Middle East Shifting into First Gear

By William E. Smith

At the close of their conversations in the White House last week, President Reagan and his guest, King Hussein of Jordan, stepped out into the Rose Garden for an impromptu press conference. The President wished Hussein well in his search for a Middle East peace settlement. The King responded with words that amounted more to a policy statement than a formal farewell. As the result of his recent talks with Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hussein declared, "we are willing to negotiate, within the context of an international conference, a peaceful settlement on the basis of the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including 242 and 338." He added: "We are offering a unique opportunity for peace which may not be with us for long."

Against almost all expectations, it appeared that Hussein had made measurable progress in his quest to seek a new dialogue on the Arab-Israeli relationship. He had reaffirmed to the Reagan Administration that he and moderate Palestinians were interested in negotiations with Israel. He had told Reagan that he had gone over the details of his Washington statement with Arafat before coming to the U.S., and thus was conveying Arafat's "explicit" endorsement of the U.N. resolutions that implicitly recognize Israel's right to exist. Said Hussein: "Every word . . . in my statement is a result of agreement between us and the P.L.O."

Administration officials, who had been cautioning against expecting anything of consequence to flow from Hussein's visit, were pleasantly surprised and intrigued. After a boat ride on the Potomac with the King, Secretary of State George Shultz was encouraged by what Hussein had told him about his latest discussions with Arafat. While emphasizing that many diplomatic obstacles remained, Shultz later declared, "There is motion today. The King's visit has given impetus to the process of peacemaking."

Hussein also delicately redefined his insistence on an international conference as the forum for Israeli-Arab negotiations. The U.S. and Israel have opposed such a framework because it would give the Soviet Union a formal role in Middle East talks; Washington favors direct contacts between Israel and the Arabs. Last week Hussein suggested that he would be willing to negotiate under an international "umbrella." Translation: the primary parties, Israel and the Arabs, would meet face to face under the guidance of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Said the King: "When I speak of negotiations, I obviously mean negotiations between the Arab side and Israel on the other side." The U.S. did not dismiss the umbrella concept out of hand, but it made public a set of conditions for Soviet participation. Among them: establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel and reducing the flow of arms to Iran and the warring Lebanese factions.

While Hussein was in Washington, Arafat received a carefully worded endorsement from the Palestinians' Central Council, the body that oversees policy in between meetings of the Palestine National Council, the Palestinian parliament-in-exile. The statement carried with it a qualification, however. The Central Council said that an eventual confederation between Jordan and Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories would have to be preceded by the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. That would be unacceptable to Israel.

Ever wary of P.L.O. intentions, the Reagan Administration emphasized that it needed a "direct, unequivocal confirmation" that the P.L.O. now accepts Washington's long-standing conditions for meeting with P.L.O. representatives. Among these are acceptance of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, recognizing Israel's right to exist, and renouncing the use of force. Once these points have been agreed to, the next step could be a meeting between the U.S. and a joint Jordanian- Palestinian delegation to discuss how to arrange direct talks with Israel.

The U.S. is well aware that in the past, Hussein's Middle East initiatives have been sandbagged by other Arab countries, notably Syria, or by radical P.L.O. elements. So far, only Egypt and Oman have openly backed the latest Hussein plan. Said a senior U.S. diplomat: "Hussein admits he needs a threshold of Arab support to move ahead. The resounding silence from Saudi Arabia shows he still has a lot of work to do there."

As for Israel, which refuses to deal with the P.L.O., there remains skepticism about the organization's purported change of heart. Only six weeks ago, the Israeli navy intercepted and sank a boat carrying 28 P.L.O. guerrillas loyal to Arafat. Their alleged mission: to bomb the Israeli Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv. In his initial response to Hussein's announcement, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres described the King's call for an international conference as "nothing more than a device to evade direct negotiations with Israel." As for a Soviet role, Peres continued, "they don't even have diplomatic relations with us, so they (would) line up with the most extremist Arab positions."

Though Hussein's visit to Washington may not have been the "historic breakthrough" he envisioned, he convinced the Administration that he deserves U.S. support. At the very least, said one U.S. diplomat, the King demonstrated that the U.S. should shift from "neutral to first gear" in pursuing a Middle East settlement. Hussein was less successful in securing backing for Jordan's request to buy advanced fighter planes, antiaircraft missiles and other sophisticated weapons from the U.S. The President vaguely assured the King of continued U.S. support, but U.S. officials privately indicated that action on Jordan's arms shopping list is not near the top of the Administration's legislative agenda. The priorities could change quickly if Hussein makes further progress in his drive for peace.

With reporting by Roland Flamini/Jerusalem and Johanna McGeary/Washington