The Diplomatic Alternative

The day before Mexico's President assured Congress that "dialogue and a negotiated solution are possible" in Central America, two of the region's nations announced that they had arrived at exactly that kind of arrangement. After a daylong meeting in Panama City, Costa Rica and Nicaragua signed an agreement allowing multinational inspection teams along their 192-mile border. The accord was a concrete step toward ending tension that began when Nicaragua attacked U.S.-backed contra guerrillas who operate from Costa Rica.

The Panama City agreement was signed at a meeting of the Contadora group, composed of representatives of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama. The signing, said Costa Rican Foreign Minister Carlos Jose Gutierrez, "confirms the thesis that the Contadora process is a genuine and viable forum toward a peace settlement and brings confidence we will succeed in a short time." He referred to the process begun in January 1983 when representatives of the four countries met at the Panamanian resort island of Contadora to search for a peaceful solution to the Central American crisis through indirect diplomacy.

Although its results have been elusive, the one certainty about Contadora is that virtually everyone supports the idea. The Reagan Administration and European allies endorse it; so do the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua's Sandinistas. Congressional and other critics of U.S. policy regularly pillory the Administration for not paying enough attention to Contadora. U.S. backing for Contadora, former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States Sol Linowitz charged last week, was merely "lip service."

Contadora is an effort by the four sponsoring countries to mediate among five Central American nations: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala. Both the U.S. and Cuba were specifically excluded. In July 1983, the presidents of the four Contadora states pledged to seek, among other things, "effective control of the [regional] arms race, the withdrawal of foreign advisers ... and the prohibition of the use of the territory of one state to plan military or political activities that will cause instability in other states." Meeting at the National Bank of Panama building in Panama City last September, the group got all the countries involved to endorse a list of 20 objectives that address the major political and military concerns in the area. Among them: withdrawal of all foreign military advisers and bases; a scaling down of national armed forces; a commitment to democratic pluralism. So far, however, the members have failed to translate the 20 objectives into formal treaty language.

According to the Reagan Administration, the lack of progress is partly the result of foot-dragging on the part of Nicaragua. Indeed, Washington argues that its covert support for the contras is one of the few sources of leverage on the Sandinistas to cooperate in Contadora. One State Department official says that only a diplomatic ruse got the Sandinistas to agree to discuss Contadora's 20 goals. By his account, the Nicaraguans for several months sought to avoid sessions with the other Central American nations before agreeing to join a ceremonial dinner. Once the Nicaraguans were seated, the impasse was broken, and they found themselves involved with a working agenda.

Another cause for delay is that the Nicaraguans depend heavily upon Cuban diplomats for guidance. U.S. officials say that at recent Contadora sessions, the Nicaraguans and Cubans have occupied adjoining hotel suites. Last week's Panama City agreement was announced only after the Sandinista Foreign Minister, Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann, met quietly with Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon de Quesada. The U.S. maintains its own discreet channels of influence with Contadora through the Administration's special presidential envoy for Central America, Harry Shlaudeman, a veteran Foreign Service officer who was executive director of the Kissinger Commission on Central America.

The next test of Contadora's success is expected to come in mid-July. A group of Central American deputy foreign ministers intends to hammer out a negotiating text for the delayed draft treaty. Depending on the outcome, the much praised, little understood Contadora process may take another significant step forward.