The Power of Perception

By George Russell

Reagan's decision widens rifts at home and abroad

The ambiguity and confusion that surrounded the Reagan Administration's latest military moves in Lebanon quickly took on a life of their own last week. From Capitol Hill to the Mediterranean littoral and beyond, both friends and foes of the White House reacted with concern and dismay to what they saw as sudden twists and turns of U.S. policy in coping with the increasingly unmanageable situation in Beirut. In the process, rifts were opened between the Reagan Administration and Congress, between the U.S. and its closest Western and Middle Eastern allies, and even between President Reagan and some of his staunchest conservative supporters. Hovering over these troubles were larger questions about the American exercise of power in the world.

For months, President Reagan has used his vaunted skills as a communicator to describe the Marine deployment in Lebanon as a sign of U.S. credibility and steadfastness in that country and throughout the Middle East. But in taking that tack, the President also managed to raise the political and diplomatic stakes surrounding any change in U.S. dispositions in Lebanon. The more that Reagan insisted on the importance of the Marine presence, the more he courted the risk that a tactical change in Lebanon would appear as a major U.S. defeat, even in response to circumstances that were not of U.S. making and beyond U.S. control.

Matters were not helped when Lebanon became a focal point of partisan politics. Sensing an advantageous election issue, congressional Democrats had intended to bring a resolution demanding Marine withdrawal from Lebanon before the House when Congressmen returned from an eleven-day recess on Feb. 21. Even some Republicans were sympathetic. In a provocative radio broadcast, only days before his sudden announcement of the Marine "redeployment" and the new rules for U.S. naval and aerial engagement in Lebanon, Reagan urged that the U.S. not "cut and run" from its positions. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, the President took a hard swipe at House Speaker Tip O'Neill, who had called Reagan's policy in Lebanon a failure, by declaring that O'Neill "may be ready to surrender, but I'm not." White House Spokesman Larry Speakes went a step further, accusing Democrats of promoting, through their withdrawal resolution, action that "aids and abets" enemies of the Lebanese peace process. Although the White House had, in fact, seriously considered repositioning the Marines as early as Jan. 21, it laid no groundwork whatever for a change in plans.

The initial reaction last week among many Congressmen, particularly Democrats, to the changing events in Lebanon was a mixture of relief and disappointment. Said Democratic Congressman Stephen Solarz of New York: "I don't think that the collapse of a pro-Western government in Lebanon and the failure of our policy there is a cause for rejoicing, but I'm inclined to believe that withdrawing the Marines is a good idea." Said Republican Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland: "The President has recognized the irreversible drift of events." Among election strategists, the feeling was that the President had won a neat domestic political advantage by removing the issue of the beleaguered Marines from the upcoming presidential campaign. Said Republican Pollster V. Lance Tarrance: "Ronald Reagan has moved from a sitting duck to a moving target." Congressman Tony Coelho, chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, described the redeployment decision as "a genius stroke."

Expressions of concern came from those who gave first consideration to the diplomatic implications of the move. The Administration turnaround seemed to concede to Syria the leading role in Lebanon and give to the Soviet Union renewed entree as a Middle Eastern powerbroker. More generally, U.S. allies, as well as key neutral nations, could draw the conclusion that the U.S. was indecisive despite the Administration's tough talk. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was quick to note that such a perception of U.S. actions was "likely to be quite serious throughout the Middle East and maybe in other parts of the world." Kissinger said that he "would have been very reluctant" to move the Marines, but added, "the Administration ought to have a chance to explain what it is doing and do its thing."

Then the U.S. battleship New Jersey began its bombardment. Suddenly the concern in Congress was how the Administration's new rules of engagement squared with the terms of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which was the basis of congressional approval five months ago for the Marine presence in Lebanon. Senate Republican Leader Howard Baker formally asked the White House for an explanation. On Wednesday, Speaker O'Neill declared that the bombing and shelling of Syrian positions in Lebanon were "absolutely not" within the discretionary powers of the President under last year's congressional approval for sending in the Marines.

On Thursday, after Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, accompanied by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Vessey, told a House committee that only 500 Marines would be moved offshore from Beirut by the end of February, the sense of congressional bewilderment and hostility rose even higher. When Secretary of State George Shultz appeared before the same committee to testify on the Lebanese political situation, Republican Congressman William S. Broomfield of Michigan warned, "We are wondering whether or not our policy [in Lebanon] is dramatically changing." Emerging from private briefings by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam on the intended Marine redeployment, Democrats and Republicans alike expressed scorn and consternation. Said a Republican Senator after the meetings: "They don't want to leave Lebanon without some measure of success. That doesn't sound like withdrawal to me. They don't have any intention of leaving." Republican Congressman Trent Lott, the House minority whip, said he told Dam, "You people are not in touch with reality." Said Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd: "It's not only chaos and confusion over there, it's confusion and chaos here."

