The President's Saltbox

By William R. Doerner.

An agreement that was never ratified and is timed to expire Dec. 31 would hardly seem cause for high drama. But this document is the 1979 U.S.-Soviet accord reached in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, popularly known as SALT II. Despite its unratified status, both the Carter and Reagan Administrations pledged not to undercut it so long as Moscow did the same. Congress has demanded to know whether this policy will continue. After fierce debate within the Administration, Ronald Reagan planned to announce his decision early this week: the U.S. "basically" will comply with the terms, but is prepared to break them selectively in reponse to Soviet violations.

The argument, which has raged for more than two months, divided the President's advisers along familiar lines. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, on the advice of his assistant Richard Perle, contended that the Soviets have repeatedly violated SALT II and must be penalized by a U.S. repudiation of the treaty. Secretary of State George Shultz and Special Arms Adviser Paul Nitze argued against handing the Soviets a propaganda victory. The Joint Chiefs of Staff contended that SALT II has resulted in at least some Soviet restraint in stockpiling offensive weapons, and that the U.S. would be at a disadvantage in an all-out arms race. The Chiefs pushed for various "gray-area solutions," one of which the President accepted.

In a report issued last February, the Reagan Administration charged Moscow with eleven separate violations of SALT II. The most serious include the illegal encoding of radio signals from Soviet missile tests, making it difficult for the U.S. to collect data necessary to verify treaty compliance. In addition, Washington accuses Moscow of developing two new strategic missiles, the ten-warhead SS-24 and the single-warhead SS-25, although the agreement allows only one. However, veteran Arms Negotiator Paul Warnke pointed out last week that the Soviets have also dismantled 1,000 ICBMs and twelve missile-launching submarines in accord with SALT II restrictions.

Reagan was forced into a SALTbox in part because the U.S. will soon be in violation of one of the agreement's provisions. When the Navy begins sea trials of the U.S.S. Alaska Trident submarine in September, the U.S. will have 14 more than the 1,200 multiwarhead land- and sea-based missiles each side is permitted. To stay within the limit, it must either retire and disable an older 16-missile Poseidon sub or destroy at least 14 Minuteman land missiles. Hard-liners argued against taking either course; they wanted the U.S. to exceed the limit deliberately. Reagan chose a halfway measure: mothballing or converting a Poseidon rather than cutting it up as the treaty requires.

The Senate, by a vote of 90 to 5, passed a nonbinding resolution calling on Reagan to "continue to refrain from undercutting" SALT II's provisions. Anticipating his decision, however, the Senate allowed for "proportionate responses" to any Soviet violations. Washington's NATO allies, meanwhile, urged the U.S. not to tamper with SALT II for fear of upsetting the nuclear status quo and undermining current U.S.-Soviet arms-reduction talks in Geneva.

Reagan, who has called SALT II "fatally flawed," kept his options open throughout the week's discussions. As is often the case when his aides are deeply divided on an important issue, he adopted a split-the-difference course. "It was a spirited debate," said one participant in the White House meetings. "But enough cautions were put on the table to make the case for a gray-area solution rather than giving the treaty the heave-ho."

With reporting by Johanna McGeary/Washington