Hoping for a Stalemate

No guerrilla force has ever toppled a Marxist regime, and the Nicaraguan contras are not about to become the first. But popular disaffection with the Sandinistas guarantees the contras a steady supply of new recruits, and renewed U.S. aid will give the rebels the means to sustain a long, fitful insurgency.

Sandinista forces outnumber the contras by 110,000 to an estimated 17,000. Well supplied with Soviet arms and equipment, the Nicaraguan army has much more mobility and firepower than the rebels. Since April the Sandinistas have kept the contras on the run, pushing them north over the Honduran border and south into Costa Rica. Last month Nicaraguan troops actually drove about three miles into Honduras and shelled Las Vegas, the base camp of the largest contra faction, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). The contras lack even the guerrillas' traditional element of surprise: Sandinista spies have thoroughly infiltrated rebel camps.

Although several elite brigades of counterinsurgency forces have engaged the contras with devastating effect, the government has not been able to move in for the kill. There are a number of reasons. Despite the assistance of several thousand Cuban military advisers, the Nicaraguan army suffers from "poor command and control," according to a U.S. military expert. Moreover, many Sandinista commanders prefer to stand off and lob rockets and shells rather than close with the enemy. Training is also slipshod: Nicaraguan draftees commonly enter the field after only two or three days of preparation.

The government has tried to transform the northern provinces patrolled by the contras into free-fire zones by clearing them of citizenry, sometimes relocating the populations of entire villages farther south. Disenchanted with the regime's military draft, rationing and repression, however, many campesinos flee in the opposite direction and sign up with the contras.

The yearlong cutoff of U.S. aid did not hamper the contras' recruiting efforts. Indeed, the FDN claims to have grown from 6,000 to more than 14,000 men. Though the contras suffer from occasional equipment shortages, about $10 million in private donations from conservative groups in the U.S., Taiwan and South Korea have largely made up for the lost U.S. aid.

Rebel bands have been able to mount operations deep inside Nicaragua, but they have been unable to hold any territory or control roads. Feuding between rival factions has prevented the contras from establishing a southern front, much less orchestrating a countrywide upheaval.

Contra leaders insist that they are on the rebound from the Sandinista offensive. Fresh supplies of aid from the U.S. will improve morale and enable the contras to equip new recruits. The rebel leaders do not predict a military victory, at least any time soon. Their aim is to hold on and sap the shaky Nicaraguan economy by sabotaging power lines and blocking highways. "The contras are able to make a lot of noise and cause damage to the Sandinista regime," says Colonel Mark Richards, a U.S. intelligence analyst. "But they are highly unlikely to be the future rulers of Managua."