Monday, Jul. 18, 1983
Was This Trip Necessary?
By James Kelly
Shultz's hasty tour of major capitals brings minor results
When George Shultz began his diplomatic hopscotch across the Middle East last week, he candidly admitted that he did not expect much to come of it. The results seem to have lived down to his expectations fully. In Damascus, Syrian President Hafez Assad told the Secretary of State privately what he has been saying publicly for two months: Syria adamantly opposes the agreement worked out last May calling for Israel to withdraw its troops from Lebanon, and therefore Syria refuses to pull out its own forces. Admitted Shultz at trip's end: "I can't point to any substantive achievement."
The outlook for a settlement in Lebanon has now turned gloomier. Faced with Syrian intransigence, Israeli officials informed Shultz last week of their plans to pull back their troops to more defensible positions within Lebanon. Such a maneuver, however, could take some of the pressure off Damascus toward any move at all and invite renewed fighting between Christians and Druze in the Chouf Mountains southeast of Beirut. Worse yet, the redeployment could lead to a de facto partition of Lebanon between Israel and Syria, with a weakened Lebanese government in control only of Beirut.
The Shultz mission was hastily hatched. When the Secretary of State embarked on a twelve-day swing through Asia three weeks ago, he dispatched Special Envoy Philip Habib to judge whether a Middle East side trip by Habib's boss would be worthwhile. By the time Shultz reached Pakistan, his last stop in Asia, senior White House aides decided that he should visit the region. They reasoned that Shultz had little to lose--and much to gain if, miraculously, his presence spurred some progress. Said an Administration official: "No one thought we had to score on this or else."
The Secretary of State stopped first in Saudi Arabia to find out how much pressure the Saudis were willing to exert on Syria. It is the holy month of Ramadan, and Shultz had to wait in Jidda while King Fahd spent the day at prayer in Mecca. The two finally met after midnight. In the course of the talks, which went on until 2:30 a.m., Saudi officials made it clear that they were not going to lean on Assad; they felt that the Israeli-Lebanese agreement favored Jerusalem.
Shultz then flew to Beirut, where, during three hours of talks, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel stressed that he was adamantly opposed to Israel's redeployment plans. Gemayel fears that the move will lead to a permanent Israeli presence on Lebanese soil and give Syria an excuse to stay put as well. The Lebanese insisted that if Israel pulled back its troops without announcing a schedule for a total withdrawal, then Beirut might scuttle its accord with Jerusalem altogether.
Next came the disappointment in Damascus. After a five-hour meeting with Assad, Shultz frankly admitted that the two of them had "argued" over the Israeli-Lebanese accord, with the discussion going "round and round." That is very strong language in the codes of diplomacy. Assad's main complaint: the agreement infringes on Lebanese sovereignty by granting Israel the right to maintain a buffer zone along the common border. Assad demanded that the accord be renegotiated before he discussed withdrawing Syrian troops, but Shultz refused. The best the two men could do was agree to a vague statement about "the importance of a strong, free, sovereign Lebanon with a strong central government." A U.S.-Syrian working group was set up to discuss ways of achieving that objective. But Shultz admitted that the group's formation was "not a big deal," and the Syrian press did not even bother to mention it.
In Jerusalem, where Shultz talked with Prime Minister Menachem Begin and other Israeli officials for nearly three hours, the major topic was troop redeployment. Since the cease-fire in Lebanon last August, Israel has been suffering a slow but steady toll of casualties. By deploying its troops along a more defensible line to the south, probably along the Awali River, Israeli officials believe they can more easily wait out Assad. Said a senior Israeli official: "If Syria insists on refusing to withdraw, the U.S. will understand we have to redeploy ourselves in the most effective way possible."
Unless President Reagan can persuade Begin to change his mind when the two meet in Washington later this month, Israel will almost surely move its troops. But then who would patrol the territory once protected by the Israelis? The Lebanese Army would be the nominal guardian, but Gemayel is counting on the multinational peace-keeping forces stationed in Beirut to assist in the task. It is by no means certain that the U.S. or the other three members (France, Italy, Great Britain) would agree. Said Shultz: "If the proposal is to get the Israelis out and let someone else take the casualties, that would not be a very appealing proposition to put to Congress."
Symbolically enough, as the Secretary of State moved through the Middle East last week, violence was never far away. In Hebron, in the occupied West Bank, several Arabs stabbed an Israeli student to death in the crowded marketplace. The Israeli military authorities responded by dismissing the town's Arab mayor and municipal council. In Beirut, Lebanese Prime Minister Chafik al Wazzan barely escaped being assassinated while driving to his office. Only moments after the Lebanese leader's motorcade had passed, a Honda Civic laden with some 150 lbs. of TNT and mines blew up. No one was killed, but that was only because most of the explosives failed to go off.
--By James Kelly. Reported by Harry Kelly/Jerusalem and Johanna McGeary with Shultz
With reporting by Harry Kelly/Jerusalem, Johanna McGeary, Shultz
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