Opening Bids in the Middle East

By William R. Doerner

The moves last week were ambiguous, their importance in the long run far from certain. But after a year of unusual quiescence on Washington's part, the U.S. once again emerged as a player in the bridge game of Middle East diplomacy. While American officials were careful to damp down expectations, the opening bids were tantalizing. Items:

-- Saudi Arabia's King Fahd paid a five-day state visit to Washington, the first by a monarch from the Desert Kingdom in 14 years. His principal message: the U.S. has a responsibility to use its influence in an effort aimed at achieving peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

-- In Amman, Jordan's King Hussein and Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, agreed on a "framework for common action" in reaching a settlement with Israel over the fate of some 1.3 million Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Though exact terms of the accord were not released, the U.S. was told through diplomatic channels that it contained at least the implicit recognition of Israel's right to exist.

-- Israeli troops over the weekend completed the first stage of a pullback in southern Lebanon. Full withdrawal, expected by the summer, would clear an important obstacle to diplomatic efforts in the region.

-- Washington announced that it will confer in Vienna this week with the Soviet Union on Middle East issues. It was the first time the U.S. had scheduled a meeting with the Soviets to formally take note of their views on the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1977, when the two sides jointly called for an international conference in Geneva under United Nations auspices. That initiative was superseded by Anwar Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem.

Fahd's arrival to a 21-gun salute on the South Lawn of the White House marked only the second time he and President Reagan had met; the first was at the 1981 North-South summit of world leaders in Cancun, Mexico. The Saudis feel that Israel is currently vulnerable, and thus more susceptible than usual to U.S. pressures for a settlement, on two counts: its economy has faltered badly, and Reagan's re-election has temporarily reduced the clout of what the Saudis regard as an overpowering Israeli lobby. "The Palestinian question . . . is the cause of instability and turmoil in the region," Fahd declared. "I hope, Mr. President, that your Administration will support the just cause of the Palestinian people."

But Washington remains deeply wary for the moment about resuming a hands-on Middle East diplomatic stance. For one thing, it has no desire to risk a repeat of its debacle last year in Lebanon, where 1,600 U.S. Marines serving as peacekeepers were pulled out in the face of terrorist attacks. For another, the Administration does not think the time is right for a domestically preoccupied Israel to make any major foreign policy initiatives. Most important, Administration officials up to now have seen little sign that the Arabs are ready to deal directly with Israel, a decision the U.S. regards as fundamental.

"The security of Israel and other nations of the region and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people can and should be addressed in direct negotiation," Reagan told Fahd. He also expressed continued faith in the soundness of his 1982 Middle East peace plan, which calls for Palestinian self-government on the West Bank and Gaza Strip in association with Jordan. Fahd's own outline for a Middle East settlement, incorporated the same year into the final declaration of an Arab summit in the Moroccan city of Fez, envisions an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Despite these diverging views, Fahd and Reagan hit it off personally during three meetings, one of them with only a translator present, and at a lavish state banquet at the White House. They had no trouble agreeing on the need to keep pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and support efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war. Reagan avoided substantive matters in his banquet remarks (they were not a toast, since the Muslim guests of honor were not served wine), concentrating instead on Fahd's well-known passion for soccer.

Word of the Hussein-Arafat agreement arrived in the course of Fahd's visit, in effect bolstering Washington's position that the best way to make peace progress is for the principals in the region to take the initiative. Described variously as everything from a "general understanding" to a specific five-point plan, the accord is the latest in a long effort by Hussein to gain standing from the P.L.O. as a Palestinians' representative, or at least temporary partner, in negotiations with Israel. But its fragility was underscored by Arafat's hasty departure from Amman to his headquarters in Tunisia, presumably to seek support for the deal from other leaders in the faction-ridden P.L.O. In 1983, after Arafat and Hussein had reached tentative agreement on a similar plan, the P.L.O. chairman was unable to cobble together the necessary backing.

