A Pilgrim's Progress

By James Kelly

Shultz persuades Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, but complications arise

The session stretched on longer, much longer, than expected. For four, five, six hours, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the members of his Cabinet huddled in Jerusalem and debated. U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, recovering from a cold, waited patiently in his suite at the King David Hotel. Newsmen, clustered in the parking lot outside Begin's office, kept wondering: Was the length of the meeting auspicious? Or was it an ominous sign? At one point, Yuval Ne'eman, the Science and Development Minister, abruptly walked out, but it turned out that he had just learned that his daughter-in-law had died. Finally, after seven hours, a decision was announced: the Israeli Cabinet had voted, 17 to 2, to accept the accord worked out by Shultz on the withdrawal of 30,000 Israeli troops from Lebanon.*

But, as the U.S. has learned so often in its negotiations with the Begin government, there was still some fine print to be discussed. The Cabinet approved the agreement only in principle; in a terse communique issued after the meeting, the Israelis demanded "clarifications" on several issues. The crucial ones involved details of security arrangements in southern Lebanon and the fate of Major Saad Haddad, the former Lebanese army officer and longtime Israeli ally whose 1,000-to-2,000-man force has controlled the border area since 1978. Even some Cabinet members who voted for the accord were unhappy with the document. "It is not a good arrangement," declared Yitzhak Moda'i, Minister of Energy. "We should have received a better one."

Nonetheless, Cabinet Secretary Dan Meridor stressed that the Begin government did not consider its reservations to be a stumbling block to a final pact. "I don't see why the clarifications shouldn't be met," said Meridor. "Even if the clarifications aren't O.K., the agreement will be executed."

With a gracious nod toward U.S. Special Envoy Philip Habib, Shultz modestly noted, "I have the pleasure of helping to put a little icing on the cake. At any rate, we hope it is a real good cake." Later the Secretary gave Jerusalem some good news: President Ronald Reagan would now lift the ban imposed last summer on the sale of 75 F-16 fighter planes to Israel.

No matter how the Begin government's questions are answered, the agreement still faces what may turn out to be its most difficult test: approval by Syria, which was not a party to the negotiations, but retains some 40,000 troops in Lebanon. Although the accord deals only with Israeli troops, Jerusalem has insisted its pullout is contingent upon the simultaneous withdrawal of all Syrian and P.L.O. forces. Thus if Syrian President Hafez Assad refuses to remove his army, Israeli soldiers will stay in Lebanon indefinitely. Shultz flew to Damascus on Saturday, declaring on arrival that he wanted to discuss "ways of putting an end to the turmoil in Lebanon." After six hours of talks with Assad and other Syrian officials, he wearily acknowledged that the Syrians were "hardly enthusiastic" about the agreement.

Just how fragile Lebanon remains was demonstrated anew as Druze and Christian militiamen launched a series of rocket and artillery duels. In the worst bombardment around Beirut since the Israeli siege last summer, Katyusha rockets, artillery shells and mortar rounds fell randomly across the city for three hours. The toll: at least 40 dead or wounded, with most of the casualties in East Beirut and the Christian suburbs north of the capital. The range of the attack strongly suggested the firepower came from areas controlled by the Syrians. It was widely assumed that Assad's troops, even if they did not undertake it themselves, had permitted the shelling as a timely reminder that Syria must be reckoned with.

From the start of his diplomatic shuttle two weeks ago, Shultz was confronted with a thankless task: to fashion a pact that satisfied Jerusalem's security demands in southern Lebanon while meeting Lebanese President Amin Gemayel's equally strong need to maintain his country's sovereignty in the eyes of the Arab world. The Israelis wanted a political agreement that would lead to closer ties between the two nations, but the Lebanese held out for a document that covered little more than the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Explained a senior U.S. official traveling with Shultz: "The Israelis must show that the invasion was worthwhile. That works counter to what the Lebanese want, which is to show that the Israelis got nothing."

The result is a 24-page masterpiece of diplomatic fog that will allow each side to claim, or to obscure, whatever it wants. Boasted an aide to Shultz: "The language is incomprehensible." The interpretation of the details will be entrusted to a joint commission set up by the two countries, but U.S. officials hope that some issues will never really be addressed. If asked whether Lebanon recognizes Israel, for example, both the Lebanese and the Israelis should be able to say simply, "The agreement speaks for itself."