There was also confusion in Europe, as well as some annoyance at the vagaries of U.S. policy. Informed four to five hours in advance of the U.S. redeployment, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ordered the removal from Beirut of her country's 115-member contingent of the four-nation Multi-National Force. According to a Thatcher aide, the move was "not dependent on what attitude the United States took." Indeed it was not. TIME has learned that the British plan to distance themselves even further from current U.S. policy by withdrawing their MNF contingent to Cyprus.

The British have long been skeptical of the entire U.S. peace-keeping strategy in Lebanon, especially Washington's unblinking support for Lebanese President Amin Gemayel and its use of force against Syrian positions. Britain, always a reluctant member of the MNF, now regards an accommodation between President Reagan and Syrian President Hafez Assad as essential to any Lebanese solution. London has concluded that Gemayel must step down and that the May 17 accord between his government and Israel, calling for the mutual withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon, is effectively meaningless.

Privately, British officials were blunt in observing that U.S. prestige suffered badly as a result of the collapse of Gemayel's government and the announcement of the Marine redeployment. Said a London diplomat: "Now Soviet propaganda can have a field day with what is truthfully a humiliating defeat for American foreign policy." The French were even more critical, although their 1,250-member MNF detachment will remain in Beirut while President Francois Mitterrand seeks a U.N. replacement. Said a senior French spokesman: "We will either revive the idea of a U.N. force [in Beirut], or we will conclude that that is impossible and accept the consequences. We certainly won't put our troops on boats, to sit and watch the debacle from the balcony." Adding their voices to the general complaint, Italian officials announced that they too hope to withdraw their 1,200-member force from Beirut in favor of a U.N. contingent, even though creation of such a force would be unthinkable in the face of presumed Soviet opposition. In Rome, Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti summoned U.S. Ambassador Maxwell Rabb to ask pointedly what the U.S. naval bombardment in Lebanon was expected to achieve.

Among Washington's moderate Arab friends in the Middle East, the redeployment and the thunder of U.S. naval batteries produced a different kind of apprehension. For the most part, the moderate Arab states were caught between a fear of weakening U.S. power and prestige in the region and a concern that increasingly direct U.S. confrontation with Syria would harden the lines between Arab states, on the one hand, and the U.S. and Israel, on the other. The latest U.S. military moves were particularly troubling for Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who, along with King Hussein of Jordan, is scheduled to meet with President Reagan in Washington on Tuesday. Mubarak's government is maneuvering to regain admittance to the Arab League, from which Egypt was expelled following the 1979 signing of the Camp David accords. Syria holds a veto over Egypt's renewed membership in the league. Officially, Cairo had no comment on the U.S.'s tactical shifts in Lebanon.

Saudi Arabia did not have much to say either. Two weeks ago, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah surprised U.S. officials with a declaration that the Marines ought to be getting Israeli forces out of Lebanon; publicly at least, the Saudis now seem to be less concerned that the U.S. is taking sides in the Lebanese maelstrom. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia, like the other oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf, is always worried about any U.S. moves that might be construed as giving a boost to their three most feared enemies: Syria, Iran and the U.S.S.R. Said a member of the foreign ministry from one of the gulf states: "We do not want to see Syria any more powerful than it is. Together with Iran, they can only cause us trouble."

The most vociferous support for the U.S. bombardment came from Israel. "The shelling is very important," said an Israeli spokesman close to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. "They should have done it two weeks or ten days ago. It is the only language the Syrians understand." With much to lose from the fall of the Gemayel government, Israel was quick to argue that any perception of U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon would, in the words of one official, "have catastrophic consequences for the U.S. position in the Middle East."

Even among a prominent handful of President Reagan's normally unswerving conservative proponents, the confusion created by the Administration's actions last week was cause for an unraveling of previous support. One of the conservative standard-bearers who lashed out at the White House was Columnist George Will. He argued that the decision to redeploy the Marines, however it was put into effect, amounted to a "use of military assets as incompetent as the Iranian rescue mission or the Bay of Pigs." Calling the shift of U.S. troops a "retreat," Will charged that the U.S. may be "in the process of erasing itself from the Middle East. Another conservative pundit, the New York Times's William Safire, agreed: "We are failing because we want to settle, and the other side wants to win." In seeking to influence events from a position of both military safety and military strength in Lebanon, the Reagan Administration seemed to have achieved the worst of both worlds. --By George Russell. Reported by Neil MacNeil and Johanna McGeary/ Washington, with other bureaus

With reporting by Neil MacNeil, Johanna McGeary