Inching Toward a Policy

Congress and the President push and pull over Central America

"We are better off than we were when we started," said State Department Official William Schneider. "We are crawling back to where we want to be." Sorting through the ambiguities created by a week's worth of arm wrestling with Congress over control of Central American policy, the Administration was able to claim a marginal victory. Lobbyists from the State Department nudged key House and Senate panels toward giving more money and support to El Salvador than many critics had wanted.

Although the House tied the aid up in a cat's-cradle of conditions, the Administration kept open its options on the future of covert operations in Nicaragua and impressed on Congress a fresh spirit of bipartisanship. "There is a new willingness to look at the problem together," said one State Department official. That may be because both sides face political peril. Republicans run the risk of being blamed for increased U.S. involvement in the murky politics of Central America, Democrats of being blamed for a rebel victory if they block aid to the Salvadoran government.

On Tuesday, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved a compromise giving the Administration $76.3 million in military aid for El Salvador for fiscal 1983, which ends Sept. 30. The Administration had requested $136.3 million, and the committee had threatened to allot only $50 million. The Senate panel also approved a military package of $76.3 million for fiscal 1984, only $10 million less than the Administration requested, and agreed to its full economic aid program: $140 million this year and $120 million in 1984.

On Wednesday, however, the House Foreign Affairs Committee opted for a less generous compromise. It endorsed a plan worked out by Democrat Dante Fascell to give Reagan only $65 million in military aid for each of the next three fiscal years. It also attached eleven pages of conditions designed to curb human rights abuses by the Salvadoran government and to bring about "a dialogue, in good faith and without preconditions," between the government and the guerrillas. The aim is to achieve "an equitable political solution to the conflict." If the government refuses to participate, U.S. aid would be cut off within 90 days; if the guerrillas balk, the aid would continue.

Schneider said the Administration could live with the conditions. He contended that the Salvadoran government could engage in talks but still fend off the guerrillas' previously stated demands to reorganize the government to include them, in effect canceling the results of last year's elections, in which they had refused to participate. The Administration has backed the government of Alvaro Alfredo Magafta Borja in its resistance to such "power sharing," and has suggested limiting any dialogue to a discussion of the ground rules under which both sides could participate in elections.

The committee's approach reflects the lawmakers' faith that any talks would have a positive effect. It also presumes that the guerrillas genuinely want to participate in elections, which is by no means certain given their spotty public support. If the guerrillas do not mean to risk their future at the polls, then they could have only one purpose in pushing for negotiations. And that is the very thing that the Administration, and Congress for that matter, wants to avoid: sharing power with the help of a loaded gun. This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.