The Israelis, however, conceded more than they would have liked to. On the crucial matter of how to safeguard the security zone in southern Lebanon, Jerusalem wanted Israeli-Lebanese patrols with full military authority and the right to operate from bases within Lebanon. The Lebanese held out for "joint supervisory teams," and, after much argument, the Israelis yielded. The compromise reportedly calls for eight teams often men each. Operating under Lebanese command, they will have no military powers; the groups will be responsible only for reporting violations. The Israelis will not be allowed to set up observation posts in Lebanon or to pursue anyone across the border.

Israel wanted its loyal ally Major Haddad placed in command of a 3,000-man brigade, made up of his own force plus regular Lebanese soldiers, to patrol the area. Beirut, however, consistently refused to discuss the major's role, on the ground that it was an internal matter. Under the fragile deal worked out by Shultz, Haddad would be deputy commander of the brigade, in charge of intelligence gathering and counterterrorism. The arrangement is not part of the accord, but has been privately accepted by Begin and Gemayel. Many Israeli officials, however, remain unhappy with Haddad's fate. Declared Minister Moda'i: "Israel can give up its interests, but not its friends."

The Lebanese also compromised by agreeing to create a special brigade in the south in which Haddad's men would continue to serve. Gemayel's government concurred with the Israelis that United Nations peace-keeping forces should remain just outside the area, although they will occasionally be allowed to inspect the Palestinian refugee camps near the border. The two countries will open liaison offices in each other's capitals, a prospect that does not gladden Lebanese officials. Although the Israeli office in Beirut would not have diplomatic status, Gemayel's aides fear that other Arab countries will see the step as a prelude to normalizing relations.

Shultz shuttled between Jerusalem and Beirut six times in seven days. He even had a mild brush with the terrorism that haunts the region. One night, as he slept at U.S. Ambassador Robert Dillon's house in suburban Beirut, two Katyusha rockets whizzed overhead and exploded about 100 yards away. The rockets, like several artillery or mortar rounds that subsequently fell within 500 yards of a U.S. Navy ship offshore, were thought to have been fired from the mountains by Syrian-backed Druze forces.

Shultz conducted the talks on two levels, nitpicking with the Israeli and Lebanese negotiating teams, but also spending long hours with Begin and Gemayel, often over a meal. He displayed a talent for shaping issues in ways that were accepted by both sides. Observed an aide: "He has a terrific ability, like a chemist, to break down problems, then provide the catalyst and recompose the elements in a different way." He repeatedly indicated that an agreement was imminent, sometimes to the chagrin of his hosts. When asked why his assessments of the talks were always gloomier than the Secretary's, Lebanese Foreign Minister Elie Salem replied: "Mr. Shultz is an American and by nature an optimist. I am from Lebanon and by nature a realist."

Shultz may yet turn into a realist; persuading Syria to go along with the accord will be a formidable task. When Lebanese Foreign Minister Salem flew to Damascus to brief Assad on the progress of the talks, Syrian officials raised so many objections that Salem became convinced that no agreement could possibly satisfy Syria.

Syria's self-confidence has been boosted by a massive supply of Soviet weaponry. Moscow has not only made up for the arms destroyed in last summer's fighting, but has provided more advanced equipment, including a sophisticated air defense system capable of shooting down aircraft over Israeli territory. According to U.S. intelligence, the system is so complex that it must be manned and protected by Soviet soldiers. As a result, the total number of Soviet advisers has risen from 2,500 a year ago to more than 4,000.

Although Moscow is clearly using its Syrian connection to make a bid for greater influence in the Middle East, its short-term strategy remains murky. The Soviets may urge Syria to keep its forces in Lebanon, thus depriving the Reagan Administration of a diplomatic victory and keeping tensions in the area high. Moscow may also be betting that its buildup will deter the Israelis from attacking Syrian troops in the Bekaa Valley.

Even if Assad wants to pull out his forces, he is certain to demand a price. One possibility: a security pact with Lebanon seeking assurances that the Israelis will not be allowed to use Lebanese territory and that Beirut will take measures to prevent the smuggling of arms and men into Syria by such opponents of the Assad regime as the Muslim Brotherhood. Shultz has vowed not to become involved in a second round of shuttle diplomacy, but he may find himself on the road to Damascus more than once to secure Assad's cooperation. Only if he prevails there will last week's success rank as an enduring accomplishment. --By James Kelly.

Reported by Roberto Suro /Beirut and Gregory H. Wierzynski with Shultz

*The two who voted no: Ne'eman and Ariel Sharon, the former defense chief who now serves in the largely powerless post of Minister Without Portfolio.

With reporting by Roberto Suro/Beirut, Gregory H. Wierzynski, Shultz This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.