"We in the U.S. Are Suckers for Style"

Richard Nixon's first love has always been foreign policy. He has written four books on the subject (No More Vietnams was published this month) and maintains a network of high- level contacts. The appointment of a new Soviet leader was much on his mind last week when he met with TIME Washington Bureau Chief Strobe Talbott and Senior Editor Stephen Smith. Looking tanned and fit after a vacation in the Bahamas, the former President said he had recovered from a prolonged bout of shingles. In his first on-the-record interview since November 1984, Nixon discussed the pitfalls of summitry and assessed the challenges facing the U.S. in the Third World. Excerpts:

We in the U.S. are suckers for style as far as Soviet leaders are concerned. I remember how we had an NSC briefing on Nikita Khrushchev back when he came to power in the '50s. We were told that he was going to be a temporary man because he drank too much, wore ill-fitting clothes, spoke bad Russian and had boorish manners.

John Foster Dulles was there. Foster used to chew his cud, and he had a tic over his eye. I can see him now as he sat back and said, "But anyone who claws his way to the top in that Soviet jungle will prove formidable." As it turned out, Khrushchev was by far the most intelligent, imaginative and creative Soviet leader I've ever met.

I remember that before I went to see Khrushchev in 1959, Harold Macmillan told me that the Soviet leaders want to be accepted as members of the club. That's a cheap price to pay. They should be treated with respect. But they are not affected in the least by how nicely you treat them.

Then when Andropov came along, I practically lost my breakfast when I read some of that sappy stuff about him in the morning papers--how he liked Western pop music and so on. Now we're hearing about how Mikhail Gorbachev has good eye contact and a firm handshake and a good sense of humor and how his wife wears stylish shoes. Just because Gorbachev uses charm does not mean he is going to be swayed by it. And as for this facade about a modern, Western- style technocrat--it's just that, a facade.

It is a testament to Gorbachev's brilliance as a politician that he could preside over four years of failure in agriculture and still come out smelling like a rose. He has the confidence of the Soviet bureaucracy because they believe he is a true believer. He isn't going to change the system. He is going to try to make it work better.

Does that mean we can't do business with him? Of course not. But it will be like doing business with the American robber barons of the 19th century. Gorbachev is not going to be a fastball pitcher. He'll throw curves, knuckleballs and spitters if he can get away with them. Of course, Ronald Reagan has played a pitcher too, in that movie The Winning Team, and he's also a very shrewd political leader. So you've got two pretty good pitchers going against each other. The question is Which side can hit?

Gorbachev has got major problems at home with the economy. Therefore where we in the West are strong, he needs our help. He's got to be concerned about Eastern Europe and the outer perimeters of the Soviet empire. Every one of the Soviet Union's "colonies" is a drag and has to be subsidized.

It's not that Gorbachev is worried about the Soviet Union collapsing, the way some of our superhawks think. Rather, to paraphrase Jack Kennedy, he has got to be worried about getting it moving again. He needs a summit a lot more than Ronald Reagan does. He needs better relations with the U.S. more than we need them with him.

I have been relieved about what seems to be a change of view within the Administration on the wisdom of a full-blown quickie summit. I have always thought that a get-acquainted, atmospheric summit, with all the trappings, would be much more in the Soviets' interests than in ours. It would be a public relations blockbuster, and the Europeans would say, "Thank God the Americans and the Russians are getting together." But if nothing came of it, there would be a lot of disillusionment, and it would be directed against us.

That is one reason why I favor annual summits. That way you can keep the pressure on. Annual summits will inhibit the Soviet Union. Nations tend to behave better when they have big meetings coming up between their leaders.

A summit must not labor and bring forth a mouse. Mickey Mouse things, like fishing rights and a new consulate in Kiev and commercial agreements, are fine. We had them at the first Moscow summit in 1972. They're the froth. But you've also got to have some good stout beer.

President Reagan has an opportunity to control the timing and the substance. So the questions are when, where, how and what. As for when, the key thing is not to be in a hurry. Reagan's position should be that he is willing but not anxious.

On the question of where, the best place to have a summit is over there. I know from experience that when an American President goes abroad, he has a more favorable press than when he stays here. Reagan was very effective in China, and he will be very effective in the Soviet Union, not just with people back here, but in Europe too. All that European concern about how the world is going to blow up because of the cowboy in the White House--that has gone down the tubes.

