Battle of the Missiles

By William R. Doerner.

It was an expenditure of political capital that Presidents make only a few times in a four-year term, and only for matters they deem absolutely essential. Just five hours before the Senate was to vote last week on spending $1.5 billion for construction of 21 more MX missiles, Ronald Reagan rode by motorcade from the White House to Capitol Hill for a climactic personal appeal on behalf of the controversial weapon. Meeting with Republican Senators over lunch in the Mansfield Room, the President pulled out a $5 bill to pay for his meal and quipped to Majority Leader Bob Dole, "Include a 15% tip."

Dole and the rest of the Senate provided a lot more than that. Late that afternoon they gave approval of the new ten-warhead missiles by the surprisingly wide vote of 55 to 45, a crucial boost for Reagan's campaign to double the size of the nation's MX arsenal. It was a reluctant majority; although most Senators have qualms about the MX, many feared that a vote against it would jeopardize the newly restarted arms talks in Geneva. In part the vote reflected U.S. concerns that two Soviet missiles believed to be mobile, the MX-size SS-X-24 and the smaller SS-X-25, may be nearing deployment.

But the ten-vote margin was primarily an impressive personal victory for Reagan, demonstrating that his clout with Congress remains strong, at least when he takes a personal stand. Conceded Democrat Lawton Chiles, who led the floor fight against the MX: "It's hard to beat the President." The size of the Administration's victory in the Senate greatly enhanced the MX's chances for getting past the Democrats in the House, which is scheduled for a similar - vote this week. Admitted California Congressman Tony Coehlo, one of the strongest MX foes: "Thanks to the wide Senate margin, we probably can't win in the House."

Reagan nevertheless was taking nothing for granted. During his Thursday- evening press conference, he began flogging the House, using the same arguments that had worked so effectively with Senators. "Now is the testing time for the House of Representatives," said the President. "The votes there will answer the question of whether we stand united at Geneva or whether America will face the Soviet Union as a nation divided over the most fundamental questions of our national security." For good measure Reagan ordered Max Kampelman, chief U.S. negotiator in Geneva, to return to Washington and lobby House members on behalf of the MX.

The largest strategic missile in the U.S. arsenal, the MX has sparked one controversy after another over four Administrations (see box). The latest rescue effort waged in its behalf stems from a compromise reached last year with a group of House Democrats led by Les Aspin, the new (since January) chairman of the Armed Services Committee. At the time, Congress voted to set aside the $1.5 billion for production of 21 missiles but to hold the money in escrow for a year and then reconsider the project. One reason: Moscow was then boycotting arms talks with Washington, and the Administration argued persuasively that the Soviets should not be rewarded with a unilateral U.S. strategic-arms concession.

As this year's congressional review approached, arms-negotiation diplomacy between the superpowers changed radically. The Soviets agreed in January to return to the bargaining table, and the new round of talks began March 12. Yet Reagan's most effective argument for extending the MX was basically the same: canceling the program would still send the wrong signal to Moscow and would undercut the U.S. bargaining position in Geneva to boot.

Arms-control advocates, church groups and nuclear-freeze organizations reject the President's reasoning, and they mounted an intense campaign to turn wavering Senators against the MX. Florida Senator Paula Hawkins, for example, received some 1,500 pieces of mail, largely against the missile, in the three days before the vote. For its part, the Administration enlisted its entire legislative affairs staff, Cabinet secretaries and notables like Henry Kissinger to argue its cause. Said one White House staffer: "We just could not afford to lose."

Three weeks ago, Reagan began playing host at a series of 8 a.m. breakfasts for small groups of 24 to 36 Senators and Congressmen, usually with Secretary of State George Shultz, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and National Security Chief Robert McFarlane on hand to answer questions. Reagan would show up around 8:30 to make an extemporaneous pitch. He spoke with dozens of other lawmakers over the telephone.

When Reagan caught up with New York's Alfonse D'Amato, the Senator was at a restaurant in Manhattan's Little Italy. Moments earlier, D'Amato's dinner had been interrupted by a prank call from Congressman Guy Molinari of Staten Island. Convinced that his old friend was prolonging the joke, D'Amato bellowed into the telephone, "Molinari, you creep, cut out this crap!" After identifying himself, the President did not have to belabor his cause before obtaining the mortified D'Amato's support.

The White House provided sympathetic hearings to Congressmen who hinted that their vote might depend on an Administration favor in their home district; a top official made sure the back scratching stopped short of anything "illegal or expensive." Reagan aides also put out the word that the President might not be eager to campaign next year for Republican Senators who failed to vote right--a tactic that almost backfired with Pennsylvania's Arlen Specter, who confronted Reagan about it during the Capitol Hill lunch. Specter and others also heard from Geneva, where Kampelman and Colleague John Tower, a former Senator, made calls to warn that the U.S. needed the MX as a bargaining tool.

