"I Was Really Worried"

Shortly after his bold and historic visit to La Palma, Jose Napoleon Duarte talked for nearly an hour with TIME Mexico City Bureau Chief Harry Kelly, Correspondent Ricardo Chavira and Reporter J. T. Johnson at the presidential palace in San Salvador. He was at times eloquent, and at times surprising, as he offered his own views about what had happened, and why. Excerpts:

What led you to believe people were ready for a dialogue with the F.M.L.N.?

You have to remember that since I took office, I said that I had my own timetable. I needed international aid and comprehension in order to go inside my country with enough strength to obtain my aims. That is why I went to Europe, to South America, to the U.S. When I obtained military aid from the Senate, that gave me the strength to say that there is confidence in what I was trying to do. When I went to West Germany and obtained economic aid, and the Minister of Commerce came to El Salvador, it created a direct feeling in the country that this was the means to solve problems. That allowed me to say that the world believed in what I was trying to do. Then I started to work inside the country, going from town to town. I started to talk to all the officers from garrison to garrison. I thought it would have taken six months. But things went faster than I thought, and that gave me the opportunity to, let's say, risk it.

Did you have a sense of risk at La Palma?

No question about it. I knew that all the people up there were armed. You saw them. Pistols all over the place.

What did you feel afterward?

Well, the whole way up I was very emotional and tense. And all the time we were in the town. You have to remember that I was taking complete responsibility for whatever happens there. One single mistake could have destroyed everything. I was even worried when [Ungo and Zamora] took the Red Cross car back to San Salvador. I stayed in radio contact the whole time, until they took the plane.

I was really worried that this would not come out the way it did. But let me say that it went beyond all my expectations. And I think that everybody was surprised by the results. This gives the people an opportunity to think optimistically about the future. I think that I have proved that this government can govern the country, that this government is capable of making its own decisions, that this government was able to open up the door that was almost impossible to open. And this is the concept behind the dialogue, that this government now has the full backing of the world and of the people of the country.

When you got home, what did you tell your wife?

I didn't say anything. We just embraced. My daughters also. They had gone up to La Palma, all three daughters, and they just gave me an embrace and a kiss, and that was it.

Did your feelings about the rebels change as a result of the meeting?

I know Mr. Ungo and Mr. Zamora very well. They acted the same as I expected them to act. I had never met any of the other people. They | were very hard at first, especially the woman [Nidia Diaz]. She was very tense and serious. But she changed as the hours passed.

The most dramatic change was Comandante Cienfuegos [Eduardo Sancho Castaneda]. In the beginning, he was trying to back up Ungo's position. But then he started to talk for himself, and he kept on talking and talking. At one moment he stopped and said, "I'm taking up all the time." And I said, "No, you just continue. I want to hear everything you have to say." So for an hour, an hour and a half, we let him talk. He was trying to prove a theory, but in the middle of his theory he was accepting important facts. He was getting more and more sincere as the time passed. At a certain moment he said, "I recognize that there is a national consensus that we are bleeding the Salvadoran brothers dry." And then he said, "I recognize that there is a national consensus for peace. I wouldn't like to keep on fighting. I would like to be back in my house and going to work and whatever I have to do." So he was getting more and more on the human side.

Did the others agree with him?

No, the comandantes were quiet. The ideological [debate] was really between the two F.D.R. people [Ungo and Zamora] and ourselves. Zamora said, "There is no democratic election unless there is an absolute democracy." I said to him, "This is a totalitarian concept. You want everything now." They would not accept, for example, even the bureaucracy. They were thinking totally authoritarian. I said I didn't agree with that. I believed that we are in a process, so I said, "The case is comparing whether there have been changes between 1979 and today. You are not accepting this, and this is your mistake." They said they were not asking for a total, global concept of democracy. They said this dialogue is a process, and the ending of the war is a process. We agreed. So we started the discussion there and took up how the proposals were going to be analyzed.

Do you think they will participate in the elections next spring?

I don't think so. In their minds they are not prepared for that. I think they feel the government is looking for a democratic space, which doesn't necessarily mean elections, and that we could find this space in other systems of social and political participation. There are a million possibilities.

Do the guerrillas feel they have to negotiate from a position of strength, meaning that there will be more military activity?

I don't know. It's for sure they've already started. They said they'd stop all the traffic in the country. This is the reason why I told them they are making a historical mistake. They are not attacking the oligarchy, or the imperialists, or the army, or the government. They are attacking the people. They are destroying the economy, the crops, the buses. They are making the people suffer by taking their lights and their energy away. That is the reason they are losing. I said it to them.

What was their response?

There was no answer.

Was La Palma a test of your control over the military?

No. The military made it absolutely clear they were going to support me. They complied with all the orders I gave. Not only that, they had already planned an operation for the [La Palma] area, and I suspended it. And yesterday I spent the whole morning with the army commanders discussing this process, and they are absolutely clear in backing it up.

And the business community?

The same thing. I have a meeting with them tomorrow to explain what happened. There is no question that the business people believe that after trying every other method, the situation in the country cannot be improved without peace.

What are you going to do about the economy?

I have my own timetable, and I haven't launched yet into the economy. This is the next priority. As soon as I finish with this effort--from here on the peace commission will take over--then I'll get into the economic problems.

Have you decided on the four government members of the peace commission?

I already know, but I won't tell you.

How much credit can the U.S. take for La Palma?

There is a change from U.S. policies of the last 50 years. Before, the U.S. was supporting dictatorships in Latin America. Now they are not. If that were not so, I wouldn't be here. If it weren't for the efforts of Republicans and Democrats in exporting democracy, then this country would never have had free elections. There is no question--and this was on the table at La Palma--that this country has a dependency on the U.S. The problem is, is this dependency reason enough for the U.S. to impose policies, objectives, goals, instruments and means?

Should the U.S. be doing more for El Salvador?

Yes, yes. The domino theory works in both directions, from the Communist countries knocking down all the dominoes and from the democratic countries doing it too. At this moment, U.S. aid has been at a level at which we can survive. But what if we fail? If we win, we demonstrate that there is a way out for the democratic revolution. Then you have an example for the world. Then the U.S. will have real friends.

Thank you, Mr. President.

I want to tell you something. I'm going next week to Torola. I'm going to build a bridge. One of the things that was on the table [at La Palma] was a letter written by the people of Meanguera, Torola and other towns [near the Torola River]. These people had written to both sides to let them rebuild the bridge, not to destroy it. Today we started the project. The people are moving back, they are going to rebuild their houses.

And the guerrillas agreed to that?

No, no. We're moving in with the troops so we can build the bridge and say, "All right. Let's see what the guerrillas do. Are they going to destroy it or not? Are they going to let the people live there or not?" That's the guerrillas' responsibility.