How to plan a summit? There has got to be intense talk at the highest level. Whatever we want to say about Henry Kissinger in our time, we were quite good at privately preparing for meetings, not making publicity all the time.

Now on the question of what the principal business of a summit should be: arms control (the first SALT accords) was the centerpiece of the '72 summit, but I do not believe it is possible to have a significant arms-control agreement by the end of this year. We might get a cosmetic agreement and set a process in motion. Even that cannot be done in Geneva. Able as Max Kampelman is, you cannot get an agreement at a table with 18 people on each side. I do not see anyone to do it but Bud McFarlane, although always with George Shultz very much in on it.

Rather than arms control, the centerpiece of the summit could be a resolution of some of the political issues dividing us in such areas as Central America, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. They are more important than arms control anyway, since it is political conflicts that could lead to the use of arms.

Gorbachev is not able to back away from any of the Soviet Union's forward positions, but his interests do require reducing the level of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S., particularly in sensitive areas such as Central America. He knows that we cannot have a situation where the Soviet Union is supporting activities that are neuralgic for us.

A statement of principles comparable to the one we signed at the 1972 summit would be useful. The problem was not in the way we applied those principles. The problem was in the way the relationship was managed after we left office.

When it comes to supporting our friends and allies who are under attack around the world, or rebels who are opposing our enemies, there is a mistake we too often make. Americans want to see things in terms of black and white, good and evil. This sometimes leads us to reach judgments that miss the mark.

For example, people with the very best of intentions--people who are all-out anti-Communists--sometimes contend that the U.S. should always support those who fight for freedom and against repression anywhere in the world. Well, let's look at China. If there were freedom fighters there, would we support them? No, of course we wouldn't, and we shouldn't.

Now China is as repressive a state as the Soviet Union. The difference between them is that in a geopolitical sense, the Chinese not only pose no threat to us, but good relations with them are indispensable to our foreign policy goals.

We have to keep looking at things globally, with an eye to our struggle with the Soviets for influence, particularly in the Third World. Take Angola. The civil war there is part of a broader conflict. American support for the rebels there is the Brezhnev Doctrine in reverse. In the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviets were in effect saying, "What is ours is forever; you cannot roll us back." That went primarily for Eastern Europe but also for any other country where Soviet proxies or surrogates are in power. In Angola, we should support those who are attempting to turn back Soviet power.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, there was a lot of talk about how they were concerned over Muslims on their border. That, of course, is bull. What they could not tolerate in Afghanistan was counterrevolution. It concerns them because of Eastern Europe and the outer reaches of the Soviet empire. If I were a Soviet leader, I would be concerned too.

The most clear-cut case where we are justified in supporting rebels is Nicaragua. The Sandinista government represses its own people. That gives us a moral right to support the contras, but is it enough? No. However, there is a second factor, which is that the Nicaraguan government is expansionist and aggressive; it is attempting to export its revolution. Moreover, Nicaragua is close to us. Also, it is a potential Soviet military base in the Americas. Put all these factors together, and you have a strong case for support of the contras.

There has been a tendency on the part of the American media to downplay both the Sandinistas' repression and the threat to their neighbors. Part of this has to do with the whole Viet Nam syndrome, the press worrying about how "we're going to end up on the wrong side of history" or "we're going to get a little bit pregnant here." There has also been a little too much equanimity, a tendency to say, "So what? What difference does it make?" Well, what difference does it make who is in charge of little Cuba? It makes a hell of a lot of difference.

People talk about the need for diplomacy. I am all for the Contadora process and that kind of thing; but diplomacy without power is simply impotent. At the same time, we should not give the impression that our approach is almost completely military. We have not given enough emphasis to our economic power. Now, I know from my own experience that foreign aid is the most unpopular damn thing in the world. It is a loser politically. We have to make it a winner.

The Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Kissinger Commission report are getting virtually no attention at all. That is because the recommendations they make--for economic aid and trade--are not as glamorous or as interesting as military and covert assistance. But economics and ideology are our strongest suits. If we competed with the Soviet Union in those areas, it would be no contest.