Israel viewed the agreement with supreme skepticism. "What is going on in Amman seems to be directed mainly toward Washington," said Prime Minister Shimon Peres. "But peace must be made with Jerusalem." Washington was appropriately cautious about the Hussein-Arafat meeting. Reagan told reporters: "(From) the little we know about it, it seems as if some progress has been made." If indeed it had, one reason was that Hussein had made skillful preparations. He has taken pains to maintain close ties throughout the Arab world, and last year became the first Arab leader to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cairo since Egypt was ostracized for signing its treaty with Israel in 1979. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's closest political adviser, Osama el Baz, participated in some of the Amman negotiations, and Hussein has helped with preparations for Mubarak's visit to Washington next month. Says a senior official at the State Department: "Hussein has embarked on a serious course to build an Arab framework that will allow him to negotiate with Israel."

Arafat's apparent desire to strike a deal with Hussein and shore up his standing with Arab moderates may have stemmed from the decision of several hard-line, Syrian-backed factions of the P.L.O. to boycott the last session of the Palestine National Council, its de facto parliament in exile. At the same time, Syria's drive to become the region's dominant Arab state may have led to a hardening of the will among moderates to reach a new consensus. In any case, the principal question still to be answered from the Hussein-Arafat agreement is how forthrightly it accepts United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. The Palestinians have always rejected that document because it refers to them as "refugees" and does not explicitly call for the establishment of a Palestinian state. If Arafat has not endorsed Resolution 242 as a basis for negotiations, the Amman accord would be a nonstarter in American and Israeli eyes.

One reason for Syria's current strength is the Arab perception that its hard line led to Israel's decision to pull out of Lebanon. In the first phase, finished ahead of schedule on Saturday, the Israelis withdrew from the Awali River and redeployed seven to 20 miles south. A recent increase of attacks on Israeli soldiers by Lebanese Shi'ite forces, including the killing of three last week, has prompted some Jerusalem officials to call for a reexamination of the pullback. So far, however, Peres insists that Israel will stick to its schedule.

After announcing the U.S. decision to participate in Middle East discussions with the Soviets, Administration officials quickly sought to downplay their importance. Reason: there was speculation that Washington was at least considering a reversal of its opposition to Moscow's participation in Middle East peace negotiations. A day after the meetings were set, Reagan declared unequivocally: "We definitely are not in support of an idea of a great international conference on the Middle East." As a British official explained, "Such a conference would give the Soviets a virtual veto on anything they disliked."

The Vienna meeting grew out of an offer made by Reagan last September in his address to the U.N. General Assembly for U.S. envoys to confer periodically with their Soviet counterparts about various crisis regions around the world. The President reiterated this proposal during a White House meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko four days later. The U.S. side in Vienna will be led by Richard W. Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; the U.S.S.R. delegation will be headed by his equivalent in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Vladimir Polyakov. These meetings consist primarily of dry recitations of each side's views on central issues. The U.S. agenda for the Middle East meeting, aside from the Arab-Israeli conflict, will probably include the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq conflict and Libya's mischief making.

The Soviets have their own agenda for the Vienna meetings, of course, and no one would be surprised if it included just the sort of international conference that Reagan ruled out. Washington claims that because Moscow lacks diplomatic relations with Israel, its interests in the region are one- sided in favor of the Arabs and its presence would be disruptive. Any international conference that included the Soviets, a senior Administration official declared last week, would be "a prescription for political theater."

Whatever happens with Moscow, the U.S. figures to remain the key broker in the Middle East. Three weeks after the Vienna meetings, Egypt's Mubarak, the leader of Israel's only neighbor to make peace, may clarify the latest Arab position on his visit to Washington. "We have a lot of movement in the Arab world," mused an Israeli government official last week. "Whether the movers are running around in circles or not, we shall see." In the Middle East, often called the land of missed opportunities, the trick for Washington is to keep a sharp eye out for the forward motions.

With reporting by Laurence I. Barrett and Barrett Seaman/ Washington, with other bureaus