That is a hotly debated argument. The Reagan Administration carefully refrained from calling the MX a bargaining "chip," which would imply a willingness to trade the system away. Even if the MX were used in the talks, moreover, that would provide no guarantee that its status would remain permanently negotiable. The Ford Administration conceived of the cruise missile largely as a bargaining item, for example, but the U.S. has since been reluctant to place cruise missiles, especially the sea-launched variety, on the table. The only major weapons system ever to serve as true trade-off material was the antiballistic-missile defense, which led to a 1972 treaty that limited such systems.

Another pro-MX argument was introduced into the debate at the last minute, thanks to the timely Pentagon release to Congress of information, including glossy four-color sketches, about the U.S.S.R.'s latest missile hardware. Actually, most of the data have been known for some time. While the Soviets have so far stored their SS-X-24s in "garages" easily detectable by U.S. spy satellites, they are experimenting with a mobile version that can be raised and fired from a railway launcher disguised to look like part of an ordinary freight train. The smaller SS-X-25, which has a single warhead comparable to the proposed U.S. Midgetman, will be transported and launched from flatbed trucks.

Under the rules of the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, which both superpowers are observing even though it was never ratified by the Senate, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are allowed to deploy one new missile system each. Moscow claims the SS-X-24 as its entry, Washington the MX. The Soviets, who now have six types of missiles in their ICBM arsenal, insist that the SS-X-25 is merely an updated version of the SS-13 and thus does not qualify as a new weapon or as a SALT violation. The Reagan Administration has disputed that point several times. In any case, said Secretary of State Shultz last week, the approaching mobility of Soviet missiles could pose new problems for Washington in keeping track of weapons aimed against the U.S. In the end, the outcome in the Senate depended on a small group of about a dozen fence sitters. Many of them, like Hawkins and Specter, reportedly did not decide until the last day. Four Republicans and three Democrats who voted against the missile last year switched positions. Maryland Senator Charles Mathias, a Republican, explained his switch on strategic grounds, expecially the MX's accuracy. Said he: "Without the MX we don't have a hard-target capability."

Though Reagan blithely disavowed his aides' warnings about political retaliation, the final vote bore the marks of tough party discipline. Only eight of the Senate's 53 Republicans voted against the MX measure. The G.O.P. defections were more than offset by ten Democratic votes for the MX, including that of Minority Leader Robert Byrd, a longtime MX supporter. Said Democrat Christopher Dodd: "The negotiations in Geneva are what put this over the top. I'll bet Reagan got ten votes on that basis alone."

Moscow's reaction to the Senate vote was reasonably muted. Soviet media continued to describe the MX as a "first-strike missile." Not surprisingly, the official Soviet news agency TASS accused the Senate of "bowing to unprecedented pressure from the Reagan Administration and the U.S. military- industrial complex." The MX vote had no immediately discernible effect on the talks in Geneva. U.S. and Soviet spokesmen announced that they had reached agreement, as planned, on dividing into three negotiation groups, one each to consider strategic weapons, Euromissiles and space arms.

Democrats were quick to deflate speculation that the President's MX victory would provide momentum in Congress for his other unpopular programs, including large increases in the military budget and new aid to antigovernment contra guerrillas in Nicaragua. Even Republican Senator Paul Laxalt, Reagan's closest friend in Congress, admits that those are "wholly different issues," without the patriotic overtones that Reagan evoked so effectively in the MX campaign. Some legislators were even talking of chopping $1 billion or more from the $3.7 billion the Administration has requested for research on the Strategic Defense Initiative, usually called Star Wars.

Nor did last week's vote necessarily bode well for the next stage of MX funding, which is due to come up for approval in Congress later this year. In that phase, the Administration is seeking $4 billion for 48 new missiles. Several Senators warned the President that their votes for MX last week should not be construed as commitments to future funding. Said Georgia's Senator Sam Nunn, a defense expert: "I can say with very firm conviction I will not vote for any number approaching 48."

Firm convictions about the MX have a way of changing, however; the Senate alone has taken at least a dozen votes on the MX over the years. By the time the issue arrives before Congress again, the MX may be only a year or so away from initial deployment, and there could well be changes in the Geneva outlook. About the only safe prediction is that the MX debate will continue to claim a large share of the Administration's energy and political reserves.

With reporting by Sam Allis and Barrett Seaman/ Washington