Nothing Personal, But . . .

By Frederick Painton

Strong words about missiles as Kohl goes to Moscow

The Soviet Union used to be able to count on the single-minded eagerness of West Germany's Social Democratic leaders to pursue a policy of detente with their Communist neighbors to the east. No longer. The Soviets got a close look last week at Bonn's first Christian Democratic Chancellor after 13 years of Social Democratic rule, and they did not entirely like what they saw. Helmut Kohl's 48-hour visit to Moscow turned out to be a bruising diplomatic skirmish that started badly and ended, as Kohl fully expected, in a standoff. Under a barrage of Soviet threats, Chancellor Kohl stood firm on the one issue that dominated his talks with Soviet Leader Yuri Andropov: West Germany's determination to abide by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decision to begin deploying U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in December if no progress is achieved in the talks on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Geneva.

Kohl's exchanges with Andropov were not a waste of time. While his Social Democratic predecessors in office, Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, often saw themselves as intermediaries between the Kremlin and the West, Kohl repeatedly ruled out any such role for himself. He was going to Moscow, he said, "not as a mediator or interpreter but to represent German interests."

Nonetheless, Kohl made his trip, with Ronald Reagan's blessing in the form of a message from the President saying, "I have been impressed by the seriousness with which you are approaching these important discussions." Before his departure, Kohl was briefed on the American negotiating position in Geneva by Vice President George Bush and other U.S. officials. In one respect, Kohl did in fact act as a Soviet-American mediator: he urged Andropov to agree to a summit meeting with Reagan. The Soviets repeated their agreement to such a get-together on condition that it be well prepared and not merely a propaganda exercise.

Talk of a reunited Germany has always frightened the Soviets, but that did not deter Kohl from raising the subject forthrightly. He defended the right of Germans to think about the peaceful reunification of West Germany and its Soviet-dominated counterpart in the future. "I told Mr. Andropov: 'What would you say as a Soviet patriot if Moscow were divided, if the Soviet Union were divided?' " Kohl reported. He also asked that the Soviet Union grant exit visas to an estimated 100,000 ethnic Germans who seek to emigrate to West Germany. In addition, Kohl risked offending his hosts by speaking up on behalf of Soviet Dissident Andrei Sakharov, currently the victim of a government slander campaign in the Soviet press.

From the outset, the Soviets made it clear that Kohl was not entitled to the same kind of welcome given his Social Democratic predecessors. For example, Soviet protocol normally dictates that the press suspend all critical references to countries whose leaders are guests in Moscow. But on the day Kohl arrived, the major Soviet television news broadcast included a report on antinuclear demonstrations in Mainz, the Chancellor's home territory. Then there was the mystery surrounding Andropov's failure to receive Kohl on the day of his arrival. Three hours before he was due to leave for Moscow, Kohl was informed that "for personal reasons," Andropov would be unable to meet him on the first day as scheduled.

West German officials immediately attributed the Soviet leader's absence to a possible kidney ailment and other recurring health problems. Soviet sources, however, encouraged the view that Andropov was administering a diplomatic snub to Kohl. After the eight-year decline and eventual death of Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviets clearly had a stake in demonstrating that the capacity of the nation's leadership was not again in question because of the failing health of their supreme leader. The West Germans, for their part, chose to believe that no rebuff was intended. Still, as one Bonn official remarked, "In Moscow, you never can be sure."

Premier Nikolai Tikhonov filled in for Andropov in what became a rehearsal of the arguments that both sides would exchange throughout the visit. In an attempt to put Kohl on the defensive over Germany's Nazi past, Tikhonov emphasized that the Soviet Union was particularly alarmed by the scheduled deployment of U.S. missiles in West Germany because "it would mean that, for the first time in postwar history, a military threat again stems from German soil to the Soviet people. There is no need to say what that would mean to us." Kohl, whose self-confidence is as solid as his 6-ft. 4-in. frame, seemed untouched by any sense of historic guilt. It was the Soviet Union, he said, that had upset the balance of power in Europe by its major buildup of SS-20 missiles.

Next day Kohl met Andropov. At the headquarters of the Supreme Soviet, the government's single-party parliament, the Chancellor was ushered into a medium-size office in which President Andropov was sitting on one side of a green baize-covered table. The two leaders did not shake hands, but Andropov said, "It was my deepest wish to see you yesterday. Unfortunately, it was not possible. I was sick." An eyewitness said the Soviet leader's face looked healthy and that his eyes, behind tinted glasses, were clear and alert. Andropov's left hand appeared numb and stiff, however, and his right hand shook visibly when he made an apologetic gesture. Kohl, who carried two 19th century framed prints of Moscow and St. Petersburg as gifts to the Soviet leader, replied: "In politics there are always obstacles. I fully understand." Chuckling, Andropov observed that "we already have agreement on one question."

That was probably the only common ground between the two men. Andropov spoke even more directly and firmly than Premier Tikhonov. Kohl said later: "I met a man who spoke to the point, who was familiar with the details of the subjects under discussion and could use them in his arguments." As one West German official put it, "Nobody can say the talks were clouded by diplomatic niceties. At times it was like having a ringside seat at a fight."

In response to Kohl's references to eventual German reunification, Andropov warned that if the NATO missiles were deployed, the people of East and West Germany would have to "look at each other through a thick palisade of missiles." He said the military threat to West Germany would "grow manifold," implying that the Soviets would react to the Pershing II and cruise deployment by installing nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe. Said Andropov: "The Soviet Union finds it hard to understand what the Federal Republic hopes to gain from the deployment of American missiles, our measures in response and the saturation of Central Europe with all types of weapons of mass destruction."

During a 70-minute press conference before leaving Moscow, Kohl confidently gave Soviet newsmen blunt answers every time they raised the missile issue. When one journalist began a question by proclaiming that "for the first time since World War II, plans are being made to station nuclear weapons on West German soil pointed at the Soviet Union," Kohl replied sharply: "SS-20s are deployed on Soviet territory, and they are directed at us." When another questioner said Germany had already attacked the Soviet Union twice in this century, Kohl countered that Germany was not solely responsible for starting World War I.

Altogether, it was an impressive performance by a leader who wanted to demonstrate that, having established a warm relationship with President Reagan, he was also capable of talking to Moscow. Kohl was assuming that the men in the Kremlin are realists who can live with the notion of a conservative West German Chancellor standing foursquare with Reagan and the other Western allies on NATO defense policies.

After the Chancellor's return to Bonn, a government spokesman announced that Andropov had admitted to a "margin of flexibility" in Moscow's negotiating position. The Soviet leader had also suggested that negotiators extend the current session of the Geneva talks beyond this week's closing date and reconvene ahead of schedule next fall.

The Soviets are, of course, mindful that West Germany is their principal Western trading partner. Annoying as he may have been to them, Kohl knew he was dealing from a position of strength, and he left no doubts about the thrust of West German foreign policy. Said a Soviet diplomat, with an air of resignation: "We have to put the emphasis on long-term relations despite the serious problem of the missiles."

--By Frederick Painton. Reported by Erik Amfitheatrof/Moscow and Roland Flamini with Kohl

With reporting by Erik Amfitheatrof/Moscow, Roland Flamini, Kohl This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.