The Winds of Peace

By Kenneth W. Banta

A new treaty raises hopes, questions and American prestige

The moment guaranteed high political drama, and the setting did it full justice. On a remote strip of bush along the border between their two countries, with the Lebombo mountains as a backdrop and hippos snorting in the nearby Nkomati River, Prime Minister P.W. Botha of apartheid South Africa and President Samora Machel of black-ruled, Marxist Mozambique last week sat down together for the first time and faced something other than the prospect of killing. As a crowd of 1,000, including representatives of black African states, watched from the tiers of a hastily constructed grandstand near the border town of Komatipoort, Botha and Machel bent over a tamboutiwood table to sign a nonaggression and good-neighborliness treaty, then smilingly exchanged their gold Parker pens. Declared Botha: "In signing this agreement today, we have opted for the road of peace." He added, "Our task now is to return to work and do all we can to ensure that historians will rank today as a major turning point in the destiny of our subcontinent."

Even without such lofty words, the new treaty would have been reason enough for hope in Southern Africa. Calling for renunciation of the use of force by both sides and forbidding the support of guerrilla groups hostile to either government, the accord may mark the end of nearly a decade of increasing enmity between the two neighboring countries, each of which has accused the other of encouraging attacks by insurgent groups. Moreover, as Machel and Botha shook hands, there were indications that after decades of ruinous skirmishing between white-ruled South Africa and black nations close by, winds of peace were sweeping through the rest of the region as well.

To the north, in Angola, South African troops were withdrawing from a five-week offensive against guerrilla bases of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), following the negotiation of a joint South African-Angolan disengagement agreement. That had opened the door to a once inconceivable breakthrough in Southern Africa's knottiest diplomatic problem: achieving independence for the South African-controlled territory of Namibia. The developments were a sorely needed foreign policy victory for the Reagan Administration. After three years of deep involvement in all of the negotiations, the U.S. policy of "constructive engagement," or soft-spoken diplomacy with South Africa, appeared to be vindicated.

The infectious new mood of reconciliation followed suddenly upon a series of peace-negotiation failures. After nearly 18 years, the war between South Africa and a handful of black guerrillas intent on liberating Namibia, held by South Africa in violation of a United Nations ruling, had vastly broadened in scope. The presence of the guerrilla SWAPO bases on its territory brought Angola into the fray, and that led South Africa to retaliate with periodic raids and support for the pro-Western rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Lately, the painstaking negotiations for Namibian independence, calling for U.N.-supervised elections, have become deadlocked. The problem was a demand by South Africa and the U.S. that the elections be linked to the withdrawal of some 25,000 Cuban troops and advisers long based in Angola for the purpose of propping up that country's fragile Marxist regime.

Many years of grinding conflict, however, seem to have left all the combatants ready to think about peace. After serving for so long as a base for the sabotage attacks on South African targets by the militant African National Congress, Mozambique increasingly feared retaliation by South Africa; on top of that, the country had been weakened by a severe drought. Marxist Angola, under siege by UNITA, saw the wisdom of compromise following consistently heavy losses during South African raids. But South Africa, too, has been drained by constant war. Namibia alone costs South Africa $1 billion annually, some 6% of the national budget. The continuing toll of casualties has dismayed the public, and pressure from abroad for Namibia's independence has been intense. Said a senior Western diplomat: "The disincentives for continuing the war appear to exceed the incentives for carrying on."

But if circumstances made peace thinkable at last, much of the credit for recent progress belongs to the U.S. and its chief negotiator, Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. On the theory that public castigation of South Africa had failed to bring change, the Reagan Administration in 1981 adopted a policy of behind-the-scenes negotiation that seems to have paid off, at least for now. Says a senior U.S. official: "We are the only mediator who talks to everyone."

After months of groundwork, negotiations came to a head last November. Following a meeting with Machel in the Mozambique capital of Maputo, Crocker's deputy, Frank Wisner, flew to South Africa with a message for Foreign Minister Roelof ("Pik") Botha: the time was ripe for bilateral talks with Mozambique. The discussions set in motion the exchange that led to last week's formal accord.

Then, on Dec. 6, Crocker met with Pik Botha in a Rome hotel room, this time to discuss Angola and Namibia. In a vigorous all-day session, Crocker convinced the South African leader that a pullout of his country's forces in Angola could lead to a ceasefire, paving the way for a Namibian settlement. Meanwhile, in meetings on the Cape Verde Islands, Wisner won agreement from Angola that in return it would restrain further SWAPO attacks. As the disengagement went into effect in February, a team of U.S. observers was sent to the Namibian capital of Windhoek to monitor the progress. So far, the cease-fire seems to be holding.

These moves have yielded an unprecedented climate of confidence, but the biggest hurdle remains: achieving a political settlement for Namibia. The Cuban withdrawal from Angola, which South Africa insists on as a condition for independence, seems unlikely to be met, however, until the Angolan government finds some way of defusing the UNITA threat. Recently, U.S. diplomats have voiced cautious optimism, claiming that the Angolans are beginning to recognize that UNITA must be given a political voice in the government.

If the way is eventually cleared for free elections in Namibia, black rule is certain to be the choice of its 1.2 million people, 85.7% of whom are black. Are South Africa's ruling whites willing to allow that development, which would create an unbroken arc of black-ruled states along their border? The answer at the moment appears to be a qualified yes.

In part, the new confidence seems to stem from victories by Prime Minister Botha over hardliners, including a constitutional reform that will give a measure of legislative power to Indians and mixed-race citizens. South Africa, says Ambassador to Washington Brand Fourie, may be embarking on "a new era of realism."

Nonetheless, South Africa's true intentions may still be in doubt. Just when Pretoria seemed in rare harmony with its black foes, Pik Botha last week unexpectedly offered a totally new proposal calling for a comprehensive conference aimed at resolving at once all the complex interlocking disputes over Namibia. The initiative has caused deep apprehension among other negotiating parties, who strongly suspect that the plan amounts to a South African ploy to sidestep U.N. supervision of Namibian independence. Caught by surprise, nervous State Department officials are unsure whether South Africa means to sabotage the peace effort or to advance it. Says one analyst: "We're keeping our fingers crossed."

Even if South Africa does come to terms with its black neighbors, there is no certainty that peace will hasten the end of its internal policies of racial discrimination. Unquestionably, the new pacts with Mozambique and Angola will deprive black revolutionary movements of bases near South Africa, dealing a heavy blow to their ambitions for fundamental change inside the country. "Peace and apartheid colonialism," seethed the African National Congress in response to the Mozambique accord, "are inherently mutually exclusive." But others point out that reduced tensions can only encourage accommodation by the white minority. U.S. officials, for their part, claim that Washington maintains constant pressure on Pretoria to end apartheid. Said a top State Department official: "We have been credible and firm in insisting that reform must come." In the end, the two objectives of internal and external peace may be inseparably linked. --By Kenneth W. Banta. Reported by Marsh Clark/Komatipoort and Johanna McGeary/Washington

With reporting by Marsh Clark/Komatipoort, Johanna McGeary/Washington