, just on our side alone.

What if you send in a coup-de-main group of civilians (a hit team)? If it comes out that they were Americans -- and it takes no time at all for that kind of thing to unravel in public -- you're facing all sorts of allegations.

If, instead, the blow-and-burn stuff is done by surrogates whom you've trained in the black arts and given a suitable cover, there is a whole other set of problems. If you've recruited them from dissidents who have an ideological motivation, they may be very hard to control. You may think you've called the operation off and wake up one morning and find out they've gone and done it anyway.

Let's say we have reason to believe that Khomeini or Gaddafi is behind some terrorist act, so you decide to strike by attacking the Iranian oil fields or a Libyan air force base. In the latter case, you've now got all the Arabs against you. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the moderates will feel immense pressure to line up with their Arab brethren. We've got to get used to the disagreeable fact that there really is no quick fix for terrorism. What we do need is improved intelligence work against terrorist groups. Penetration can help derail the nasty stuff. When I was in the agency, the CIA penetrated the P.L.O., and we helped head off several terrorist acts, including an assassination attempt against Golda Meir.

We also need improved cooperation among free-world intelligence services. As long as we have a leaky Congress and a leaky oversight process, friendly services are simply not going to share with us. Another important thing is that we must prove we're serious, that we have the political will to continue the fight against terrorism after this episode is over. One problem is that our moods change all the time. Back in 1975, the CIA was ridiculed and pilloried for allegedly doing things we didn't do, and the things we did do were pretty small beer compared with what's being talked about now."

JAMES SCHLESINGER

There's now surprising enthusiasm for creating an entity for which our democracy seemed to have no tolerance whatsoever five years ago. You're witnessing a radical alteration of standards. Just a short time ago, we were talking about the CIA as a rogue elephant whose wicked acts had to be reined in. Now some say we must have a mechanism for inflicting punishment on America's foes.

This is a society that is characterized by a generalized ethical ambivalence about rough-and-tumble measures. A lot of people who are now advocating a counterterror capability have in mind our emulating the Israelis. But America is not under enough of a threat for us to do that. We're not a small country with powerful enemies just over the border. So our capacity consistently to carry out pre-emption and retaliation is certainly not assured. Democracies forgo certain options by the nature of their societies and the whole set of ideals they represent.

In any event, assassination is not the right word to describe what is being proposed. What is needed is the ability to bust up terrorist organizations. If someone is killed in the operation, it is not because of his political role; it's because he is a casualty of the operation. The purpose of the operation should be to destroy the power of a terrorist organization, and if there are casualties, so be it. That's quite different from assassination.

More important than any particular mechanism is for us to establish a pattern of behavior on which other nations will base their expectations. It is important for others to have a high level of expectation that the perpetrators of terrorist acts will be punished. The character of the punishment matters a helluva lot less than the certainty that they will be punished. That means establishing a pattern over a period of years. It means avoiding sending conflicting signals. It means not issuing threats and then backing off. If you make a threat and then don't deliver, that raises morale and whets the appetite on the other side.

WILLIAM COLBY

We are terribly underequipped for rescue missions. It's outrageous that the Israelis and the West Germans can do these things and we can't. We've had a couple of examples of how much we need to improve. Iran (the Desert One debacle) was one. Grenada was another. The operation there was pretty elephantine.

Part of the problem is that we're bound by our labyrinthine military structure. What you need for rescue missions is to set aside a unit, give it its own command, stop worrying about whether the Army and the Navy and the Air Force are each going to have a piece. You need a dedicated force, not what's left over from all the other units.

Another counterterror function is retaliation. What I'm talking about here is a military attack on a base or a depot. I'm not talking about singling out individuals for elimination. Assassination is beyond what our country can stand. One problem with assassination is that you're playing God: you think that by killing one man you can change the course of events. In addition to the moral arguments, there are practical considerations. The efforts to kill Castro were feckless. You end up using tools and people that are unreliable. With assassination you can't win. If the operation works, you will probably get blamed for it; if it doesn't work, you will probably still get blamed for it. And if it works and isn't revealed, it does not do much good as a deterrent.

Whatever actions we take, it is important they not be seen as unreasonable by ordinary world citizens. That is why, where possible, we should follow the laws, and in foreign operations follow the rules of war. It is also important that we control these retaliatory forces ourselves, not rely on proxies that can get out of hand. You certainly do not want to be identified with death squads.

STANSFIELD TURNER

I have very little sympathy for preemptive assassination. We are a country that embodies a lot of legal principles as well as moral ones, and it's hard to be sure that when you target someone for assassination, you've got the kind of evidence that would hold up in court for a capital crime. President Ford signed an Executive Order forbidding assassination, and that order has been replicated by Presidents Carter and Reagan. I think basically it was a good thing. I remember that when Khomeini came to power, someone suggested to me that we should look at getting rid of him. I told him to get out of my earshot. Creating hit teams would mean changing that order.

It would also mean playing by very nasty rules. What we may think of as justifiable counterterrorism is someone else's terrorism. Much as I don't like Gaddafi, I don't think we should be part of that game.

Also, we don't want to be seen as a wild West country that takes the law into its own hands. Remember that the President has to tell Congress when he undertakes covert action. That means it will leak. Does the U.S. want to stand up before the world and say, "We're smart enough to know when to kill people"?

Another problem is that we've got to be very careful about the sort of people who do our dirty work for us. What assurance do we have that our proxies won't take out 80 innocent people? When you hire assassins, you're not dealing with the cream of humanity. In addition, I'm not sure that retaliatory assassination, even when it might be justified and much as it helps vent our frustration, really solves the problem of terror. It can make things worse. It can invite brother Shi'ites to engage in more martyrdom.

Perhaps some consideration should be given to creating a CIA force. I'm not totally convinced it would be a good idea, but there are situations that require more stealthy, subtle, surreptitious and covert means than the military is capable of. You've got to deceive people, use a minimum of force and get control of a situation. In the Iran hostage crisis, for example, the military wasn't ready until the end of January -- three months (after the hostages were taken) -- to go into Iran. The military just isn't attuned to doing that kind of low-level but difficult operation. We don't know how to be truly expeditionary anymore.

At a minimum, I'd urge that there be a CIA appendage to the Delta Force. When I was CIA director, I went down to Fort Bragg to watch the Delta Force prepare to storm hijacked airplanes. "Have you asked us for help?" I asked. They were too proud. They were thinking in terms of moving their people around in tourist clothes on commercial planes. I asked them, "How are you going to get phony passports and disguises? Are you letting your guys let their hair grow so that they'll look like hippies rather than G.I.s?" Would they like us to help them out with our forgery and disguise departments? They said they hadn't thought about that.